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Much of the recent work in the public policy field
in Political Science has heralded a welfare

economics/public choice approach as the new "paradigm"
of the field.

A welfare economics/public choice

approach does have political appeal because

it

redefines

politics, the public good and citizenship in ways that

seem to resolve many of the problems facing the modern

administrative state.

However, the thoughts and

practices necessary to make these redefinitions and
resolutions hold are even more dangerous than the

problems now facing the administrative state.
The public policy field has opened itself up to

much of the fare of

a

welfare economics/public choice

approach because the field lacks

a

history guided by

more than just a case-study approach.

This work

attempts to develop a history of public policy in the
v

United States that is guided by an understanding of the
relations between the public sphere and the private
sphere.

Such an examination provides insights into the

nature of guiding approaches developed in the United

States to deal with the problems of

a

federal government

with immense responsibilities for, yet, relatively weak

powers in, the private sphere.

Each of the approaches

taken by representatives and administrators at the
federal level from 1883 to 1969 had its flaws.

Yet,

compared with a welfare economics/public choice
approach, each previous approach maintained a commitment
to good politics,

to the public good and to citizenship.

The historical examination of past policy

approaches helps reveal both the appeal and the danger
of a welfare economics/public choice approach to public

policy.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The Public Good and Public Policy
In the last fifteen years scholars and

practicioners of public policy in the United States have
been lured by the sirens of a welfare economics/public
choice approach to public policy.

In the public

administration literature, the policy literature and the
policy analysis literature the sirens have warned that
past policy approaches taken by the federal government
to solve social ills and promote social equity failed,

and failed dangerously. [ 1]

The previous forms of

intervention into the private sphere by government have
been accused of wrecking the economy, fostering civil

disturbances and weakening the social fabric of the
United States.

Indeed, the sirens claim that the

legitimation crisis of the 1960s and the 1970s was not
so much the product of institutionalized racism, nor of

the Viet Nam War, nor of the Nixon presidency nor of a

rejection of American mores, but was, instead, the

product of the techniques of public policy.

The sirens,

of course, do more than warn of danger, they offer a new

approach and a new set of techniques which will, they
1

promise, secure a strong economy, restore faith in

government action and protect citizens from the

deliterious effects of the private economy.
I

have little doubt that many of the techniques and

models advocated by those who support

welfare

a

economics/public choice approach will be adopted by

policy makers in the United States.
grave doubts about the effects

a

I

have, though,

welfare

economics/public choice approach will produce on the
political life in the United States.

The assumptions

made by this approach about human nature, the public
good and good politics portend the depolit icizat ion of

government and society in the United States.

make such a claim lightly.

I

do not

The methods of intervention

in the private sphere by government establish practices

and create concepts which influence the thoughts and

actions of citizens.

As the Founders understood, good

government is predicated upon good citizens, but good
government also has a responsibility to nuture good
citizens.

A public policy approach which ignores the

connection between good government and good citizens is
dangerous.

A public policy approach which isolates

citizens in the policy process, encourages unreflective

behavior by citizens and endorses "homo economus" as the
ideal citizen is dangerous.

A public policy approach

which denigrates the ability of citizens to come
together in public forums and to rise above selfinterest in the pursuit of the common good is dangerous.

Methods
I

want to expose these dangers, which are the

dangers of the depol i t icizat ion of public policy at the
hands of
I

a

welfare economics/public choice approach, but

also want to explore why past policy approaches have

encouraged this depoliticization of public policy.

In

reviewing the history of public policy in the United
States,

I

found (and/or constructed) four federal

approaches to public policy since the 1880s.
"approach" to public policy

I

mean

a set of

By an

techniques,

structures and concepts which guide government officials
as they are forced to make interventions in the private

sphere.

Each approach that

I

have discerned makes

assumptions about human nature, good politics and the
public good which guide and justify the actions taken by
the government under that approach. [2]

As we shall see, each approach taken since the
1880s has been a response to the failure of previous

approaches to respond successfully to new political,
economic and/or social developments.

Each approach also

4

generated problems which could only be handled by moving
outside the boundaries which determined that approach's

selection of techniques for intervention in the private
sphere.
it

Rarely does an approach die outright.

Rather

survives in some areas, but is supplanted in most

areas of government intervention by a new dominant
approach.

From the 1880s to the 1970s, the history of public

policy in the United States has been marked by four
approaches to government intervention in the private
sphere.

First, beginning in the 1880s the federal

government adopted a regulatory approach to intervention
in the

private sphere.

Second, without abandoning the

regulatory approach, the federal government, in response
to the Great Depression, accepted responsibility for

steering the economy and for guaranteeing decent living

standards for all citizens.

The myriad of approaches to

these new responsibilities during the New Deal makes the

New Deal approach hard to label, but the emphasis on
social responsibility by the federal government

separates this era from the regulatory movement and

I

have chosen to call it the social responsibility

approach.

Third, following the Second World War, the

federal government attempted to fulfill the promises of
the New Deal with the scientific-planning approach.

Fourth, in the 1960s a participation approach was

slapped on top of the increasingly deficient scientific-

planning approach.
It

is my argument

in this work that each of these

previous approaches, although containing serious flaws,

maintained

a

commitment to good politics, the public

good and good citizenship.

We need to rethink these

past approaches so that we can find the moments of truth
and of insight that each approach offers.

We need to be

aware of the deficiencies of each approach so that

better policies can be made in the future.

We need to

beware those approaches which sacrifice politics, the

public good and good citizenship to the single banner of
efficiency.

Organizat ion
The depolit icizat ion of public policy at the hands
of a welfare economics/public choice approach is the

thread which binds this work together.

I

use the term

"depoliticization" to signify the de-moral izat ion of
both citizen and citizens: the political being and the

political body.

Political life is

a

way of being in the

world which has been celebrated periodically in the
history of humans and squashed quite easily, though not

completely, for much longer periods.

In the literature

of public policy there is far too little discussion of

the connection between policy and good politics and

between policy and good citizenship.

These connections

need to be explored if the study of public policy is to

make lasting and fruitful contributions to the human
condition.
In Chapter I,

"The Anti-Political Character of a

Welfare Economics Approach to Public Policy,"

I

critique

the assumptions about human nature that welfare

economics/public choice advocates hold.
four chapters

I

In the next

began the examination of the four

approaches to public policy practiced from the 1880s to
the 1970s.

In Chapter VI,

"The Why of a Welfare

Economics/Public Choice Approach to Public Policy,"

I

present the case for the welfare economics/public choice

approach by examining the flaws of the previous
approaches.

In Chapter VII,

Public Policy,"

I

"The Depolit icizat ion of

illustrate the conceptual weaknesses

and practical dangers of a welfare economics/public

choice approach to public policy.

ENDNOTES
1. My criticisms of a welfare economics/public
choice approach to public policy are aimed most
specifically at works by Vincent Ostrom and Charles L.
Schultze: Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in
American Public Administration (University. Alabama:
Alabama University Press, 1974); Charles L. Schultze,
The Public Use of Private Interest (Washington D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1977); Allen V. Kneese and
Charles L. Schultze, Pollution, Prices and Public Policy
(Washington D.C. The Brookings Institution, 1975).
I
am more leary of holding other advocates of a welfare
economics/public choice approach knowingly responsible
for the depolit icization of public policy which such an
approach encourages. Ostrom and Schultze, though, are
both politically astute scholars and cannot claim
ignorance of the political benefits and costs of the
model they endorse.
:

2. I make no claim that this is the only possible
construction of previous policy approaches. Other
scholars may discern more complicated and sophisticated
patterns in the ways which the public/private split has
influenced public policy in the United States. My
schema is helpful for understanding the dilemmas of the
modern administrative state in the United States and, I
hope, that it is provocative enough to encourage further
historical analysis of public/private relations and the
way in which these relations determine the possibilities
for government action.

7

CHAPTER

II

THE ANTI-POLITICAL CHARACTER OF A WELFARE ECONOMICS
APPROACH TO PUBLIC POLICY

The Tragedy of the Commons
In 1968 Garrett Hardin published his now famous

parable, "The Tragedy of the Commons. "[1]

—

a

This parable

paraphrasing of an account made by an English

political-economist in 1883 -- has become the standard
introduction to works that argue for a welfare economics

approach to public policy. [2]

Hardin's parable is

useful to welfare economists because it illustrates
their conception of the individual and the dangerous

consequences of this individual in action.

Furthermore,

the parable is an alleged explication of an historical

event: the enclosure movements in England.
a fable

This is not

with talking fauna, but an, allegedly,

exempl icat ive and "true" story of humans acting in the
world.

The claims of such a story deserve exploration.

The parable reads:
The tragedy of the commons
develops in this way. Picture a
pasture open to all. It is to be
expected that each herdsman will try
to keep as many cattle as possible on
Such an arrangement may
the commons.
work reasonably satisfactorily for
centuries because tribal wars,
8

.

poaching, and disease keep the
numbers of both man and beast well
below the carrying capacity of the
land.
Finally, however, comes the
day of reckoning, that is, the day
when the long-desired goal of social
stability becomes a reality. At this
point, the inherent logic of the
commons remorselessly generates
tragedy.
As a rational being, each
herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.
Explicitly or implicitly, more or
less consciously, he asks, "What is
the utility to me of adding one more
animal to my herd?" This utility has
one negative and one positive
component
1. The positive component is a
function of the increment of one
animal.
Since the herdsman receives
all the proceeds from the sale of the
additional animal, the positive
utility is nearly +1.
2. The negative component is a
function of the additonal overgrazing
created by one more animal. Since,
however, the effects of overgrazing
are shared by all the herdsmen, the
negative utility for any particular
decision-making herdsman is only a
fraction of -1.
Adding together the component
of partial utilities, the rational
herdsman concludes that the only
sensible course for him to pursue is
to add another animal to his herd.
And another.... But this is the
conclusion reached by each and every
rational herdsman sharing a commons.
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is
locked into a system that compels him
to increase his herd without limit
Ruin is
in a world that is limited.
all men
which
toward
destination
the
best
own
his
pursuing
each
rush,
interest in a society that believes
in the freedom of the commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to

—

10

all. [3]

(original emphasis)

The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons

Within the parable is a clear description of the
individual according to welfare economists.
Individuals,

including herdsmen, are "rational" beings

who seek to maximize their individual economic gains.
Individuals, as economic self-maximizers

,

lack the

ability to perceive correctly interests greater or other
than their own individual and specific economic
interests.

Being incapable of, or at least retarded in,

determining interests other than their own economic
interests,

individuals are denied the political ability

of communicating and discussing political issues in a

forum where the pubic good (as opposed to the summation
of private interests) might be determined.

Individuals

are cast as economic and atomistic creatures, not as

political and social beings.
If this is indeed a true picture of human nature

then one is prompted to ask why the commons originated

and how they were maintained before the enclosure

movement.

No precise explanation of the origin of

commons is offered in the parable, but one is suggested
by the parable's direct answer to how commons were

11

maintained.

The parable states, "Such an arrangement

may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because
tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of

both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of
the land." [4]

Simply, each individual was earnestly

pursuing economic self-maximization in the commons, but
the ill effects were constrained by warring neighbors,

roaming villains and natural disasters.

Maintenance of

commons, then, was the result of the whims of human

nature and the caprice of nature.

The origin of the

commons also must, then, be the result of whim, caprice
and chance.

maximizers

Surely, economic and atomized self-

—

with narrow and short-term world views who

are devoid of political and social skills

—

must have

simply lucked into the commons arrangement.
The parable, having presented such a sparse view of

human nature, must ignore evidence that the users of

commons were also responsible for the maintenance of
commons.

A vast array of anthropological studies have

shown how even the most primitive tribes have

sophisticated social, religious and political practices
which maintain their commons. [5]

These practices may

not be acceptable to modern citizens, but the practices

do illustrate that members of these tribes, as well as

English herdsmen, were not merely economic creatures who

12

were constrained from destroying their commons by the

whims of other humans and the caprice of nature.
Indeed, the English commons were not enclosed

because they were an agricultural failure or because

pasture land was overgrazed.

From the thirteenth

century to the sixteenth century enclosures were carried
out by the heads of baronies for the creation of parks

and to secure land surrounding their homes. [6]

This

estate-building by the aristocracy was usually

accomplished without remuneration to the yeomanry.

The

aristocracy may have displayed prestige and security

motives in these enclosures, but economic motives were,
at best,

unimportant.

After 1600 an economic motive for

the enclosure of commons did appear.

Commons were

enclosed to provide the vast acreage necessary to make
the raising of sheep for wool production profitable.

Enclosure was possible because the aristocracy was able
to enlist the most affluent yeomanry to the movement.

As commons were enclosed,

large villages disappeared and

were replaced by five or six large estates: affluent

yeoman had become landed gentry.

These enclosures

forced the yeomanry off the land and created yet another
new class in England: the poor. [7]

Prior to these

enclosures some of the yeomanry were impoverished, but
they maintained access to their own sustenance.

After

13

these enclosures, dispossessed yeomen either found

market for their labor or found themselves in

a

a

building

without an exit: the poor house.
The enclosure movement was fueled, at times, by

economic motives, but the explanation of the demise of
the commons (as a result of each herdsman pursuing his

rational self-interest and thus destroying the commons

through overgrazing) was an incorrect and posthumous

apology for the aberrational economic motives displayed
by the aristocracy and the landed gentry.

This

prevaricated apology by England's blooming political
economists was necessary to explain the most dangerous
consequence of the enclosure movement, the new class of
the permanent poor.

Evicted yeomen who sought no

employment and escaped the poor house were able to

sustain themselves by relocating to areas where commons
still were maintained.

By gleaning and by using waste

land held in common in these areas, these yeomen were

able to avoid selling their labor without ending up in
the poor house.

These "idle poor" never constituted a

threat to commons, but they were seen by English

political-economists as deviants who refused to live by
the new model of economic self-maximization and who were

thus poor role models and future threats to social

stability. [8]

14

The enclosure movement did provide economic

benefits.

Wool production was profitable for those few

who owned large sections of land.

The rents charged for

enclosed land were higher than those charged for land on

agricultural commons and this also created profits for
large land owners.

New and more productive agricultural

techniques were employed more often on enclosed lands
than those on commons and these innovations surely

produced some long-range economic benefits in
England. [9]

However, the claim that the enclosure

movement after 1600 produced economic benefits for some
and the claim that these enclosures were the product of

some individuals' attempting to maximize their prestige,

security and, in some cases, profits do not prove that
the economic explanations of enclosure and the economic

arguments for enclosure expounded by political-

economists in the nineteenth century are correct.

On

the one hand, the explanation of the enclosure movement

propounded by the political-economists (the one which
Hardin accepts) assumes that the tragedy is the logical
outcome of the transcendental self-maximizing character
of all humans.

This explanation was inaccurate, but

necessary for the political-economists who wanted to
illustrate that the economic self-maximizing individual

glorified by Mandeville and elevated to the rank of

15

citizen by Adam Smith was not simply

a

vision of or

a

model for the modern subject, but was instead an

historically verifiable (and transcendental) description
of human nature.

On the other hand, the economic

argument for continued enclosures advocated by the

political-economists was a result of their desire to dry
up the resources of the "idle poor" and force these poor
to conform to the political-economists* vision of the

safe and depol i t ic ized modern subject.

The political-

economists' explanation could carry no weight until the

many deviants who undermined their interpretation were
forced to accept their proper economic attitude toward
life.

The attempt to argue that the economic self-

maximizing individual is

a

transcendental construct is

central to Hardin's parable, but this construct is

simply not self-evident.

Hardin's parable assumes such

a transcendental claim about human nature

—

gaining

persuasiveness by the very simplicity and brevity of the
story -- by ignoring both anthropological and historical
evidence.

16

Consequences of Endorsing the Myth of the Tragedy of
the
"
Commons
Despite these serious flaws,

it

is still

possible

that the parable may be an accurate description of

particular actors in particular commons situations.

Welfare economists use the parable to explain why air
and water pollution occur in the United States: the

polluter is plagued by only a small proportion of the
environmental damage his pollution creates, but the
benefit of the free use of the environment to dispose of
the pollution accrues completely to the polluter.

The

welfare economists have provided a compelling

explanation of modern air and water pollution by
retrieving Adam Smith's vision of the individual as an
economic self-maximizer with accurate knowledge only of
his own passions and by applying this vision to both the

modern corporation and the modern individual.

It

is not

the modern corporation that is demeaned in this view,

but rather the quality and character of humans.

this view of the modern individual, how is

it

Given

possible

to solve public problems created by individuals (and

corporations) pursuing and knowing only their own

private interests?

How is

it

possible to determine and

to pursue the common or public good?

Hardin and the welfare economists part company in

17

answering these questions.

Hardin, exhibiting Hobessian

colors, suggests the necessity of a scientific-

administrative elite to determine and enforce the public
good.

The individual pursuit of economic interests

would be blunted by administrative laws and

constructively rechanneled by a paternalistic
technocratic elite.

How this elite would be selected

and how it would maintain its allegiance to an

acceptable interpretation of the public good are

questions Hardin does not answer.

How would individuals

in society (previously known as citizens)

rise above

their channeled pursuit of self-interest and select

technocratic guardians who have everyone's best
interests in mind?

How would expertise in scientific

issues provide a moral framework within which allocation

decisions could be made?

Why would individuals who are

in essence self-maximizers accept the decisions of

individuals whose only claim to legitimacy is a

scientific background and a claim to moral superiority?
Such questions cannot be answered when one's conception
of the individual estranges the individual from

knowledge of interests greater or other than his own.
The advocates of a welfare economics approach to

public policy avoid the inconsistencies of Hardin's
solution.

Individuals will not determine the public

18

good, because the concept of the public good is a
myth

and the public good is, therefore, not accessible.
is accessible is the summation of all

What

individual

interests in society, and this summation of interests
will replace the false ideal of the public good with the

empirical reality of the "public interest."

The

calculation of the "public interest" does not depend
upon the ability of humans to act ethically or morally.
Nor does it depend upon the ability of humans to

communicate their interests to each other and upon
reflection posit
interests.

a

"good" greater than individual

The calculation of the "public interest,"

then, does not rely on either democratic or republican

forms of government.

For both forms ultimately must

rest upon the virtue of citizens and upon the greater

insights of intersubject ive communication in democratic
forums. [10]

Indeed,

individuals who act ethically

and/or who try to understand and represent interests

other or greater than their own interests "artificially"
skew the results in the calculation of the "public
interest."

Proper calculation depends upon proper

behavior: economic maximization (at all costs!). [11]

According to welfare economists, the dangers posed
to common resources by self-maximizing behavior, as well
as the deleterious effects of ethical and political

19

action on the calculation of the "public interest

can

be managed by creating the proper incentive structures
in society.

To control pollution of common resources,

all that is required is a system of effluent fees that

force manufacturers to "cost in" their use of common

resources. [12]

Adam Smith's vision of the individual

was not incorrect; what was misunderstood by Smith was
the role that public policy must play in ensuring that
the individual pays the full cost of his economic

activities and in ensuring that the individual will
"live up" to Smith's meager vision.

Once one has accepted Smith's model of the
individual, the solutions prof erred by the advocates of
a

welfare economics approach to public policy seem

internally consistent.

The welfare economics model

needs no bureaucratic elite with the abilty to determine
the public good.

If the summed preferences of

individuals illustrate

a

preference for industrial

production over clean rivers or

a

preference for plastic

trees over natural trees, then so be it. [13]

It

is not

the role of the bureaucrat to determine the final

outcome of public policies, only to determine the proper
incentives which will produce the outcome which the

aggregation of individual preferences has indicated.
The problem facing welfare econom)cs advocates is the

20

acceptance of this model of the individual and of the
"public interest" by policy makers and by the public.
The problem, then,

is to convince the populace of the

"social" benefits of giving up on political thought and

action and replacing political life in the United States

with pure economic behavior.

The allure of Hardin's

parable for welfare economists now becomes clearer.

For

the parable posits this model of the individual in all

times and in all places.

An accurate understanding of

the political nature of human nature can become

unnecessary if only the proper (read welfare economic)
vision of the individual can be produced.
The transcendental implications of the parable's

description of humans are important for

a

welfare

economics approach because so much must be sacrificed to

produce and maintain this vision of the individual.

As

we have seen, the welfare economics model of humans must

reject:

(a)

the ability of humans to know interests

greater or other than their specific individual
interests and, thus, their ability to act ethically and
morally, and (b) the ability of humans to communicate

intersubject ively to determine the public good and thus
their abiltiy to participate in either democratic or

republican forms of government.

The concept of the

public good must be abandoned because the demoralization
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and depoliticization of humans make the public good

unattainable.

Inividuals must be emptied of all the

virtues and abilities that form the bond between
politics and the public good.

Why such a mortal sacrifice of the political nature
of humans is acceptable to proponents of a welfare

economics approach to public policy will become clearer
in the following chapters.

predominant approaches to

For each of the four

public policy which preceded

the welfare economics approach failed to make such a

sacrifice and, also, failed to achieve the political and
economic promises that each had offered.

Each previous

approach had relied on politics, the concept of the
public good and enlightened political citizens to
achieve their policy goals.

In order to avoid the

failures of past approaches the welfare economics

approach is willing to sacrifice politics, the concept
of the public good and the political citizen in favor of

economics, the "public interest" and the economical
consumer.

Why such

a

model of society and of the hollow

individual is now offered up for public consumption can
best be answered by first examining the four previous

policy approaches and why each one failed to deliver its
political and economic promises.

.
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CHAPTER III
THE REGULATORY APPROACH: 1883-1933

The Beginnings of Modern Public Policy

Two legislative enactments of the 1880s marked the

beginning of modern public policy.

The first, the

Pendleton Act of 1883, provided the rudiment of

a

professional and rationalized federal civil service.
The second, the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887,

created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) which

established

a

precedent for future government

intervention in the private economy and served as model
for the administrative structure of subsequent

independent regulatory agencies.

Neither Act produced

the results sought by their respective advocates until
the first decade of the twentieth century, but both Acts

proved crucial in setting boundaries for the development
of modern public policy in the United States.

The Pendleton Act and the Moral Character of Public
Employees

The Pendleton Act was not

a

piece of legislation

that was swiftly and haphazardly patched together in

response to President Garfield's assassination by
25
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frustrated office-seeker denied Republican spoils.

Garfield's assasination did prove instrumental in
provoking a public outcry against the spoils system and
in prodding a reluctant Congress to take some sort of

action, but careful research and sophisticated

legislative proposals preceded the Pendleton Act by more
than a decade.

In 1868, Congressman Thomas A. Jenckes

sponsored a report on the civil service procedures of
China, Prussia, France and England. [1]

In 1871,

President Grant appointed George William Curtis,

a

proponent of civil service reform and an admirer of the

Northcote-Trevelyan civil service reform in England, as
chairman of a Civil Service Commission.

[

2

]

Grant's

Commission was refused appropriations by the Congress in
1873 and slowly and quietly died, but not before it had

produced detailed procedures and laws for a civil
service based on competitive examinations, security of
tenure and political neutrality .[

3

]

By 1881, the

National Civil Service Reform League, with George

William Curtis as President, was formed after meetings
of numerous state and city reform associations. [4]

The target of these reformers was the spoils
system.

While they were interested in producing economy

in government by securing more competent public

employees, their distaste for the spoils system centered

]
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upon the lack of honesty and morality exhibited by

public employees selected on the basis of their

connections with the political party in power.

Dismayed

by the avarice and illegalities of individuals who

sought public employment for purely economic gain, the

reformers proffered

office

—

a

view of political men in public

moral economic men

—

who could counter the

ill effects of amoral economic men in the private

sphere. [5]

Economic considerations were not

unimportant: corruption and incompetence were costly and

businessmen were dissatisfied with the waste and
inconsistency of performance and judgement diplayed by

patronage appointees .[ 6 ]

Leonard

D.

White has also

suggested that another motivation for reform was "...
the concern of thoughtful men over the prostitution of
the party and the weakness of the executive power. "[7]

Such concerns may have motivated

Woodrow Wilson included, but

it

a

few reformers,

is clear that these

conserns were far from primary for most ref ormers

.

[

8

Nor was the demand for a businesslike approach to

government a source of reform zeal, for business methods
of recruiting,

selecting and promoting were also

underdeveloped and lagged behind the federal government
for decades after the Pendleton Act.

The primary objective of the civil service
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reformers was the creation of mechanisms which would
select moral and competent public employees and would

allow these employees to remain free from partisan
intrusions that would threaten moral and competent

performances.

The Pendleton Act of 1883, drawn up by

the New York Civil Service Reform Association in 1881,

contained such mechanisms.

Certain positions in the

federal government were designated as classified

positions and were to be free from political influence.
Entrance into classified positions was based upon
success in competitive examinations.

Performance in

public office was to be the only basis for removal from
office, providing classified employees with a relatively

secure tenure in their positions.

Merit would determine

placement and advancement in classified positions and

party loyalty or affiliation was to be disregarded in
the selection and evaluation of classified personnel.

Civil Service Commission was created by the Act and

empowered to control the testing of applicants for
classified positions and to investigate departments to
ensure conformity to the Act.

The Civil Service

Commission, to ensure its ability to maintain this

politically neutral sphere of public employment, was
composed of three members, one of whom was to represent
the political party out of (executive) power.

The

A
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President,

in recognition of the executive power over

federal administration, was granted the power to dismiss

commissioners without explanation, but appointments were
to be confirmed by the Senate.

The Congress also

granted the President the power to increase the number
of classfied positions by executive order. [9]

By the use of executive orders the number of

federal civilian employees covered by the Pendleton Act
was slowly and erratically extended from 1883 to 1900.
In 1883,

14,000 of the 100,000 federal positions were

classified and by 1900 the merit systen covered 106,000
of some 275,000 federal civilian posit ions .[ 10

]

Of

course, these figures on federal employment also reveal
that between 1883 and 1900 the number of patronage

positions grew from 86,000 to 169,000.
system was far from collpse by 1900, but

The patronage
it

had given up

ground to the merit system in key technical positions
within the executive departments.

The Departments of

Agriculture and Interior, especially within those
offices which gathered and analyzed data, experienced
rapid extension of the merit system. [11]

Positions

within the Treasury Department that required technical
and scientific expertise were also quickly covered by
the Pendleton Act, and continuity within these offices

was matched by consistency in external relations with

a

30

the private economy with the passage of the Customs

Administration Act of 1890.

This Act further

rationalized the Treasury Department, much to the

pleasure of businessmen, by creating

a

board to ensure

uniform custom rates at the various ports in the United
States[12]

The number of patronage positions in the

federal government still far exceeded the number of

merit positions in 1900, but the percentage of merit

positions had doubled in the first twenty-seven years of
the Pendleton Act, and the positions covered by the

Pendleton Act were concentrated in executive departments
where knowledge and consistency were the keys to power.
By 1900 the extension of the Pendleton Act had

created a sphere in the federal government that was

separated from both partisan politics and the private
economy.

Politics and administration can never be

entirely divorced, but in 1900

it

was possible to argue

reasonably that there was politics and then there was
civil service administration.

Such a claim was possible

because the Pendleton Act provided for moral and neutral
administrators, and Congress passed laws which were

extremely detailed and which denied administrators

discretion in implementing legislation.

For example,

Congress passed very rigid and very detailed legislation
for the provision of Civil War pensions.

Administrators
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were given little discretion in applying Congress'

standards for these pensions and from 1886 into the
1890s Congress passed hundreds, even thousands, of

personal bills each year exempting individuals from the
standards set by Congress.

The denial of discretion by

Congress from 1886 to 1900 on the awarding of pensions
and the subsequent flood of personal bills to right this
lack of discretion illustrates the difficulty of

accepting Theodore J. Lowi's argument in The End of

Liberalism that one of the solutions to "liberalism" is
Congressional enactments which limit administrative

discretion by providing detailed and specific
instructions for administrative action. [13]

If

Congress

could not develop equitable standards for pensions,

it

is far from likely that Congress could establish

equitable and non-dicret ionary standards for more

complicated legislation.
At the turn of the century, neither Congress nor

civil servants encouraged administrative discretion.

Congressman saw administrative discretion as

a

delegation of power to the executive branch and they
were leary of their loss of power under the Pendleton
Act.

Indeed, Senator George F. Howe wrote in his

autobiography that: "The reform of the civil service has

doubtless shorn the office of Senator of

a

good deal of
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power. B [14]

Civil servants, by being denied discretion,

were safe from assaults on their integrity.

If there

were complaints about the effects of policy these

complaints should be directed at Congress, not at the
neutral civil service created by the Pendleton Act.

Pendleton Act had created

a

The

civil service that could be

recognized in Max Weber's ideal-type presentation of
bureaucracy.

Of course, the civil service in the United

States has never reached

a

state where it corresponded

exactly with Weber's ideal type bureaucracy

—

it

was

not Weber's intention to suggest that any bureaucracy

would correspond exactly with his ideal-type
presentation

—

but, the United States' civil service

under the Pendleton Act was able to operate behind a
facade of bureaucratic neutrality. [ 15]

Because there

was a real distance between Congress' politics and the
civil servants' administration of politics at this time

there was substance to the facade.
The Pendleton Act was important in the development
of

public policy in the United States because

it

created a civil service that was professional and
structure of administration that was rational.
features were absolutely essential

if the

a

These

federal

government was to be effective in promoting the success
of private enterprise in domestic and foreign markets.
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The emphasis by civil service reformers on moral

economic men who would be neutral administrators was not
hypocritical, but it was crucial in developing

a

federal

administration that could serve the interests of
business in the United States, usually big business,
without appearing to be a handmaiden to those interests.
In time,

the moral foundation of the Pendleton Act would

reappear to haunt those individuals and those interests

who demanded

a

purely business-like approach, rather

than an ethical approach, from government for business.

The Act to Regulate Commerce and the Commitment of
Public Employees to the Public Good

The direct regulation of private enterprise by the
federal government began with the establishment of the
ICC in 1887.

Support for government regulation of the

railroads came from farmers, shippers, paying passengers
and, even,

from some of the railroad owners.

Farmers

and shippers objected to long haul/short haul price

differences that sometimes made

it

ship goods two hundred miles than
eight hundred miles.

more expensive to
it

was to ship goods

The lack of standard track gauges

and coupling devices for railroad cars produced

increased loading and unloading costs for those who

shipped goods long distances over the tracks of several
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railroad companies.

Farmers and shippers were also

outraged at the price concessions and rebates given
large corporations.

Paying passengers were dissatisfied

with the practice of giving free railroad tickets to
favored shipping customers.

Some railroad owners were

wary of the increasing "cut-throat" competition among

railroads and desired government determination of

minimum charges for railroad services

—

a

goal that

these railroad owners had been unable to secure through
informal pooling associations of railroads.

Furthermore, the cut-throat competition among railroads
was producing a crazy quilt of unnecessary and redundant

railroad tracks across the country.

Despite all this support for government regulation
of the railroads, the ICC was, until 1904,

rather

ineffective in addressing the complaints of its various
supporters.

The most powerful restraint on ICC action

came not from the private sector, but from the Supreme
Court.

Determined to protect the self-regulating

economy (the market) from direct intervention by
government, the Supreme Court in 1893 and 1897 denied
the ICC the power to establish standard rates for the

railroads. [ 16]

The first major reform of the Act to

Regulate Commerce of 1887 was the Elkins Ant i-Rebat ing
Act of 1903.

This Act was written by employees of the
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Pennsylvania Railroad and was supported by most of the
large rai lroads

.

[

17

]

The most important provision of

the Elkins Act legalized the setting of joint rates by

railroad companies.

In effect,

by allowing joint rate

setting to be legalized, the large railroads had finally

achieved the goal they had sought with informal (and
ineffective) pooling: standardized rates that would not
be threatened by cut-throat competition from small

and/or new railroad companies.

Indeed, the Elkins Act

fulfilled the request that Albert Fink, Chairman of the

Executive Committee of the Trunk Lines Association, had
made before the United States Senate Committee on InterState Commerce on May

6,

1889 when Mr. Fink claimed that

the ICC would be truly effective only if pooling were

legalized. [ 18

The Elkins Act though, did not solve the basic

problem confronting the ICC
rates for railroad services.

in

establishing maximum
It was

impossible for the

Congress to pass legislation that would provide rigid
standards for maximum rate setting by the ICC.

This is

not to suggest that the ICC welcomed discretion in rate

setting.

Martin A. Knapp, the Chairman of the ICC,

wrote in 1905 that the ICC should not have its authority
over the railroads extended until there were clear

administrative guidelines established by Congress:
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We must begin by prescribing in the
statute law, with as much precision
and certainty as the case admits, the
rules of conduct which it is the
province of administration to apply
and enforce. The substantive law
must first be made ample and
explicit, clear and comprehensive in
its definition of legal duty and as
exact as may be in its restraints and
requi rements [ 19
.

Knapp's call for more ample and explicit administrative

guidelines went unheeded by Congress.

In 1906,

the

Congress instead passed the Hepburn Act which gave the
ICC rate-making power. [20]

Nowhere in the legislation

were there specific guidelines for the determination of
just and reasonable rates.
The delegation of rate-making authority to the ICC

completed the birth of the first regulatory agency in
the United States.

Even at that time it is possible to

discern the criticisms that would later be launched at
the ICC, other regulatory agencies and the regulatory

approach to public policy.

First, government regulation

of private sector enterprises entails a government

guarantee of the continued success of those enterprises
regulated.

If

regulated enterprises fail,

it

is not the

fault of the enterprises, but of the regulator, the

government.

Thus,

regulated enterprises must be

protected from new competition and must be guaranteed
profit in their operations.

Second,

if

the government

a
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is to guarantee the success of regulated enterprises,

the government agency which regulates must be staffed,

especially at the top of the agency, with personnel
familiar with the regulated enterprises.

Although only

three of the five ICC Commissioners can be of the same

political party, usually all five have been extremely
familiar with the railroad companies and almost all have
been extremely sympathetic to the interests of the

railroad companies.

Because familiarity with the

workings and problems of regulated enterprises is
essential for government regulation,

it

is not

surprising that regulatory agencies are so frequently

co-opted by those whom they are supposed to regulate.
Third, given the need to guarantee the success of

regulated enterprises and the need for intimate

knowledge of the regulated enterprises to provide the

guarantee of success, it is necessary for Congress to

delegate authority to regulatory agencies.

The more

complicated the regulation of enterprises becomes the
more impetus there is for Congress to delegate the

setting of standards and the making of rules to

regulatory agencies.

Increased and increasing

administrative discretion by regulatory agencies

is not,

of
as Theodore J. Lowi suggests, simply one of the ills
of
interest group liberalism, but is the logical result
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government intervention into the private sphere. [21]
Fourth, government regulation of private enterprises

ensures the status of those enterprises which are in

dominant positions at the time government regulation
begins.

Large railroad companies encouraged government

regulation and secured their continuing dominance

in

railroad transportation under the post-Elkins Act ICC.
This same pattern can be seen in the regulation of

meatpacking companies. Large meatpacking companies
supported the Pure Food Act of 1906 because the new
standards would reduce competition from small domestic

meatpackers and would open the European market to meat
exports from the United States. [22]

European countries

had controlled meat exports from the United States by

setting health and quality standards that most United

States meatpackers did not meet.

The new standards for

meat quality that the Pure Food Act set were

a

boon for

consumers, but the standards also assured the success of
the large meatpackers who could most readily adopt them.

Government regulation of the banking industry with
the Federal Reserve Act of 1914 followed much the same

scenario as the ICC and the Pure Food Act.

In response

to the bank panic of 1907 a National Monetary Commission

was appointed in 1911 to study the value of
reserve system for banks.

In 1912

a

national

the Commission
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produced the Aldrich Plan which was written by Paul M.
Warburg of the powerful banking and investment giant
Kuhn, Loeb and Company. [23]

The Aldrich Plan, which

clearly expressed the desires and interests of the large
banks in big cities, was reworked under the direction of

Senator Carter Glass of Virginia and President Woodrow
Wilson.

The result, the Glass Plan, reduced the

centralization of private control envisioned by the
Aldrich Plan, but still managed to address the major
interests of the large banks and of high finance.

As

was the case with the ICC and the Pure Food Act, the

Federal Reserve Act secured the interests of the largest

enterprises, but

it

also paid more than lip service to

the idea of government regulation serving the public

good.

As Arthur S. Link has stated in his analysis of

the Federal Reserve Act:

What began as a bill designed to
serve only the business community and
reinforce private control over
banking and currency had
metamorphosed, under progressive
pressure, into a measure that offered
substantial benefits to farmers as
well as bussinessmen and allowed at
least a modicum of public
regulat ion. [ 24

Government regulation of the private sector, in the

Progressive Era, cannot be viewed simply as the success
of public control over the excesses and abuses of
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private enterprises.

The regulatory approach ensured

the success of large enterprises that were regulated and

allowed such agencies as the ICC to interpret, at times,
the public good as the railroad companies' good.

The

determination of the general approach to regulation and
the infiltration of regulatory agencies by those

enterprises which were regulated denies

a

simplistic

interpretation of the Progressive Era's regulatory

approach as a triumph of the public over the interests
of the private sector.

Yet, the arguments of recent historians, such as

James Weinstein and Gabriel Kolko, which claim that the
regulatory movement in the Progressive Era was actually
the triumph of conservatism and of corporate elites over
the public and the public good are also simplistic

misinterpretations. [25]

Corporate interests were served

by government regulation of private enterprises, but

corporate interests were forced to acknowledge the
existence of a public good in the establishment of

regulatory agencies.

Simply because government

regulatory agencies have not always served the public
good does not mean that the public good has lost its

value as

a

criterion for judging the effectiveness of

regulatory agencies.

Rather, the symbolic value

accorded to the public good in the regulatory movement

41

by the populace, by the government and by those

enterprises that were and are regulated has forced all

discussions and evaluations of the regulatory approach
to include service to the public good as the primary

criterion of the effectiveness of government regulation.
This emphasis on the public good is not just

a

product

of flowery after-the-fact assessments of the progressive

era which ignore the benefits regulatory agencies

produced, and still do produce, for regulated agencies.
To suggest, as Kolko and Weinstein do, that during the

Progressive Era the symbol of the public good

camoulflaged the protections and benefits provided
regulated enterprises by regulatory agencies is to

miscalculate the insights of even the mainstream
commentators of the day.

In 1910,

commenting on the

administrative consolidation of the Hepburn Act under
the Manns-Elkins Act of 1910, [26] Gustav Stickley,

editor of the home improvement journal, Craftsman

,

made

the following remarks about the ICC and the railroads:

Now the government steps in and
interposes the strong shield of the
The whole railroad system is
law.
lifted into the realm of a recognized
public service, and the powers of the
railroad officials are clearly
defined. They are in a manner
regarded as trustees of property that
in the last analysis belongs to the
whole people, and the very laws that
restrict their freedom of action in
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administering it and disposing of it,
also relieve them of embarrassment
and hedge them about with vastly
improved economic conditions that can
only result in a stronger
organization.
In effect, the law
that regulates rates puts money into
the pockets of the railroad companies
to an extent that has never been
obtained before, for it practically
insists that they shall charge full
price for services which they have
been in the habit of rendering free
to anybody strong enough to demand a
place on the free list. Moreover,
the law protects the railroad
companies from one another, for it
has practically established the whole
system as a monopoly to be carried on
under government protection as well
as supervision. [27]
The paradox of the regulated self -regulat ing

capitalist economy

—

government regulation for the

public good includes government insurance for vested

private interests

—

was evidently understood during the

Progressive Era.
The failure to grasp this paradox of the regulated
self -regulat ing capitalist economy is most evident in
the seemingly contradictory interpretations offered by

historians on the final progressive reform of the ICC:
the Transportation Act of 1920.

I.

L.

Sharfman, the

prominent historian on the ICC, concludes that the

Transportation Act "... marks the beginning of
approach in railroad legislation. " [28]

a

new

Sharfman

emphasizes that by granting the ICC the power to set
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minimum, as well as maximum, rates and by authorizing
the ICC to establish a rational and integrated national

system of railroads the Congress passed

constructive measure

n
[

29

]

a

n
.

.

.

radically

The measure was radically

constructive because the ICC was to take positive action
in promoting the public good rather than simply

protecting the public good through restrictive measures.
By focusing on the Transportation Act's positive

promotion of public responsibi lty by the ICC Sharfman
stresses the break between the pre-Transportat ion Act
and the post-Transportation Act ICC.

Gabriel Kolko, in his Railroads and Regulation
1876-1916

,

concentrates his analysis on the government's

insurance of vested private interests and concludes that
the Transportation Act was not a major shift in ICC

policy, but was instead the logical culmination of the
federal government's guarantee of success for

established railroads:
The Transportation Act represents the
final victory of the railroads under
the Wilson Administration, and was
the logical culmination of their more
than forty years of agitation and
education for comprehensive federal
railroad regulation designed to
provide rationalization and stability
to the industry .[ 30

Theodore J. Lowi's analysis of the Transportation
Act in The End of Liberalism does not suffer from the
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myopia that both Sharfman and Kolko share.

perceives the paradox inherent in

a

Lowi

regulated self-

regulating capitalist economy and underscores the

conflicting directives embodied in the Transportation
Act of 1920 when it calls on the ICC to provide (a)

integration of the national transportation system and
(b)

securement of a "fair share" for transporters .[ 31

Furthermore, Lowi correctly claims that the directives
were ambiguous, especially when implementation of the

directives was to rest on the ICC's perception of "just
and reasonable" rate setting.

Lowi rues this ambiguity

because it forced the ICC to make decisions on a case-

by-case basis rather than determining all cases by
reference to clear and specified rules.

However, as has

been suggested, this ambiguity is a fundamental

characteristic of federal regulation of private
enterprises in the United States.

The guarantee of

commercial success for regulated enterprises entailed
the sacrifice of justice (clear and specific rules that

apply impersonally to all) in the search for equity

(decisions determined by reference to the specific

circumstances of each).

Equity-based regulation does, as Lowi argues,
weaken the government's claim to authority by delegating
power to make decisions to non-elected officials who

45

appear inconsistent in the application of privileges and

who are disadvantaged in promulgating decisions where
information needed to make decisions is supplied and

controlled by the private enterprises.

Decisions

derived from singular cases also erode government
authority because government must depend on the candid
cooperation of private firms

seldom rewarded.

—

a

dependence that is

The control, by private enterprises,

of the information necessary for case-by-case decisions

provides private enterprises with a lever for the

manipulation of regulatory agencies.
Kolko's calim that the Transportation Act was

victory of the railroads over the public good
unfounded.

a

is not

The problem with the claim is that it

ignores the concept of the public good, a concept which

was and is essential to sustain an equity-based

regulatory approach.

By charging federal regulatory

agencies with a responsibility for the public good,

Congress could legitimate government decisions and
actions that worked to the benefit of each established
and regulated private firm.

Private firms, while

reaping the benefits of government regulation, could, at
the same time, deplore the costs of subservience to the

public good.

The concept of the public good served the

regulated firms by creating the appearance that there

46

was a contest between the interests of private

enterprises and the concept of the public good.

Without

this appearance of continuing contest it would not have

been possible to legitimate government regulatory

agencies which,

in

many cases, so obviously pandered to

the private interests of private firms. [32]

Sharfman's applause for the positive promotion of
the public good inaugurated in the Transportation Act is

applause for the very concept that legitimized the
rather constant manipulation of regulatory agencies by

regulated enterprises.

The concept of the public good

is a difficult concept to constrain, but constraint of

the concept was (and is) possible .[ 33 ]

First,

federal

regulatory agencies were charged with the finacial
success of regulated firms (the paradox).

Second, the

concept of the pubic good was used to create the

appearance of opposition between the concept and private
interests while the public good was actually being

subsumed to private interests (the appearance of
continuing contest).

Third, a case-by-case approach to

regulation restricts the information easily available to
regulators and to the public.

The lack of information

by regulators discourages a coherent view of the public
good.

Case-by-case decisions also make

it

more

difficult for the public to ascertain the general
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effects of regulatory policy.

Lack of information and

a

plethora of speicific decisions retard the
politicization, the self-reflective awareness and
discussion, of regulatory policy.

Nevertheless, the concept of the public good was
and is not permanently constrained by a regulatory

approach.

We have noted earlier the development of the

public good as the primary criterion for evaluating

regulatory agencies.

By reaping the benefits of

regulatory policy and offering up "sacrifices" to the
symbol of the public good, regulated firms maintained

a

context in which the concept of the public good could be

enlarged to provide a legitimate critique of regulatory
agencies for their extreme subservience to regulated
interests.

Indeed,

in the 1960s and the 1970s consumer

advocates enlarged the concept of the public good in

regulatory policy and provided the information necessary
to politicized regulatory policy. [34]

The response, by

conservative politicians, by the Reagan Administration
and by proponents of a welfare economics approach to

public policy, has been to de-regulate enterprises and
thus (a) to depoliticize the actions of those

enterprises and of regulatory agencies and

denigrate government's role
the public good. [35]

in,

(b)

to

and the possibility of,
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Equity-based regulation can retard politicizat ion
of regulatory policy, but once politicizat ion has

occurred equity-based regulation provides easy targets
for consumer investigators.

This is especially the case

when, as in the United States, equity-based regulation

has been so sympathetic to the interests and

circumstances of each firm regulated.

Furthermore,

equity-based regulation depends upon the administrative

discretion of the regulators, regulators who may also
become politicized and acknowledge

a

broader concept of

the pulbic good. [36]

Lowi's rejection of an equity-based regulatory

policy is not founded on the "dangers" of potential
politicizat ion of regulatory policy, but instead on its
lack of justice (in distinction to equity) and the

subsequent loss of authority that a lack of justice
implies for government

.[

37

]

Lowi's alternative to equity-

based regulation, a justice-based regulation with clear
and specific laws developed by Congress for strict

application to all enterprises regulated, though, is not
convincing.

First, as we have observed, the complexity

of regulatory policy is usually great.

Congress has

illustrated neither the inclination nor the ability to

handle the specifics of regulatory policy.

Second,

without the insurance of success of established private
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firms by the government,

it was

unlikely that any

measure of federal regulation would have been adopted.

Cooperation from the railroad industry was necessary for
federal regulation to begin and to be "effective."
Third,

it

is

doubtful if the federal government could

have been successful in establishing effective justice-

based regulatory policy.

Government planning mechanisms

were sparse, particularly in Congress, and the

government-induced failure of some established railroad
companies, a result almost guaranteed by a justice-based

regulatory approach, would have been perceived as
failure of the federal government.

a

Even if the federal

government had possessed the authority to create

a

justice-based regulatory approach in the regulation of
railroads, such authority would have been undermined by
the consequences.

The early history of the federal regulation of

railroads reveals that the regulatory approach in the

United States has two aspects that are joined

in,

what

we have termed, equity-based regulatory policy.

Commentators exploring the traits of only one face of
this regulatory approach, have assessed federal

regulation of private enterprise as

a

creature spawned

by private enterprise for the service of private

enterprise.

Examination solely of the other face

results in an undeserved adulation of the federal

government's role in the positive promotion of the
public good.

Only by the recognition of the moments of

truth contained in each of these unidimensional

interpretations is

it

possible to grasp how the concept

of the pulbic good is enmeshed in the conception of

regulatory policy in the United States.

Federal

regulation of private enterprises in the Progressive Era
was dependent upon the concept of the public good.

The

concept was often perverted, abused and constrained

under the regulatory approach to public policy, but the

concept was not destroyed.

Indeed, the development of

the concept of the public good during the Progressive

Era was crucial in laying a foundation of the claims of

public responsibility that would be made in the 1930s
after the regulated self-regulating capitalist economy
had crashed.

The Legacy of the Pendleton Act and the Act to Regulate
Commerce

Both the Pendleton Act and the Act to Regulate

Commerce were legislative enactments which served
private sector interests.

Yet, both Acts established

the concept of the public good within federal government

institutions and both Acts charged the federal
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government with public responsibi lty
sought to place moral men in

a

.

The Pendleton Act

sphere removed from

partisan intrusion and private sector avarice.
were helpful in disguising policies that

Such men

were not in the

public good, but federal administrators to
this day are
aware and self-reflective about the moral
position
and

public responsibility that they hold.

The ICC was

created to protect the pubic good and to protect the

private interests of the railroad companies.

The

submergence of the former does not destroy its impact on
the development of regulatory policy and the later

enlargement of public responsibility by the federal
government.

Both Acts established a moral foundation

for future federal government intervention in the

private sector.

The Acts set both the structure of

future intervention and the moral claims for future

intervention.

It

should come as no surprise that the

modern welfare economics/public choice critique of
public policy wishes to destroy the structure of

regulatory policy in the United States in order to
uproot the moral claims and demolish the concept of the

public good.
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CHAPTER

IV

GOVERNMENT ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY: 1932-1940

The First Period of the New Deal: 1933-1935
The inability of the United States economy to

rebound after three years of severe depression following
the collapse of the regulated self-regulating economy in

1929 paved the way for a new set of relations between
the federal government and the private economy.

The

policies adopted by Franklin D. Roosevelt's
Administration, however, were not guided by any one
coherent view of public policy or by any one specific

conceptualization of the relations between the public
sector and the private sector.

Indeed, one of the

greatest difficulties in understanding and evaluating
the policies of the New Deal is that there were three

distinguishable periods in the New Deal; and, in each
period, several policy views vied for dominance.

No

single view comnpletely dominated any period of the New
Deal, much less the entire New Deal era.

Despite this

lack of coherence in policy conceptualization, there did

emerge in and from the New Deal

a

major change in the

relationship between the public sector and the private
sector.

The federal government assumed direct
56
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responsibility for maintaining and guiding
industrial
capitalism and for easing the economic burdens
individuals had to bear under modern industrial
capitalism.

By assuming the role of "steering

mechanism" for industrial capitalism and the role
of the
legitimator of the social order

—

a role

previously

filled by the private economy under the "Horatio Alger"

myth

—

the federal government vastly enlarged the size

and functions of the public sphere. [1]

Put most simply,

the New Deal politicized society.

The first period of the New Deal -- March 1933 to

June 1935

—

did not indicate a course toward the

politicization of society that would later develop.

In

this period the Roosevelt Administration pursued three

distinct approaches to federal policy.

Each approach

aimed at producing economic recovery but each was guided
by different basic assumptions.

One of these approaches

was founded on the assumption that the federal

government's expenditures were responsible for the

Depression and this approach called for
such expenditures.

a

reduction of

Another approach blamed "cut-throat"

competition for the Depression and focused on the need
for government to act as a mediator and a conduit for

cooperation among industries.

The third approach found

fault with big business and high finance in their lack
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of public concern and in their inability
to plan

production to fit pattterns of consumption
and demanded
that the federal government become an
active partner in
the planning of a new industrial society.
The "budget-cutting" approach to the economic

crisis of the 1930s was not abandoned when FDR
took

office on

5

March 1933.

FDR fulfilled, at least

initially, the campaign promises that he made in
the
fall of 1932.

He [FDR] would increase aid to the
unemployed, but he would slash
federal spending. On this one point
he was specific: he would cut
government spending 25 per cent. At
Sioux City, Iowa, in September,
Governor Roosevelt stated: "I accuse
the present Administration of being
the greatest spending Administration
in peace times in all our history.
It is an Administration that has
piled bureau on bureau, commission on
commission, and has failed to
anticipate the dire needs and reduced
earning power of the people." In
Pittsburgh the next month, he
declared: "I would regard reduction
in Federal spending as one of the
most important issues in this
campaign.
In my opinion, it is the
most direct and effective
contribution that Government can make
to business. " [2]
In order to placate business,

to appease the "arch-

conservative du Pont wing of the Democratic Party," to
make good his campaign promises and to effect his own

beliefs that government could be run just as efficiently
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with greater economy, FDR submitted

a

bill to Congress

on 10 March 1933 that granted the President
the

authority "... to slice $400 million from payments
to
veterans and to slash the pay of federal employees
another $100 million.

"[ 3

]

Congress quickly granted FDR

this authority over the budget and FDR took the task

seriously.

Throughout the spring of 1933

,

FDR was

confident that the twenty-five percent cut could be
made; and all of the major federal departments were

required to come in with budget proposals substantially
lower than the allocations made under Hoover's

budget. [4]

The budget-cutting approach did not survive for
long in the New Deal, but its devotees did not disappear

altogether.

After Lewis Douglas resigned as Director of

the Budget in September 1934, Henry J. Morgenthau, the

Secretary of the Treasury, became the advocate for

budget-cutting and budget balancing.

While Morgenthau

was rarely successful in his attempts to cut the budget,
he maintained influence with FDR who used Morgenthau to

hatchet unsuccessful programs, to be the voice of

orthodox finance and to reassure the business community
of FDR's sanity.

A second approach to healing the ills of the

economy was launched on 17 May 1933 when FDR presented

the Congress a proposal for the National
Industrial

Recovery Act (NIRA)

.

The NIRA itself contained enough

different parts to avoid

a

single label.

Recovery Administration (NRA)

,

The National

a component of NIRA,

began the Blue Eagle Campaign and exempted from
antitrust laws businesses that were willing to draft
code

agreements for their industries.

Labor was guaranteed

the right to collective bargaining, and standards were
set for minimum wages and for maximum hours.

The

planning advocates in the Administration were appeased
by the government's new role in the licensing of

businesses and the opportunity to spend $3.3 billion for
public works. [5]

Even though the NIRA was many things

to many people and almost everyone could find some

aspect of NIRA to applaud, there was a coherence to the

policies of the NRA as they were carried out under the
leadership of General Johnson.

The policies of the NRA

cohered around a vision of the federal government as the

arbitrator among big businesses and between big business
and big labor unions.

Indeed, William Appleman

Williams, emphasizing this particular approach in the

New Deal, has interpreted the New Deal as a
restructuring of the political-economy of the United
States into a functionalist-syndicalist framework.

[

6

While Williams overemphasizes the completeness of the
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framework under the New Deal, the NRA
represented, in a
very unsubtle way, the syndicalist approach
to public
policy that did exist in the New Deal.
The NRA represented a syndicalist approach,
as

opposed to a planning approach, because the government
was not to be a planner but rather a vehicle through

which big businesses could plan their futures.

Under

the NRA, businesses were allowed to form trade

associations and draft their own code agreements over
production and pricing. [7]

The NRA codes were never

standardized and each trade association became a private
economic government .[ 8 ]

Rather than increasing the

federal government's authority over the private sphere,
the NRA set up a series of economic feifdoms.

What the

NRA shared with the planning approach in the New Deal
was an explicit rejection of the "individualistic

organization of economic activity.

n

[9]

As commentators

in 1934 noted:

The NRA is not intended as the
beginning of a steady encroachment by
governmental authority over the field
of production and distribution.
It
is intended mainly to eliminate those
competitive practices to which the
business community generally has
strenuously objected for many years,
and which, in its jargon is
designated as "cut-throat,
destructive, uneconomic
compe t i t i on " [ 10
.
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The NRA was similar to the regulatory
approach we
examined in the last chapter in two ways.
First the NRA
was used to protect those businesses that
were already
large and established enterprises. Second,
the trade

associations provided

a

system for maintaining prices

that had not been achievable through voluntary

agreements between businesses.

In fact,

the trade

associations legalized and institutionalized pricefixing agreements that hampered the entry of new

businesses and insured the success of established firms.
The NRA even provided a better guide to long-term

planning by big business than did the regulatory
approach by creating an institutionalized arrangement
for dealing with labor through legalized collective

bargaining.

However, the NRA departed from the legacy

of the regulatory approach to public policy in a much

more fundamental way.

While the regulatory approach

charged the independent commissions with responsibility
to the public good, the NRA left this responsibility to

the private enterprises that framed the "codes of fair

competition" and controlled the trade associations.

One

might assume that, given such control and given an

economic crisis that called into question the capitalist
economic system, private enterprises would rise above
pure and narrow self-interest if only to perpetuate a

system conducive to their long-term
stability and
profitability. This did not occur, while
each code of
fair competition contained the obligatory
denouncement
of monopoly, each code erected controls
that insured

monopolistic practices and that enlarged those
enterprises astute enough to take part in the
formulation of the codes. [11]
The NRA was a syndicalist approach to public policy

because the government provided a legalized and

institutionalized framework within which the competitive

practices of individualistic capitalism could be

deterred and the confrontational and violent tactics
that big businesses and labor unions practiced on each

other could be abated.

Furthermore, the NRA was a

syndicalist approach because the federal government

maintained little or no control over the actors in the
framework which the government established.
associations, and, to

a

The trade

small degree, the legally

recognized agents of the labor movement, became
important actors in establishing the definition of the

public welfare. [12]

The NRA, then, was not a vehicle

for enlarging the pulbic sphere, but was rather an

approach that institutionalized the privatization of
public issues and political questions.
The syndicalist elements that emerged from the NRA
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from May 1933 into the spring of 1934
did not avoid
resistance despite the anti-monopoly rhetoric
in the
codes of fair competition. Price-setting
control by the
trade associations became price-raising power,
and the

control over production became a means to restrict
production.

Rather than speed economic recovery, the

NRA's policies retarded recovery.

Consumers blamed the

NRA for high prices; small businesses accused the NRA
of

creating monopolies; workers found the labor provisions
of the NRA to be anemic, and private enterprises,

sensing an end to economic and social crisis, deplored
the NRA framework that held them accountable for the

unselfless actions they had taken.

By 1934, FDR showed

growing concern over the leeway businesses had been

allowed in drawing up the codes of fair competition. [13]
After 1934, the NRA was restructured into an

organization that renounced the use of price and

production controls and that promoted the competitive
ideal. [14]

Not that this change was successful, for

most of the major codes had been
written, and the market restorers
were never able to apply their policy
to codes already approved.
The chief
effect of their efforts to do so was
to antagonize businessmen and to
complicate the difficulties of
enforcing the code provisions that
were out of line with announced
pol icy [ 15]
.

.

.

.

The rather quick demise of the NRA
after 1934 marked the
end of a full-fledged functional-syndicalist
approach in
the New Deal.
The third approach to public policy in
the first

period of the New Deal was a planning approach.

The

planning approach differed from the syndicalist
vision
most profoundly in the role the federal government
would

assume in relation to the private sector.

The planning

advocates, most notably Harold Ickes, Rexford G. Tugwell
and Charles E. Merriam, agreed with the syndicalist

assumption that individualistic competitive capitalism
was an outdated form.

The planners also shared with the

syndicalists the belief that the private economy must be
maintained.

However, the planners envisioned the

federal government as something more than a simple

expeditor for corporate-controlled planning of

production and distribution.
government would

(a)

Planning assumed that

take an active role in the

establishment of standards for business activity,

(b)

serve to ensure that big business served public goals,
(c)

protect the natural resources (the public domain) of

the country and (d) produce those necessary goods and

services that the private economy could not or would not

produce in sufficient quantity or with sufficient
equity.

The planning advocates espoused such a role for
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the federal government not on the basis
of economy or
efficiency, but rather on the basis of ethical
and moral
ends. [16] Government would become the
guarantor of

justice and fairness and only secondarily the
generator
of economic prosperity.

It was the planners who laid a

foundation within the New Deal for the assumption of
social and economic responsibilities by the federal

government
In considering the role of the planning advocates
in the first period of the New Deal

it

is imperative to

heed the distinction William E. Leuchtenburg has made

between the shadow of planning and the substance of
planning. [17]

It

is certainly true that a fully

developed planned economy directed by the federal
government was never a likely possibility during the New
Deal.

FDR never took the idea seriously, nor did the

planners presume that such an idea could be realized to
such a full extent.

Even Tugwell, the most avid

advocate of national economic planning by the federal
government, did not wish to challenge the private

ownership of established corporations, but rather he
wished to control abuses made possible by the increased
size and power of corporations:

Collectivization was here to stay;
the only question was whether it
could be made to work in the public
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interest without actually being
publicly owned. We contended that it
could.
Most of the abuses charged to
it could be eliminated by mutual
agreement, all conforming to
established standards: but these
standards must be set, or at least
approved, by representatives of the
public, and restraint must be applied
to those who might seek profit from
others' compl iance [ 18
.

Other advocates of the planning approach to public
policy,

including Ickes and Charles Merriam, did not

even share Tugwell's rather optimistic opinion that a

mechanism of planning through the control of prices and
distribution could be installed in the United
States. [19]

The planning approach in the first period

of the New Deal did not envision a society mapped out

and controlled by levers of power accessible to the

federal government (or some combination of government,

business, labor and consumers).

Neither did it envision

the submergence of political questions by empirical data

and macro-economic tools that would assure an ever

growing-economic pie. [20]

Dreams of

a

technological

Shangri-la did not flirt before the eyes of the New Deal

planners
The planners, though, did lay a rudimentary

foundation for later planning in the New Deal and
beyond.

Within specific agencies, planning mechanisms

were established.

In the Public Works Administration
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(PWA),

ickes put together a staff that could plan

construction, cost out the price of construction,

estimate labor costs, procure equipment and
materials,
and supervise completion of projects.

The PWA also

created a tough internal procedure for assuring honesty
and legality during the course of the construction
of

projects. [21]

Similar planning mechanisms were also

established for the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) in
the first period of the New Deal as the National Park

Service acquired more than twice the area of land

previously purchased by the federal government for
national protection.
that,

Indeed, Leuchtenburg has written

"Of all the forest planning, public and private,

in the history of the nation, more than half was done by

the C.C.C."[22]

With the enactment of the Agricultural

Adjustment Act of 1933 the Department of Agriculture
became a planner of prime importance.

Not only was a

national perspective necessary to plan acreage

reductions in planted farmlands, but the county agents
had to become experts in gathering and presenting data
for effective national planning.

In the Agricultural

Adjustment Administration, the focus of activity and the
center of information was the Program Planning
Division. [ 23

]

Within specific agencies, then, planning

imperatives led to changes in what administrators did
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and to changes in the lines of
communication among

administrators.

These changes did not represent the

substance of complete national planning by the
federal
government, but they had more substance than
shadow.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

,

signed into

law on 18 May 1933, was also an artifact of
the planning

approach in the New Deal.

The TVA, a public

corporation, was designed to produce hydroelectric
power, control floods, manufacture fertilizer and aid in
soil conservation and reforestation.

The TVA was also

to engage in social experiments with state and local

governments. [24]

Planning in the TVA was not national

or comprehensive planning, for it had a geographically-

defined jurisdiction as well as functionally specific
planning responsibilities, but
a

it was

direct and substantial effect.

was not

a

planning that had

Furthermore, the TVA

syndicalist solution, but was

corporation that was "... to serve as

a

a

purely public

'yardstick' to

measure what would be reasonable rates for a power
company to charge." [25]
it

The TVA was not a shadow, but

did cast a shadow across private utility companies in

the country.

By assuming new standards for public

responsibility and public accountability, the TVA
satisfied the demands of the planning advocates.

Another component of the planning approach

in the
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New Deal was the National Planning
Board (NPB)
established in 1933. The NPB enlarged the

concept of

planning during the New Deal because, as
Barry Dean Karl
has argued, the NPB "... provided the
possibility
for

important utilization of a kind of planning
which was
not specifically oriented toward either the
budget or

toward such specific interests as transportation,

conservation and natural resources, or industry.

"[ 26

The focus of the NPB was not on the administration of

planning or the management of planning, but on research
and education.

The NPB's research arm, the National

Resources Planning Board (NRPB)

,

produced large volumes

of social science research on a wide variety of topics
to present a picture from which the priorities for

national planning could be selected.

The research was

also intended to educate the public about the necessity
of federal government activity in the private

sphere. [27]

The NPB was not an effective management

agency, and its recommendations for policy changes were
not accompanied by "... detailed programs of

administrative act ion

.

"

[

28

]

The NPB was not a

centralized planning agency nor was

it a

mechanism for

the operationalizat ion of planning in the New Deal.

Nevertheless, the NPB extended the concept of planning,
improved the process of data gathering for social
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phenomena and educated the public about the
social ills
that were a consequence of the regulated self
-regulat ing
economy of the United States. The NPB made these

contributions not from academic enclaves, but from

within the federal government with the sanction of the
Chief Executive.

With the establishment of the NPB

,

a

scientific

method of planning had been inaugurated in the New Deal.
This scientific method had not yet penetrated the

administrative structure of the federal government
(although it had made certain thrusts in specific
agencies) nor had it yet reached

a

level of self-

deception where science governed politics.

Karl

emphasizes this latter point in his discussion of

Charles Merriam:
This idea -- that in the relation
between science and politics it was
politics which governed and science
which served -- was, from the
beginning of Merriam's interest in a
science of politics and throughout
his life, the key to his fundamental
position. He supported the supremacy
of politics, the view that the
information recieved from research
was only information, only material
for use in the making of political
decisions, the "commands ."[ 29
The planning approach to public policy in the first

period of the New Deal was more than
planning.

a shadow of

A comprehensive national system of planning
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for the production and distribution
of goods based on a
rational, planning-directed administration
did not

emerge at this time, but the planning advocates
did
create some substance of planning and they did
much to
enlarge and legitimate the role of the federal

government as a national planner.
The existence of three distinct and contradictory

approaches to public policy in the first period of the

New Deal was a result of the administrative style FDR

practiced as Chief Executive.

FDR's administrative

style is important because it illustrates how disparate

policy approaches could co-exist in the White House and
how major shifts in the configuration of disparate

policy approaches were possible.

FDR's administrative

style has been characterized accurately by Richard

Tanner Johnson as "competitive."
Several themes underlay FDR's
competitive methods. The first was
his appetite for diverse ideas. The
second was his choice of advisers of
clashing temperaments and values to
supply the diversity of outlooks he
sought.
Roosevelt sharpened these
clashes by virtue of a third
attribute of his management style: he
granted overlapping delegations of
authority. [ 30
FDR did not seek policy coherence, and his

Administration did not produce

it.

FDR would often

assign two men, with different policy philosophies and

with independent power bases, to the same
task.
men would be assured by FDR of their primacy

Both

in this

policy area; and, during the ensuing months
(or years),
FDR would provide both men with sufficient
political and
administrative rope to hang themselves .[ 31 ]
administrative style did provide for

a

FDR's

diversity of

policy ideas, an invigorating rivalry between
administrative agencies and

a

centralized authority

where diverse analyses of problems and projects could be

surveyed and evaluated: FDR.
But, FDR's administrative style also had its

drawbacks.

The administration of the federal government

was far from a rationalized structure under the

hierarchical control of the Chief Executive.

The Chief

Executive could not be the sole focus of decision-making
and planning because he could not control the entire

federal administration as it was structured, and he

could not possibly handle the pressure or absorb the

information necessary to control the administration

single-handedly even
restructured.

if

the administration were

These problems were to be addressed later

in the New Deal with the Brownlow Report

(The

President's Committee on Administrative Management);
and, as we shall see, the Brownlow Report underscores

the connection fused during the New Deal between policy,
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planning and administration.

No restructuring of the

federal admninistrat ion, though, could have
addressed
another disadvantage of FDR's administrative

style, the

loss of experienced and intelligent advisers
who could
not stand the strain of institutional
"competition" in

the White House or who could not abide the
ruthlessness
of FDR when he would finally dump the less
successful of

his two primary policy activists.

Roosevelt's administrative tactics did, of course,
have political advantages.

By keeping a few

philosophies and a few agencies in each policy fire, FDR
could keep a variety of critics satisfied that their
interests were being heeded and served.

By delaying

decisions until plans had been put into effect, FDR
could test and evaluate not only the administrative

efficacy of alternatives, but also the political
reactions from prominent persons and from the pulbic.
As Paul K. Conkin has argued, one should refrain from

dubbing FDR's style as pragmatic for

it

is not the

pragmatism proffered by the two American philosophers of
pragmatism, Dewey and Pierce. [32]

Rather, FDR's style

reflects a politically practical approach that guards

political power at the expense of administrative economy
(as opposed to efficiency) and of a coherent

conceptualization of policy.
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FDR's administrative style, with its
encouragement
of diverse opinions and tactics and
with its sudden
shifts in policy approaches, is partly
responsible for
the variety of interpretations that have been
made of
the policy precepts and policy effects during
the New
Deal.

Simply put, the diversity of approaches and the

shifts in approaches make

it

possible to find some

evidence to support diverse, even contradictory, views
of the New Deal.

If

one emphasizes the orthodox

financial push in the first period of the New Deal, one
can certainly make the claim that the early New Deal was
a

continuation of the conservative politics of FDR's

predecessors and that FDR's attack on big business from
1935 to 1940 was a move toward the radical left. [33]
If,

as William Appleman Williams does, one focuses on

the NRA and the New Deal attempt to bring labor into a

permanent bargaining arrangement with business, then

it

is possible to assert that the New Deal,

was

in general,

the completion of a functional-syndicalist framework
that was initiated during the Progressive Era. [34]

Williams'

interpretation minimizes the shift of 1935 by

discounting FDR's attack on big business as the rhetoric
of a campaigning politician.

Rexford G. Tugwell

emphasizes the planning possibilites available in the
AAA,

the PWA and the CCC, and Tugwell views FDR's
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assault on big business in 1935 as

diverted attention from
a shift that

a

I

sideshow which

major shift in public policy,

rejected planning approaches and embraced

conservative economic phi losophy

While

a

.

[

a

35

do not dispute that elements of orthodox

finance and syndicalism were important during the early

New Deal and that elements of both of these approaches
were maintained throughout the New Deal, the shift in
1935 can neither be dismissed as a purely rhetorical

shift nor can it be interpreted as a move to the radical

Tugwell's interpretation overemphasizes the

left.

rejection of planning from 1935 to 1940, but his

analysis that the 1935 shift by FDR concealed

conservative economic philosophy

is,

a

in general,

correct

The Second Period of the New Deal; 1935-38

—

The second period of the New Deal
the spring of 1938

—

June 1935 to

was a time of ascendance for the

Brandeis-Frankf urter group.

After the abuse showered on

FDR's Administration at the annual meeting of the United

States Chamber of Commerce in May 1935, FDR found the

policy approach of the Brandeis-Frankf urter group to be

personally and politically sat isf ying

.

[

36

]

Louis D.
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Brandeis and Felix A. Frankfurter did not
view the large
corporation as an essential feature of the modern
age.

Large corporations, with their vast economic,
social and

political power, undermined the classical model of the
market and endangered the democracy which Brandeis and
Frankfurter viewed as dependent upon that model.

The

role of government was to maintain competitive

capitalism by dismantling economic enterprises which

dominated markets and thus prevented the efficient,
honest, but unplanned, distribution of goods in society.

Government intervention in the private sphere was
necessary, but only to prevent the aberrations of

monopoly or oligopoly.

The policy approach of the

Brandeis-Frankfurter group offered FDR the chance to
reduce the management demands imposed by planning,

(a)

(b)

reduce government involvement in the private economy,

especially the NRA, and

(c)

the 1936 elect ion. [ 37

Furthermore, the Brandeis-

]

Frankfurter approach tapped

develop

a

a

campaign theme for

traditional base of the

reformist movement in the United States -- the

opposition to large economic units and

a

fundamental

belief in the benefits of open competition

—

which FDR

could embrace without flinching.
The idea that individual freedom, political rights
and social justice were accessible only in a competitive
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capitalist economy was, of course, not new.

Nor was the

belief that government regulation was necessary
to

prevent monopolies and to maintain standards of
honesty
in business a fresh idea.

During the Progressive Era

there had been a split between progressives over the
role of large corporations in society.

This split was

most obvious in the 1911 Presidential campaign in the

rhetoric of Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt

.[

38

Wilson's "New Freedom" campaign was an appeal to the
progressives who distrusted the large corporations.
Theodore Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" campaign accepted
the large corporations as a given and promised a closer

relation between the federal government and big
business.

The conflict between the Brandeisians and the

planners during the second period of the New Deal was a
rematch of this earlier row.
To the planners, the Brandeis-Frankf urter approach
to the private sphere diminished the role of planning

and reduced the government's reponsibility for social
justice.

By concentrating on an anti-trust method of

regulating the economy, the Brandeisians were ignoring
three points that the planners deemed crucial.

First,

economic prosperity was possible only if, in certain
industries, large corporations prospered.

Second, the

failure of the market system to distribute goods
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effectively and efficiently when large corporations

dominated markets made government control and
planning
essential for

a

prosperous economy.

Third, government

control and planning could allow the government to
insure economic security for individuals and to

redistribute wealth to provide for equality of

opportunity -- the planners' ideal of social
justice. [39]

The planners saw the Brandeisians as

advocates of a conservative economic philosophy because
the Brandeisians would limit government to limiting the

development of large corporations.

The public sphere

would not be expanded and social justice would be left
to the machinations of the private economy.

The Brandeisians were not opposed to government

employment and government relief during economic
emergencies.

They were opposed to the permanent

establishment of such government agencies, though, and
they encouraged reliance on private enterprise as the

solution to the economic crisis even as they railed
against the dangers of large corporations.

The

legislative enactments of 1935 did create government
respons ibl i ty for the economic conditions of citizens,
but the responsibility was diluted in the case of Social

Security legislation and

it was

qualified in the case of

federal employment of the unemployed, the Works Progress
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Administrat ion.
The Social Security Act of 1935 established
a

permanent role for the federal government in
protecting
individuals from one of the "side-effects" of
competitive capitalism: the poverty of the elderly who
had worked during most of their lives.

The Act expanded

the concept of federal government responsibility
for the

welfare of individuals and expanded the federal

government's intervention in the private economy at the
expense of private insurance and retirement plans.
Social Security Act, though, was far from

The

a

comprehensive package of protection for the individual
or family that was suffering from the systemic crises

encountered in the economy.

Indeed, the Committee on

Economic Security, the drafters of the Social Security
Act, worked independently of the Federal Emergency

Relief Administration (FERA) which was engaged during
1934 in planning for a works program.

Although there

were contacts between the Committee on Economic Security
and the planners in FERA, attempts at coordination

between the two were not successful.

Institutional

rivalries between the two planning agencies were fueled
by FDR's competitive management style, and the rift

between the two agencies was deepened by the distinct

policy views held in each agency. [40]

The Committee on

Economic Security, chaired by Francis Perkins
(a member
of the Brandeis group), did not wish to
become

affiliated with an organization advocating

a

permanent

structure of federally supported work relief. [41]

The

planners at FERA accepted the importance of social
security legislation, but they did not believe that

it

addressed the more pressing issue of the unemployed
employable. [42]

Thus,

it was not

only political

considerations that produced the piecemeal approach to
social welfare initiated by the Social Security Act.
The piecemeal approach was due to a difference between

policy approaches and grand visions of the good society
within FDR's Administration.

The Social Security Act

was a victory for the Brandeisians because

it

expanded

the concept of social responsiblity without offering a

comprehensive package of protection for citizens that
would demand a vast expansion of the federal
government [43
.

The failure of the Social Security Act to secure

more comprehensive protection for the economic fortunes
of citizens was not the only factor which served to

dilute the expanded concept of social welfare.

The

funding for Social Security was drawn from payments by

workers with matching payments by employers .[ 44 ]

This

taxation on the workers was highly regressive because
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all wages were taxed proportionally
under a low ceiling

figure.

Furthermore, the Act was not even comprehensive

in its coverage of workers.

The law denied coverage to numerous
classes of workers, including those
who needed security most: notably
farm laborers and domestics.
Sickness, in normal times the major
cause of joblessness, was
disregarded. The act not only failed
to set up a national system of
unemployment compensation but it did
not even provide adequate national
standards. [45]

The Social Security Act was conservative social
legislation.

It fit

comfortably within the designs of

the Brandeisian view of the good society.

Government

would regulate and maintain competitive capitalism while
treating the side-effects of competitive capitalism with

programs that would minimize
treatment,
sector,

(b)

the cost of the

(a)

government intervention in the private

expansion of federal administration and (d)

(c)

the discretionary powers of federal administrators.

The Works Progress Administration (WPA)

,

the

product of FERA planning in 1934, was also a setback for
the planning advocates in the New Deal.

offered as

a

The WPA was

means to get the federal government out of

direct relief for the unemployed.

Previous attempts at

government employment of the unemployed had been subject
to several types of criticism.

The PWA was accused of
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moving too slowly in the planning of
projects and also
was accused of competing with private
contractors when
plans were accepted. The Civil Works Administration
(CWA) had developed a reputation for providing
useless

"leaf-raking" work. [46]

Both the PWA and the CWA were

criticized for paying salaries to workers based on the
local prevailing wage.

practice because

it

private employment.

Businessmen objected to this

did not encourage workers to seek
The WPA was designed to address

these criticisms by spending funds rapidly, building

projects that did not deprive private contractors of
work and developing pay scales that were below the local

prevailing wage. [47]

The WPA, to assure private

enterprise that this was an emergency program, was
funded in two year increments.

The WPA was a

recognition by the federal government that

it

did have

some responsibility for the economic fortunes of

citizens, but this reponsibility was extremely limited.

The WPA employed 2.9 million workers in 1936, 1.5

million workers in 1937 and
1938. [48]

3

million workers in

However, there were still over

unemployed in each of these years.

7

million

The WPA turned out

to be an important gesture and a godsend for many

millions of workers, but

it

was not a comprehensive

program effective in solving the unemployment situation
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in the United States.

Instead, the WPA was a short-term

cure for what was viewed as a temporary illness
of the
economy.

The federal government was in the business of

production and construction, but

it

was conducting this

business at the fringes of the private economy.

Unlike

the TVA, the WPA projects could not become actors in
the

economy.

Rather, WPA projects would be designed to

stimulate heavy industry and, thus, the entire private
economy. [49]

The emphasis on the success of private

enterprises was further illustrated in the wage-scale
adopted by the WPA.

The WPA's low wages were to serve

as an inducement for workers actively to seek jobs

within the private sector. [50]

The WPA was not

a

project in which the planning advocates could take
delight. The WPA served the interests of private

enterprises by improving transportation, by diminishing
labor violence and by creating a labor pool that kept

workers healthy in preparation for their return to the

private economy. [51]

The federal government would

assume some responsibility for social welfare during

economic emergencies, but the federal government would
not be an active planner, or senior partner,

production and distribution of goods

in the

in society.

The

WPA left the Brandeis vision of the good society intact.
Despite the success the Brandeis group enjoyed from

1935 to 1937, the planning advocates had not
been

completely ousted from the federal government.

The

planners did not design any of the large scale
public

programs during the second period of the New Deal,
but
they were successful in specific areas in promoting
the

centralization and rationalization of administration.
In November 1934, Marriner Eccles was appointed
as

Governor of the Federal Reserve Board; and by February
1935, he had drafted and had introduced to Congress

banking legislation. [ 52 ]

The Banking Act of 1935, based

largely on Eccles's draft, provided the federal

government with the powers to control currency and
credit and, thus, established the mechanisms necessary
for the employment of the fiscal techniques being

advocated by John Maynard Keynes. [53]

Senator Carter

Glass, the self-proclaimed founder of the Federal

Reserve System, claimed that he had reduced

substantially the amount of government control over
private finance that was envisioned in Eccles's draft,
but the deletions by Glass were not as important as he

suggested.

What Congress conspicuously deleted
was a statement of policy Eccles had
In it he
attached to the bill.
argued that the Federal Reserve Board
should adopt policies to maintain
business stability and to mitigate
unstabilizing influences on
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production, trade, prices and
employment by monetary action and
credit administration. This looked
toward the Employment Act of 1946 and
toward avowed policy of today.
In
actual practice the Board, by open
market operations, shifts in the
rediscount rate and rare changes in
the reserve requirements, did just
this, finally bringing the supply of
money and the cost of credit almost
completely into the area of public
policy. [54
The Banking Act did not provide the government with

complete control over the banking system or over

monetary policy, but the act did provide sufficient
control for the enactment of Keynesian techniques by the
federal government.

The policies advocated by Keynes

were suitable for FDR's administration because the

policies did not require extensive planning or expansive
administration.

The federal government could guide the

general direction of the economy without threatening the

system of private enterprise and without entering into
an explicit partnership with private finance.

The

policies of Keynes would require planning and they would
necessitate occasional government action in the private
sector to prime the economic pump during recessions, but
these policies did not require the extent of planning
and the continuous activity of government in the private

sector envisioned by the planning advocates during the
first period of the New Deal.

The federal government
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could steer the economy without having to man the

engines of the economy.

The Third Period of the New Deal; 1937-1940

The Banking Act created the mechanisms of control

necessary for Keynesian policies to be put into
practice, but the mechanisms of control remained idle

until the 1937-1938 recession.
though, did not remain idle.

Planning advocates,

They attempted to

resurrect the planning approach through the

restructuring of the entire Executive branch.

The

planners had grasped the influence of administration on

policy and their proposals for the reorganization of the
federal administration were to influence the course of

future policy approaches for the next thirty-five years.
The distinction between politics and administration

could never again be made with the clarity that had been

possible at the turn of the century.
On 20 March 1936 FDR created the President's

Committee on Administrative Management (PCAM) to propose
a

reorganization of the federal administration that

would give the President greater control over the
federal bureaucracy.

The three men appointed to the

Committee by FDR were Louis Brownlow, Charles

E.

Merriam
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and Luther Gulick.[56]

The final report of the PCAM,

submitted to the President in January 1937 and
submitted
to Congress the same month, became a center
of

controversy between the Executive and

a

Congress that

was beginning to assert its independence. 57
[

]

The

PCAM's report called for a restructuring of the federal

administration that sought clear lines of hierarchy
under the President, presidential control over the

plethora of independent commissions,

a

permanent

national planning board and an expanded White House
staff.

The report was designed to increase Executive

control over a bureaucracy that had expanded in a

piecemeal fashion and at a rapid rate since 1932. [58]
However, by the spring of 1938, when FDR presented the

PCAM report in a legislative package to the Congress,

many members of the Congress believed that the
"rationalization of administration" was simply

a

rationalization for an increase in Executive power at
the expense of Congress .[ 59 ]

The proposals of the PCAM

did envision an increase in the power of the Executive,
but the Committee viewed this increase in power as

essential if there was to be responsibility and

accountability for the actions of the federal
administration.

The explicit battle over the PCAM's

report was waged as a constitutional struggle between
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the Executive branch and Congress, but the
implicit

battle was between two views of the role of the
federal

government in society.

Those who drafted the PCAM's

report were committed to government action in the

private sector to control the economy and to effect
social justice.

Opponents of the report placed their

faith in a private economy free from the interference
and direction of government.

The PCAM's report did not advocate a system of

planning that would control the production and

distribution of goods in society nor did

it

enter the

fray between the Brandeisians and the planners over the

issues of big business and monopoly.

did advocate was

a

What the report

centralized administration that would

take responsibility for economic stability and for the

enrichment of the lives of

c

i

t

izens

.

[

60

This social

]

responsibility by government would be possible only if
planning and scientific study became fused with an

administrative structure that was accountable to the
people by being under the supervision of a single

elected representative, the President.

The PCAM's

report is filled with a compassion for the social and

economic rights of individuals and with

a

recognition of

the government's role in pursuing the public good.

90

Your Committee fully appreciates that
there is no magic in management
alone.
Management is a servant, not
a master -- a means, not an end, a
tool in the hands and for the
purposes of the Nation. Public
service is service of the common good
in peace or war and will be judged by
this standard.
Not merely lower unit
costs but higher human happiness and
values are the supreme ends of our
national life, and by these terms
this and every other system must
finally be tested. Good management
will promote in the fullest measure
the conservation and utilization of
our national resources, and spell
this out plainly in social justice,
security, order, liberty, prosperity,
in material benefits, and in higher
values of life. The adjustments and
arrangements we suggest have no other
purpose or justification than better
public service for our people through
better administrative management .[ 61

The PCAM's report represents a transition from the

second to the third period of the New Deal.

The PCAM's

report espoused planning by the federal government for

economic stability and the economic and social fortunes
of individuals.

The federal government's role in

planning was not to entail the penetration of the
private sphere advocated by the planners in the first

period of the New Deal, but the government's role would
be greater than that advocated by the Brandeisians

.

PCAM's report also broke from the Brandeisian vision

because the report called for the centralization of

administration that guaranteed

a

large federal

The

government.

The federal government would not be
as

large as would be necessary if the government
assumed

responsibility for the production and distribution
of
goods in society, but it would still be large enough

to

arouse the fears of those opposed to bigness in

government and business.
The ascendance of the Brandeisians in the second

period of the New Deal did not prevent planning

mechanisms from being established, nor did it prevent

a

greater expansion of the concept of social
responsibility.

The Brandeisians were able, though, to

prevent planning advocates from entrenching the

government deeply within the private economy.

The

Brandeisians did not allow the planners to become the
controllers of private enterprise or to become partners
with private enterprise.
carried out at

a

Just as regulation could be

distance from the private sphere

(within a neutral sphere charged with the public good),
so too could planning be carried out a distance.

Brandeisian influence helped create

a

The

relationship

between the public sphere and the private sphere that
made the federal government responsible for economic

stability and for the social welfare of citizens and,
yet,

left the federal government at such a distance from

the machinations of the private economy that the
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government had neither the information nor
the control
commensurate with the responsibility.
Indeed,

in 1938 the conservative coalition
in

Congress rejected legislation drawn from the
PCAM's
report and, thus, denied the Executive effective
control
over the distanced federal administration.

FDR, not to

be denied, put into place in September 1939 most
of the

recommendations of the PCAM's report with Executive
Order 8248.

This Executive Order created the Executive

Office of the President which was to be staffed with six

administrative assistants and moved the Bureau of the
Budget to the Executive Office from the Department of
the Treasury. [62]

The creation of the Executive Office

secured the President's position as the head of the
federal administration and made the Executive the center
of the federal government as the government assumed

responsibility for economic stability and social
welfare.
The transition to the third period of the New Deal
was completed in April 1938 when Roosevelt finally

accepted a Keynesian response to the 1937-38 recession.
During 1937 Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau
had convinced FDR that the cure for the recession could
be found in the principles of orthodox finance.

Government spending was reduced and the rolls of the WPA
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were slashed.

Finally,

in April 1938 FDR decided
to

accept the advice of Eccles and to use
federal spending
as a means to economic recovery.
Eccles 's approach was
straightforward.
The government must be the
compensatory agent in this economy;
it must unbalance its budget during
deflation and create surpluses in
periods of great business
activity. [63]
The appeal of the Keynesian approach to the economic

fluctuations of capitalism, as we have noted, is that

it

allows the government some control over the direction of
the economy while still allowing the federal government

distance from the operations of the private market.

The

Keynesian approach fits within the policy model that
emerged in the conflict between the Brandeisians and the
planners.

Planning would be essential and

centralization of administration would be necessary, but
planning would be done from

a

safe distance and the

centralization of administration would not demand the
consolidation or the control of private markets.
The Keynesian approach was in accord with the

vision of the good society proffered by members of the
PCAM.

The problems of information gathering and of

control of private sector aberrations could be solved by
the fusion of planning mechanisms and administrative
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management.

A profound faith in scientific
study and

administrative techniques was exhibited by
members of
the PCAM.
It is important, however, to see to
it that our arrangements for making

use of the finest and soundest
American experience and judgement in
planning for the American future are

the best that can be set up, and
further that they are meshed with the
machinery, first of administrative
management and finally of policy
determination. We confidently
believe that the universal aspiration
for economic security and the
increasing enrichment of human lives
may be forwarded by substituting the
results of careful scientific study
for uninformed judgement and
political expediency as the basis for
the formulation of governmental
plans. [ 64 ]

This profound faith was also evidenced in the writings
of Keynesians.

The relationship between the
Roosevelt administration and
Keynesian doctrine, then, was at best
one of tepid affection. On the
longer run what counted more than the
1937-38 fiscal episode was the growth
to academic power, even to academic
dominance of an indigenous Keynesian
school.
The conversion of Keynesian
public policy into administrative
routine which has been the
achievement of the Kennedy-Johnson
years was based upon the training of
a generation of economists and
students in a new set of techniques
and a new set of practical
consequences 65
.

[

Science and the scientific tools available
to

administration would overcome the distance
between the
public sphere and the private sphere and ensure
an
enlarged concept of social responsiblity.
The third period of the New Deal was

a

profession

of faith in science and scientific techniques.

Scientific administration and scientific techniques
could be harnessed for the benefit of both private

enterprise and the public.

The political liberties

derived from an open, competitive economy could be
maintained because the government was to exercise
control only from the perimeter of the private sphere.
The threat of bureaucratic tyranny from a large central

government was abated because

(a)

the federal

administration would be guided by the neutral principles
of science and (b) the selection of appropriate

techniques by administrators would be guided by elected

representatives and would be limited by scientific
certainty.
The confidence in a scientific approach to public

policy in the third period of the New Deal was certianly
not shared by many in the federal government.

Nor was

the establishment of scientific administration and the

perfection of scientific techniques completed during
FDR's tenure as President.

A structure for scientific

administration had been proffered, though, and the
acceptance of Keynesian techniques in both government
and higher education spread the faith in scientific
tools.

World War

II

would provide the situation in

which scientific approaches and scientific

administration would flourish.

The federal government,

during World War II, would engage actively in the
planning of the production and distribution of goods,
increasing the opportunities for scientific experiments
in planning,
II

but the federal government after World War

would quickly return to the perimeter of the private

sphere. [66]

The accommodation reached during the third period
of the New Deal between the Brandeisian vision of the

good society and the planners' vision of the good

society determined the relationship between the public
sphere and the private sphere for the next thirty-five
years.

Even the issues omitted in the accommodation

between the two policy approaches would remain issues of

contention far into the future.

The issue of bigness in

private enterprises was not resolved in the
accommodation, and this resulted in an anti-trust

program that can be characterized, at best, as
schizophrenic
The accord reached in the third period of the New
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Deal

—

the scientifc approach to public policy

crucial in establishing

a

—

was

federal government that could

assume responsiblity for the machinations of the
private

economy even as the government kept its distance from
the private sphere.

The federal government accepted the

responsibility for maintaining the private economy and,
at the same time,

for protecting citizens from the worst

side-effects of the private economy.

The federal

government became the steering mechanism for the economy
and the legitimator of the social order.

Success in

either one of these roles would be difficult enough from
the perimeter of the private sphere.

Success in both

roles at once, even with science, would be, at best, a

tightrope act.
was on.

The scramble for scientific solutions
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CHAPTER

V

THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO PLANNING:
1946-1969

The Dilemma P osed by the Employment Act of
1946
The Employment Act of 1946 was both a cogent

articulation of the public policy model that emerged in
the last two years of the New Deal and of the
institutionalization of a scientific-planning approach

destined to undermine its own integrity.

The Employment

Act embraced the late New Deal vision of government

planning on the periphery of the private sphere.

The

federal government would be both the steering mechanism
for the private sector and the guarantor of basic needs
for the citizenry while maintaining its distance from

the basic economic decisions which private enterprise

made.

Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies would make

planned economic growth

a science that need not

penetrate into the core of the private sphere.

The

science of economic planning offered the promise of a
federal government able to foster and promote free

competitive enterprise and the general welfare.
The Employment Act institutionalized this science
of economic planning by creating the Council of Economic

Advisers (CEA).[1]

The CEA was to be composed of three
104
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members appointed by the President and
approved by the
Senate. The CEA was placed in the Executive
Office,

further acknowledging the role of the
President in

national (economic) planning.

The function of the CEA

was to provide (a) long term forecasts of
economic

developments,

(b)

policy choices and

current policies to the President.

(c)

evaluations of

Furthermore, the CEA

was to furnish the President with the information

necessary to present Economic Reports to the
Congress. [2]
The dual, but far from compatible, mandate

established for all CEA activities

—

the promotion of

free competitive enterprise and of maximum employment,

production and purchasing power

—

was apparent even

during the legislative battle over the Employment Act.
The House bill emphasized the promotion of free

enterprise while the Senate Bill stressed maximum
employment, production and purchasing power. [3]

The

result, not surprisingly, was an Act that promoted both

goals equally and never addressed the question whether

both goals were compatible with economic planning.

The

CEA was to hurdle the issue of how much intervention by
the federal government is necessary to achieve maximum

employment, production and purchasing power without

allowing that intervention to undermine the promotion of
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free competitive enterprise with the
use of four

strategies.
First, each member of the CEA was "...
to be a

person who, as

result of his training, experience,

a

and attainments, is exceptionally qualified
to analyze
and interpret economic developments, to appraise

programs and activities of the Government in the light
of the policy declared in section 2, and to formulate

and recommend national economic policy to promote

employment, production, and purchasing power under free

competitive enterpr ise

.

"

[

4

]

Economic expertise would

allow the CEA to remain above the dilemma posed by the

Employment Act.

Furthermore, this science of economics

could avoid the obvious political and partisan

explosions sure to follow government plans calling for
increased intervention into the private sphere and the

private economy.

Edward S. Flash Jr., in his Economic

Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of

Economic Advisers

,

has described well the distance from

politics which scientific expertise was to purchase for
the CEA:

From its Olympian perch the Council
could dispense expert advice with
objectivity, perspective and
independence. The implication of the
qualification for holding office was
essentially that of non-political
expertise. The Council would not
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become enmeshed in the passion of
advocacy and operation. Moreover
expertise would reveal the answers
lead to the setting of correct goals,
and provide economic standards for
judging specific policies. Truth
would harness, perhaps even overcome
but never succumb to partisanship.
True to the public administration
views of the day, economics, like
administration would be separated
from politics. [5] (original emphasis)

Expertise, of course, was to be expertise in the

economics of planning at the periphery of the private
sphere: Keynesian economics.
Second, the CEA would overcome the dilemma posed by
the Employment Act by advocating the pan-partisan

economic philosophy of fast and vast growth.

Economic

growth would (or, at least might) create a private
economy that, although still regulated in some areas,

provided

a

free space for competitive capitalism.

Economic growth would also relieve the government of the

responsibility for procuring the basic economic needs of
those who suffered during depressions and recessions.

thriving economy could produce a low tax rate combined

with increasing expenditures for domestic policies

designed to aid those who remained unemployed
of plenty.

in times

Most importantly though, a booming economy

could allow the CEA and the government to avoid the
nastiest and most precocious issues which confront

A
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society in the United States:
redistribution of income
and wealth. [6] Sustained economic
growth could sate the
citizenry and mute the issues of
redistribution of
income and wealth.
Indeed, Leon H. Keyserling,

appointed as Chairman of the CEA in May
1950, summed up
this perspective in a 1948 article which
preached the
merits of planned, sustained economic growth:

"There can

be so much for all that the removal of unmerited
poverty

will remove the threat to merited wealth. "[7]
Third, the CEA could enact the social programs and

produce the social benefits most Keynesian economists in
the United States supported.

This could be done without

an explicit redistribution program or a government

planning system intervening directly in the choices of

private enterprises because the periodic expansion of
social programs and services was one of the accepted

scientific techniques in the Keynesian counter-cyclical
arsenal.

Social programs that lived up to the promises

of the federal government during the New Deal

—

"low-

cost housing, social insurance, education, resource

development" [8]

—

could be funded by economic growth

and could be expanded as a technical response to periods
of economic stagnation.

Scientific neutrality in the

pursuit of planning for the good society was to exist

within the CEA, as

it

had in the National Resources

Planning Board during the New Deal, as
armor for "scientific integrity.
" [9]

a

protective

"Scientific

integrity," of course, was synonymous with

a

view of

society that can be best described as
"moderately
liberal."

This is not to suggest that critics of

planning and of Keynesianism did not penetrate
this
neutral facade and realize the social responsibilities

government could eventually assume under the guise of

counter-cyclical techniques designed for
economy. [10]

a

growth

Nevertheless, scientific techniques and

the promise of a booming economy could still the

naysayers and offer opportunities for social programs
that might promote the general welfare and might not

infringe on free competitive enterprise.
Fourth, the ambiguity of the langauge in the

Employment Act provided political shelters for both the

CEA and the Congress.

To empower the CEA to "promote

free competitive enterprise" and to "promote maximum

employment, production, and purchasing power" in accord

with the general welfare was to promote executive

discretion and administrative discretion.

Congress

attempted to pass on particularly troublesome and

dangerous economic issues to the Executive branch by

delegating authority on

a

grand basis.

Accountability

for CEA proposals and policies was to result from the
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CEA's inclusion within the Executive
branch and from the
faculty of economic science to limit
discretion by
limiting the number of rational choices to
one.

By

stressing the economic expertise necessary for
qualified
CEA members, the Congress intended a CEA that
would be
above politics and, thus, above discret ion

ambiguity of the language
the CEA room to manuever.

in
it

.

[

11

]

The

the Employment Act did give

was possible to place

emphasis on either the mandate to promote free

competitive enterprise or on the mandate to promote

maximum full employment.

However, discretion to slight

the former mandate was more limited than the discretion
to slight the latter mandate.

Federal policies that

subvert free competitive enterprise (or, at least, the
ideal of free competitive enterprise) are always easier

to identify than policies that undermine maximum

employment.
been

a

Indeed, since the Employment Act there has

continuing debate over what level of employment

can be considered maximum (or full) employment

Consequently, the CEA's discretion
side by the vision of
in no mass society.

a

is

.[ 1 2

bounded on the one

market economy that has existed

Explorations by the CEA past this

boundary are sure to bring indignant comments from

Congressmen accusing the CEA of transgressing its
author i ty.

Ill

These four strategies

-

scientific economics,

rapid and continuous economic growth,
hidden social
benefits, ambiguity of the mandates
were employed by
the federal government after World War
II to bypass the
dilemma posed by the responsibility of government

—

for

both steering the private economy and maintaining
the
basic needs of the citizenry. The institutionalization
of these strategies within the Executive branch
in the

CEA marked the beginning of an approach to public
policy
by the federal government that was grounded in

scientific planning.

This scientific planning, though,

was to be denied access to the information about the

decisions, costs and plans of private enterprise which

might have allowed the federal government to plan

successfully for economic growth and maximum employment.
Scientific planning might give the government

a

fair

chance to manipulate the proper fiscal and monetary
levers, and thus a fair chance to abet prosperous times

and to curtail recessions.

Nevertheless, the macro-

economic tools available to the federal government would
not be able to address all the responsibilities

government had accepted for the general welfare of the

populace nor for the specific groups within society
whose economic situations did not improve even during
the most prosperous periods.

This scientific planning
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era in

public policy in the United States

—

marked by

the scientization of economics and, thus,
the

depoliticization of economic issues[13]

—

was slowly,

unevenly, but progressively, to bring about
the

rationalization of the federal government's

administrative structure, budgeting procedures and

evaluation processes.

In not one of these areas would

rationalization for scientific planning come close to
completion, but each area would realize enough

rationalization to make apparent by the 1960s that

planning on the periphery was not going to be

a

complete

success
The acknowledgement that scientific planning on the

perimeter of the private sphere would not be a final
answer to the dilemma created by the Employment Act of
1946 was made only after scientific planning had been

tried for almost two decades and its own partial success
had exposed its deficiencies.

We turn now to an

exploration of those decades focusing on the

responsibilities accepted by the federal government and
on the rationalization of structures and procedures that

were to make possible the performance of those

responsibi 1 it ies.
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Scientific Planning in the Truman
Administrati on

Harry S. Truman made clear, soon after his
elevation to the presidency, that the federal
government
would not disregard the responsibilities it had
assumed
before World War II.
messages to Congress in

m

September and November of 1945, President Truman asked
for legislation on employment and health. [14]

The First

message called for both unemployment compensation and
for full-employment legislation.

Truman's emphasis on

the role of government in assisting in the maintenance
of a "full production peace time economy" to create full

employment parallels the thinking behind the Employment
Act.

Truman's November message to Congress asked for

a

comprehensive health program founded on the Fair Deal's
"Economic Bill of Rights."

Truman stated:

Our new Economic Bill of Rights
should mean health security for all
regardless of residence, station, or
race
everywhere in the United
States.
We should resolve now that the
health of this Nation is a national
concern; that financial barriers in
the way of attaining health shall be
removed; that the health of all its
citizens deserves the help of the

—

nat ion ...

[

15

While Truman was committed to the role of
government as the underwriter of an economic bill of
rights, he was wary of budget deficits and of Keynesian
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explanations of the acceptability of
deficits. Truman's
fear of deficits and unease with
Keynesians was
reflected in his appointment of the first
Chairman of
the CEA, Edwin G. Nourse. Nourse, an
advocate of

orthodox economics, was far more conservative
than the
other two members Truman selected for the
CEA, Leon H.
Keyserling and John D. Clark. [16] Nourse not
only

disagreed with the policy views of the other members,
he
felt that they abused their positions within the
CEA by

making political statements and judgements. [ 17
]

Nourse

took seriously the claim that the CEA was to be a

repository for non-partisan experts, and his belief that
the CEA was to refrain from political debates made him

appear to the other members to be naive.

The lack of

harmony in the CEA, Nourse' s view of a passive CEA and
an increasingly poor relationship with Truman led to

Nourse's resignation in October 1949.

Prior to Nourse's

resignation, Truman had begun to rely on the advice of
Leon H. Keyserling.

Keyserling offered an economic view

and a political stance that afforded Truman the

opportunity to mitigate his fear of deficits, to support
the provision of essential social services and, yet, to

retain his apprehension about that element in

Keynesianism which seemed to question the importance of
private enterprise and to inflate the government's role
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production of goods and services.

Influenced by

Keyserling's thought, Truman could
claim in his July
1949 midyear Economic Report that a
balanced budget
during a recession was not a top
priority:

We cannot expect to achieve a
budget
surplus in a declining economy.
There are economic and social
deficits that would be far more
serious than a temporary deficit in
the Federal Budget. [18]

Keyserling's ability to influence Truman's
economic
views (and to garner the position of Chairman
of the CEA
after Nourse's resignation) [ 19] rested on
Keyserling's

ability to combine an abiding faith in the virtue
of

capitalism and in the Tightness of big government.

Keyserling's critique of the New Deal did not find fault
with the government's use of fiscal and regulatory
policies. [20]

Rather, Keyserling argued that the

greatest fault of the New Deal was that
faith in capitalism.

it

had lost

The New Deal had forgotten that

the private sector was the sector responsible for

economic growth and that the government's social

responsibilities could be afforded (and expanded) only
because of economic growth. [21]

The New Deal had relied

too extensively on a coercive relationship with private

enterprise and had taken a dogmatic view on anti-trust
policy, weakening businessmen's faith in government and
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dampening their willingness
to invest in a
"hampered"
private sector. The government
should trust private
enterprise to establish
wage-price-profit policies that
will enhance the chances for
maximum production
and

(thus) maximum employment.

Private enterprise should

have faith in the government's
ability to enforce
regulatory policies and to employ
fiscal policies that
will also enhance the chances for
maximum production and
employment. [22] This mutual trust
can only be instilled
if there is a clearer separation
of the responsibilities
of each sphere than occurred during
the New Deal.

Keyserling's criticisms of the New Deal are,
of
course, open to contention.
in Chapter IV we saw

how

FDR's anti-business rhetoric was only rarely
coupled

with legislation which could be deemed
anti-business.
Indeed, the relief policies of the New Deal (a)
paid

heed to the opinions of business leaders,

(b)

helped

diminish anti-capitalist sentiment among workers and the
unemployed and
enterprise. [23]

(c)

supported

a labor

pool for private

Nevertheless, Keyserling's critique of

the New Deal remained compelling for two reasons.

First, maximum production and employment were dependent

upon a booming private economy. [24]

Second, a booming

private economy was possible only

private

if

entrepeneurs retained faith in the prospects for

a
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healthy investment environment
in the future; for
entrepeneurs such an environment
entailed limited
government intervention in the
private sector.
Keyserling saw the government's
role in enhancing
investment prospects as dependent
upon the curtailment
of Executive branch criticisms
of big business

and upon

an increase in Executive branch
reliance on the goodwill

and farsightedness of big business.

Keyserling's reliance on voluntarism

in

dealings

with the private economy was essential
to the framework
of government planning at the perimeter
of the private
sphere.
Government policies designed to combat
recessions in the business cycle must not weaken
entrepeneurs' confidence in the economy and, thus,

exacerbate the recession.

By avoiding direct controls

over wages-prices-profits and direct coordination of

private production, Keyserling sought the confidence of
businessmen.

The voluntary cooperation of business and

labor would be possible because the goal of government

planning (at a distance) was what Keyserling termed
"expansion economics."

Expansion economics would render

voluntary cooperation from all members of society
because economic growth would provide economic largess
for all without posing threats to "merited wealth. "[25]

The productive potential of the economy would be
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harnessed (or unleashed) by reliance
upon "...
indirect controls of taxation, credit

(i)

the

restraints, and

allocations and

(2)

labor and consumer

.

voluntary adjustments by business,
"[ 26]

Keyserling's views on expansion economics
and on
voluntarism were important because his views
shaped
Executive branch policy under Truman and
established a
boundary between the government and the private
sector
that future administrations did not violate
(without

overwhelmingly compelling reasons).

Keyserling was

instrumental in postponing wage and price controls in
1950 and 1951.

United States'

During this period of recession and
involvement in Korea, the Office of Price

Stabilization (OPS) argued for wage and price controls
to reduce inflationary pressures.

Keyserling's approach

to the problem of inflation was to impose a price

freeze.

OPS wanted to go beyond a price freeze and

enact a system of price roll-backs to prevent unfair

profits from being taken by companies that had raised
their prices in expectation of a freeze and a system of

roll-forwards to reward companies that had refrained
from opportunistic price-gouging and that were now

making unsatisfactory profits. [27]

Keyserling opposed

price roll-backs because they would be difficult for the

government to administer effectively and he opposed
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roll-forwards because they would
increase prices. [28]
Keyserling's view, of course,

rested on his concept of

government planning at a distance,

a

distance that would

be threatened by government
attempts to intervene more
directly in the private economy
to secure an equitable
price freeze. OPS action to set
price roll-backs and
roll-forwards would place the government
in the wage-

price-profit domain which was to be
Keyserling's
sanctuary for private (enterprise)
decisions.

By late

April 1951, though, OPS had won its
battle with
Keyserling and a price roll-forward policy
was

enacted. [29]

OPS's moment of success was short-lived,

however, as Keyserling managed a long-term,
but rather
strange, victory.

OPS calculation of price roll-backs and roll-

forwards was made on the basis of industry's own

calculation of cost-price data (yet another example of

planning at the perimeter of the private sphere).
Industry calculations were presented in formats designed
to retard equitable decisions and to maximize short-term

profits. [30]

The failure of OPS to provide equitable

price-cost adjustments undermined the use of wage and
price controls as

a

technique for government control of

the economy for almost thirty years. [31] Keyserling

could point to the failure of coercive action by the
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federal government in its
relationship with private
enterprise. Keyserling's claim
was strange both because
price controls were a response
to the failure of
voluntary profit restraint by
private enterprises and
because the failure of OPS price-cost
policy
was,

in

part, a failure of private enterprise
to live up to the
integrity they were supposed to
illustrate in a

voluntaristic framework.

Keyserling lost

a

battle with

OPS only to prove the final victor in
establishing a
separation of roles for the federal government
and the
private economy which would keep scientific
planning at
a

distance from the private sphere.

Keyserling's ability to maitain government planning
at the perimeter of the private sphere as
prescribed in

the last two years of the New Deal was also evident
in

the Truman Administration's role in the steel ordeal of
1951 and 1952.

In November 1951, Keyserling's CEA

presented two confidential reports to the President on
the course government action should follow if collective

bargaining between the steel industry and the unions did
not produce a contract before the 31 December strike

deadline.

Grant McConnell, in his excellent monograph,

The Steel Seizure of 1952

,

summarizes the CEA's advice:

The Council argued that "any remotely
reasonable wage increase" would be
absorbable without any price
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increase. Hence, although some
wage
increases should probably be allowed
the government should stand
against
any policy of simultaneous wage
and
price increases. To do anything else
would be to encourage irresistable
collusion between labor and industry
And as a part of such a stand, the
government should avoid being drawn
into bargaining itself.
Finally, the
government should not await the
outcome of bargaining between the two
parties to make its own position
known.
The CEA's reports constituted
a fairly forceful argument both for
separating price and wage controls
and for the active participation of
government (in the role of neutral)
in dispute settlements. [ 32
'

Three important facets of Keyserling's domestic

policy approach shine through this summary.

First, the

government's responsibility to make its own general wage
and price position known to the public reflects

Keyserling's belief that expert knowledge can serve as
tool for consensus politics. [33]

a

If both parties to a

dispute (and the general public) are aware of the
"facts," and the consequences that will emerge from

those facts, then reasonable people will reason to

consensus.

Keyserling's faith in voluntarism

a faith in experts'

is at root

knowledge and in the general

rationality of citizens. [ 34 ]

The federal government can

maintain its distance from the private economy because
rational proposals by the government will command the

attention and consensus due to the authority of
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rationality.
Second, the separation of the federal
government's
wage control decisions and price
control decisions
reveals a problem inherent in planning
in the United
States. Wage controls and price controls
were the

domain of two distinct administrative units,
because if
wage and price controls were decided upon
by one

agency,

then wage and price controls for any one industry
would
have to be adjusted simultaneously .[ 35] Simultaneous

adjustment of wages and prices was to be avoided to

prevent management/labor collusion for wage and price
increases at the expense of consumers.

Separation of

wage and price decisions, though, is not without its own
problems.

This separation of decisions assumes that the

proper wage levels and satisfactory profit levels can be

determined empirically.

The issue of redistribution of

corporate earnings can be silenced under such

a

schema

because a proper wage-to-profit ratio can be
"empirically" established, but the data from which the

empirical ratio is derived is always skewed in favor of

management and, thus, in favor of rising prices.

This

result is not due to pro-business government

administrators, rather it is the result of relying on

data provided to government by private enterprises.
steel companies refused to provide their operating

The
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figures to the OPS and the OPS staff
had to rely on
published industry figures in deciding
upon a price
increase. [36]
One can imagine the public outcry
if wage
controls were to be determined on the
basis of a union's
estimate of workers' wages. Even if an
empirical wageto-profit ratio could be determined for
government

economic planning,

it

could not be determined with the

management data available to OPS.

Government planning

on the perimeter must prevent management/labor

collusion, but it must also impede its own planning

abilities (however limited) to prevent its penetration
into the sphere of private enterprise.
Third, the federal government can be an active

participant in the private sphere, but
neutral participant.

it

must be a

Neutral participation results not

so much from the neutral ethical sphere established by

the Pendleton Act, but rather from the neutrality

secured through scientific and economic expert ise .[ 37
Federal administration, in response to the post-New Deal
role in society, justified its decisions and actions as
the proper scientific decisions and actions.

Prior to

the New Deal, administrative discretion was to be

limited by specific statutory authorization of

administrative duties.

After the New Deal, the federal

government's responsibilities were more difficult for
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the Congress to specify precisely
(e.g., the language of
the Employment Act) and administrative
discretion was to
be limited by expertise.
Scientific neutrality could

side-step potentially disruptive
political issues by
emphasizing the "reasonable" results of
rational action.
Even Truman's decision to seize the
steel industry

on

8

April 1952, after the failure of
collective

bargaining and the rejection of the Wage
Board's

recommendation by steel management, cannot be
seen as
gross violation of the private sphere by the

a

federal

government.

The steel seizure by Truman actually

amounted to little more than the refusal to allow

managers and workers to leave their jobs during the
Korean War.

The government did not fire, hire, take

profits or even examine the operating figures of the
steel industry.

When the Supreme Court declared on

2

June 1952 that the seizure was unconstitutional, Truman

immediately revoked the seizure.

The steel workers went

on strike and they did not return to work until

collective bargaining had produced (with White House

guarantees to the industry of price increases) a
settlement on 24 July 1952.

Thus, although the strike

took place during wartime in a key industry, the federal

government remained at
sector fray

—

a

a

distance from the private

distance that had been endorsed by the
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Keyserling CEA.
The Keyserling Chairmanship
established the CEA as
a vital actor in domestic
politics.
The Keyserling CEA
set a precedent for an active CEA,
whose activity would
be justified by expert knowledge.
Furthermore,
the

Keyserling CEA established boundaries
for government
activity in the private sector. These
boundaries had
been suggested during the last two years
of the New
Deal, but the Keyserling CEA was able to
congeal

these

boundaries.

Even the critiques of the Keyserling CEA

made by commentators on the left did not admonish
the

CEA for failure to take

private sector.

a

more active role within the

Rather, the criticism was that the

Keyserling CEA had placed "... insufficient emphasis on
the monetary, tax and expenditure policies of the

federal government as stabilizing devices ."[ 38 ]

The

Keyserling CEA was criticized for insufficient use of
the economic tools available to

a

government at the

perimeter of the private sector, not for the limited
options available at the perimeter.
The Keyserling CEA was also responsible for adding

expansion economics

—

a

philosophy of rapid and

continuous growth with the federal government as the

controller of the stabilizing devices
acceptable options for public policy.

—

to the list of

Expansion

126

economics was never fully embraced
by the Truman
Administration, nor was it to be the
guiding economic
theory of the Eisenhower Administration.
Nevertheless,
the theory of expansion economics
was accepted by the

moderate-to-left wing of the Democratic
Party and was to
regain access to the Executive branch in
1961.

Even

those opposed to the government activity
inherent in
expansion economics were forced to (a) rely
on and

deploy the macro-economic tools prescribed by
expansion
economics and (b) to measure the success of other
economic approaches by the indices developed by

advocates of expansion economics (e.g., growth).

As we

shall see, expansion economics would exert influence

even during an Administration that viewed expansion

economics with disfavor.
The recourse to federal government planning after

World War

II

required a further rationalization of the

Executive branch.

During the Truman Administration,

attempts were made to increase Executive control over
the federal administration, to develop budgeting

techniques which could evaluate the new programs

government would now undertake and to create planning
staffs within domestic agencies
Increased Executive control over the federal

administration was a goal of the First Hoover Commission
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(1949). [39]

Following the tradition of
the President's
Commission on Administrative
Management
(1937), the

First Hoover Commission recommended
that: (a) the three
member Civil Service Commission
be headed by one
Chairman who would also be a staff
adviser to the

President;

(b)

the number of staff units be
expanded

under the hierarchical control of the
Executive Office;
and (c) administrative assistant
secretaries to
the

Commerce, Justice, Labor and Treasury
Departments be
selected from the career civil service.
The latter two

recommendations reflected the pervasive view that
planning was now essential to good government
and that
planning was an Executive, not legislative,
responsibility.

Scientific planning could be held

in

check by the technical application of knowledge and by
the unity of command under the President.

While the

first recommendation did not prove satisfactory when it

was pursued during the Eisenhower Administration, the
latter two recommendations were enacted without major

disruptions.

The increase in the number of staff units

provided more hierarchical control over the expanded
administrative state and made possible
among staff units.

a

distinction

As Hugh Heclo has argued:

"Over

time, even the staff concept became differentiated

between pure staff (such as planners and personal
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advisers) and auxiliary staff
services (organizational
maintenance functions such as
supplies, personnel, and
so on). «[40]
The First Hoover Commission
Report
was a

proposal for the rationalization
of the planning
approach to public policy in the
United States.

Executive control over the federal
budget and
Executive Office evaluation of domestic
programs were
extended during the Truman Administration
with the
sophistication of "performance" budgeting.
Allen
Schick, in a 1966 article outlining the
three

stages of

budget reform in the twentieth century,
characterizes

performance budgeting by its emphasis on management
control
In the first stage, dating roughly
from 1920 to 1935, the dominant
emphasis was on developing an
adequate system of expenditure
control. Although planning and
management considerations were not
altogether absent (and indeed
occupied a prominent role in the
debates leading to the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921), they were
pushed to the side by what was
regarded as the first priority, a
reliable system of expenditure
accounts.
The second stage came into
the open during the New Deal and
reached its zenith more than a decade
later in the movement for performance
budgeting. The management
orientation, paramount during this
period, made its mark in the reform
of the appropriation structure,
development of management improvement
and work measurement programs, and
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institutionalization of PPB
(Planning-Programming-Budgeting) can
be traced to earlier efforts
to
planning and budgeting as well link
as to
the analytic criteria of
welfare
economics, but its recent
development
is a product of modern
informational
and decisional technologies
such
those pioneered in the Department as
of
Defense. [41] (emphasis added)
,

Performance budgeting was

a

response to the same proble

addressed by the First Hoover Commission
Report:
inadequate Executive control over an
expanded federal
administration.

Performance budgeting provided for

greater agency accountability to the Executive
Office
and installed performance evaluation techniques
which
would produce data for future planning proposals.

Performance budgeting aided in establishing

a

system of

rational evaluation of government programs which would

make possible a greater emphasis on long-term planning.

Long-term planning by domestic agencies was

accentuated during the heyday of performance budgeting
by the creation of planning staffs within the agencies.
In the Department of Interior,

a

Program Staff with

committees in the field was created in 1947.

Program Staff was to design

a

The

system for the

clarification of the Department's short-term and long-
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term goals and to improve the
means for departmental
coordination of activities. [42] The
Program Staff
proved particularly adept at defining
and clarifying
short-term goals. Which is not surprising
given the
emphasis and techniques of performance
budgeting.
Longterm planning, though, posed greater
problems
for the

Program Staff.
The Program Staff did produce a five
year plan

(1955-1960)

in 1953, but the planning reports
suffered

from those three banes of domestic long-term
planning:

imprecise statement of program goals, inadequate

quantitative techniques and insufficient research.
Precise articulation of program goals

is never easy in

domestic policy and Congress has manifested little

willingness to hone the goals of domestic legislation.
As was suggested earlier, oblique social legislation is

part of the political fare in a society where government

plans at the periphery of the private sphere.

The

problem of inadequate quantitative techniques for
domestic long-term planning

is

inherent in any society

which permits open debate over the value of human

products and human activities, and holds values that
cannot be quantified by the market.

This does not mean

that the quantification of agency activities and goals
is useless or that techniques cannot be improved.

The
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introduction of systems analysis
in the 1960s offered
an
analytical framework that did
provide planners with more
success in long-term predictions
and that produced a
plethora of information for
decision-makers. More
sophisticated analytical techniques
would not solve the
problems endemic to government planning
at a distance.
However, the planners within the
Truman Administration
had faith in the ability of scientific
techniques to
solve the problems of government planning
and they

experimented with the integration of planning
structures
into domestic federal agencies. Their
experiments
came

to a temporary conclusion with Eisenhower's
election,

but their contributions would not be lost to
the

Democratic administrations of the 1960s.

Scientific Pla nning in the Eisenhower Administration
The Eisenhower Administration did not follow the
same path toward the rationalization of the federal

administration for improved government planning that the
Truman Administration had begun clearing.

Eisenhower Administration took
parallel path.

a slower,

The
but still

The slower pace was due to a greater

belief in (a) the self-sustaining power of free
enterprise,

(b)

the dangers of big government and (c)
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the role of Congress in making
public policy.

The

inability to stake out a different
direction from the
one chosen by the Fair Deal was
the result
of a basic

acceptance by Eisenhower of the federal
government's
responsibility for private sector growth

and for social

welfare.

The Eisenhower Administration would
underscore
the Employment Act's mandate for the
promotion
of free

enterprise, but the mandate for maximum
employment and
for securing the general welfare (with
its implications
for social welfare programs) would not be
rejected.

Eisenhower's economic philosophy and the role of

government in his philosophy has been summarized well
by
Elmo Richardson in his The Presidency of Dwiqht

Eisenhower

;

Eisenhower's yardstick in measuring
the public good was economy
what
he liked to refer to as "fiscal
responsibility." A sound economy was
the shortest distance to the solution
of any domestic problem, he asserted,
and it was the nation's best defense.
The federal government's role in
every subject before the Congress
should be based, Eisenhower said, on
"the plain workings of economic law,"
that is on the common sense
philosophy of production capitalism.
He did not wholly embrace the
laissez-faire economics of the
nineteenth century, but he did
believe that the nation's commerce
and industry needed encouragement to
venture ever further. Business
mergers, in that context, were deemed
necessary and proper. [43]

—

D.
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Eisenhower praised the virtue of

a

permanently balanced

budget and forsook Keynesian
economics because
advocated government deficits during
economic

it

downturns

and it placed government too close
to the activities of
the private sector.
The federal government could
reduce its size and
could remove itself farther from the
machinations of the
private economy, Eisenhower assumed,
because state and
local governments would be able to
control the worst
effects arising from free(d) enterprise.
The federal

government would stimulate the economy by exhibiting
fiscal responsibility and by promoting a stable
economy

conducive to private investment.

The states and local

governments would be responsible for regulating private
enterprise in a manner conducive to regional and local
interests. [44]

This separation of responsibilities

between the federal government and state/local

governments seems to be a reasonable modern rendition of
the division of powers envisioned by the Founding

Fathers.

However, the Eisenhower Administration never

examined the possiblity that private capital might prove
too powerful for state and local governments nor did it

ever develop clear guidelines for the separation of

responsibilities.

The federal government removed itself

farther from the private sector, justifying this move by
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federalism" that was never produced.
The relative inactivity of the
Eisenhower
Administration was also a product of
Eisenhower's belief
that the constitutional separation
of powers between the
Executive and the Congress was not to
be ignored.

Eisenhower wished to redress what he
perceived as
excessive aggrandizement of Executive
power.
A greater
reliance on Congress for public policy
initiation
and

legislation would also, of course, relieve
the Executive
of long-term domestic planning responsibilities
and

distribute the accountability for the results of
remaining social programs. [ 45

]

It

is

unfair to claim

that Eisenhower's belief in a more equal distribution of

power between the Executive and the Congress did not
rest upon his appreciation of the constitution, but it

would also be an underestimation of his intellect to
assert that Eisenhower did not gauge the political

leanings of the dominant Congressional bloc of the late
1940s and the 1950s. [46]

The conservative bloc --

composed of Republicans and southern Democrats

—

which

controlled the legislative locks during Eisenhower's two
terms shared Eisenhower's convictions that the federal

government should prune its size and its
responsibilities.

Congress placed little pressure on

the Eisenhower Administration to extend its role in
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domestic long-term planning.
Despite the restraint of Executive
branch activity
these three components of Eisenhower's
political thought
implied, the Eisenhower Administration
could not divorce
itself from the techniques employed by
its predecessor.
When the Eisenhower Administration did
eschew the fiscal

techniques advocated by the Keyserling CEA,
the economic
growth necessary to diminish the political tempest

between rich and poor did not occur.

Administration finally faltered

in

The Eisenhower

its balancing act

between the mandates of the Employment Act

(a

tough

enough act, in itself) and the goals of orthodox
economics.

The problems encountered can be exposed by

an examination of the Burns CEA.

Arthur Burns,

a

professional economist who shared

Eisenhower's view of government/private economy
relations, was Eisenhower's selection for the Chairman
of the CEA.

Burns combined a belief in orthodox

economics with

a

conviction that the science of

economics could transcend partisan debates.
himself as

a

Burns saw

professional economist who could,

therefore, fill the role prescribed for the CEA by the

Employment Act.
"...

Burns stated that the Employment Act

expresses the plain intent of Congress that members

of the Council should function as professional
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economists, giving their views
on economic problems and
policies in an objective, non-partisan
manner.
-[47]

Unintentionally, perhaps, Burns
helped maintain the
illusion conjured by Keyserling:
economics was a science
(beyond the din of politics) which
could guarantee the
promises of the Employment Act without
resorting to the
dangerous politics of redistribution.
To promote the idea of a science
of economics,

Burns insisted on

a

distinction between framing policy

and justifying policy. [48]

The Burns CEA would frame

policy, but it would not offer political
justifications
for its policy.

A science needed no political

justification.

The illusion of one right scientific

answer to each economic problem was also to be

maintained by a change
structure.

On

1

in the

CEA's organizational

June 1953, the Eisenhower

Administration proposed to Congress "Reorganization Plan
No.

9.

n

[49]

This plan brought about a centralization of

power in the CEA conferring new powers to the Chairman
of the CEA:

(a)

operating head of the CEA; (b) sole

reporter to the President of CEA findings; and

responsibility for staff appointments.

(c)

The disharmony

that thwarted the Nourse CEA and, thus, revealed the

lack of scientific agreement on economic issues was to
be avoided by ensuring harmony through the firm
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leadership of the Chairman of the
CEA.

Government planning by the Burns
CEA was based on
the belief that long-term planning
was unnecessary,
because short-term plans to stimulate
the economy would
be sufficient to accelerate economic
growth.
Keynesian
fiscal tools would be used sparingly
and only to provide
economic stability, rather than to generate
the

expansive economic growth Keyserling
advocated. [ 50
Nevertheless, the Burns CEA retained the services

of a

Keynesian economist to analyze economnic indicators
and
during the recession of 1954 to draw up plans for
a

large public works program. [51]

The public works

program was never enacted, but its consideration by the
Eisenhower Administration is testimony to the influence
of the Employment Act and of Keynesian economics on even

the most diligent subscribers of orthodox economics.

The Eisenhower Administration's reliance on a

balanced federal budget to promote a stable, favorable
economic environment did not entail an abandonment of

established social programs to secure
budget.

In 1956 and 1957,

a

balanced federal

the only two years of

Eisenhower's presidency in which the federal budget was
balanced, federal domestic spending increased slightly
each year.

The "fiscal responsiblity" demonstrated by

the Eisenhower Administration in 1956 and 1957 did
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little to prevent a recession in
1957 and 1958.
experience, combined with a growing
commitment

This
by the

Burns CEA to ride out economic
upturns and downturn s
with minimal government activity, was

not to be lost on

the policy advisers in the Kennedy
Administration.

Increased funding for social programs
would be possible
only if government would more directly
control the

macro-economic tools at its disposal and create
rapid
and sustained economic growth. The Eisenhower
Administration, though, had no commitment to an

expansion of social programs and was unwilling to
employ
fiscal policy to manufacture rapid economic growth.

result was a holding pattern on social programs,

The

a

sluggish economy and a federal government seeking
greater distance from the private sphere.
Two indices of the Eisenhower Administration's
strides for a greater distance from the private sphere
were the Second Hoover Commission Report of 1955 and

Eisenhower's call for a Goals Commission
1959.

in

January

Analysis of the Second Hoover Commission Report

has usually emphasized the Report's contribution to

a

clearer understanding of the distinction between

political positions and administrative positions

Executive branch. [52]

in the

The increase in the number of

political appointees recommended by the Report was, in
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part, a recognition of the problems
the first Republican

administration in twenty years might
face
administrators brought to the upper

in

controlling

echelons of

government during the New and Fair Deals.
recommendation for the creation of

a

The Report's

Senior Civil

Service composed of three thousand high
ranking career
administrators was based, however, on a notion

that such

experts could remain politically neutral.
[53]
The best
that can be said of the Report's clarification
of the

politics/administration distinction is that

it

recognized the need for political control over the

Executive branch (which its predecessors had also
recognized) and that

it

opened no Pandora's box by

claiming the intrinsic neutrality of career
administrators.

The more important contribution of the

Second Hoover Commission Report (at least, to the

Eisenhower Administration) was the Report's attempt to
fulfill the mandate outlined by the Eisenhower

Administration in 1953: "... eliminating nonessential
services, functions, and activities which are

competitive with private enterprise.
was,

in fact,

"[ 54

]

The Report

an attack on the social policies of the

New Deal and a justification of the economic philosophy
of the Eisenhower Administration.

The Report was a

series of guidelines for removing the federal government
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even farther from the private
sphere.

The final contribution of the
Eisenhower

Administration to federal planning was
the establishment
of a Goals Commission in 1959.
The Goals Commission was
to prepare a report outlining national
goals for health,

education, welfare and living standards
.[ 55
that the setting of such goals would not

]

To ensure

be based on an

active federal government, Eisenhower
stipulated that
the Goals Commission was to be (a) composed
only
of

members drawn from the private sector and
entirely by the private sector. [56]

(b)

funded

Eisenhower's

version of planning placed the federal government at

distance from the private sphere where

it

a

could still be

beckoned in times of domestic crisis, but where the
expansion of government's responsibilities could not be
the result of government's advocating more government.

The extension of federal government programs into the

private sector would be solely

a

reactive extension

premised on the neutrality (and "objective" distance) of
the federal government.

With the exception of the Second Hoover Commission
Report, the Eisenhower Administration made no lasting

contributions to scientific planning by the federal
government.

Further rationalization of the budgeting

procedures and of evaluation techniques, and the
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institutionalization of planning staffs
within domestic
agencies would await the New Frontier
and the Great

Society.

Scientific Planning in the Kenned
y and Johnson
Administrations
The election of John

F.

Kennedy marked the return

of Keynesians to the federal government
and the return

of the federal government to the
prescribed Keynesian

location at the perimeter of the private sphere.

The

Kennedy Administration's reliance on and endorsement
of
the Keynesian brand of scientific planning
produced two
important results during the 1960s.

First, the Kennedy

Administration successfully deployed Keynesian tools to
bring about expansion economics.

The 1964 tax cut,

during a business upturn, placed the federal government

directly behind the wheel that was to steer the economy.
The success of the 1964 tax cut invigorated the

Keynesians in the federal government and made possible
the extension of the social services always promised by

expansion economics.

The celebration of the science of

economics following the 1964 tax cut increased both the

government's confidence in its ability to address and
redress social problems in a scientific, efficient and

neutral manner, and thus, the government's willingness
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to accept more and more social
responsibilities,

m

the

remainder of this chapter we will
examine the
relationship between the private sphere

and the public

sphere which was articulated during
this heyday of
scientific planning. The second important

result, which

we shall give closer scrutiny to in the
next chapter,
was the realization that expansion economics
based on
the scientific tools employed at the
perimeter of the

private sphere was not adequate to the task of
fulfilling completely the social promises of the

Employment Act.

Expansion economics would have little

effect on those citizens suffering from structural

unemployment or from the newly discovered "cycle of
poverty" (the Kennedy Administration's code word for

institutionalized racism).

Consequently, expansion

economics would come to be supplemented with a
"scientific" approach to community participation.

Kennedy's interest in Keynesian economics prior to
his election in 1960 was, at most, slight.

Kennedy's

appointments for his two top economic advisers, Walter

Heller for Chairman of the CEA and Douglas Dillon for

Secretary of the Treasury, reflected the ambiguity of
Kennedy's view of Keynesianism, as well as the dilemma
facing all post-New Deal Democratic presidents.

Heller was a respected economist of the Keynesian

Walter
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variety and Douglas Dillon was
advocated orthodox economics.

a

Republican who

Both men, though, did

share a common characteristic of vital
importance to
effective service in Kennedy's Executive
Office: and
ability to shed (or, at least, alter the
hue of) their
ideological trappings with changes in the
politicial

surroundings.

Kennedy was to find Heller the more

persuasive adviser, but Dillon was important for
calming
the anxieties businessmen always evince at the
election
of a post-New Deal Democratic president.

Kennedy's reliance on orthodox economics when he
became President was evident in the Kennedy

Administration's tax policy in 1961.

The tax package

provided no cuts for individuals and for small
reductions in corporate taxes. [57]

Private enterprises,

through the enactment of an investment incentive credit,
were to trigger

a

period of faster economic growth.

The

reliance on investment, rather than consumption, was an
indication that the Kennedy Administration was not yet

prepared to break away from the assumptions that guided
the Eisenhower Administration.

Not that Kennedy's

Keynesian advisers pushed hard for
In January 1961,

a

change in policy.

President Kennedy's Task Force on the

Economy, a choice selection of Keynesian economists

including Paul Samuelson, Seymour Harris, James Tobin
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and Walter Heller, reported to
Kennedy that their advice
was to go slowly on public expenditures,
to postpone any
tax cuts unless the economy remained
sluggish and to

minimize reliance on monetary policy.
[58]
was not difficult for Kennedy to accept.

Their advice

Kennedy's conversion to expansion economics
was the
result of (a) an interest in increasing
public
expenditures for the military and

(b)

a

battle among

three competing economic views advocated by
Kennedy's

advisers.

The argument for expansion economics during

the Truman Administration was strengthened by the

infamous NSC-68 document and the Korean War. [59]

Expansion economics in the 1960s was appealing because
of the renewed heat of the Cold War (especially the

Berlin Crisis) and Kennedy's promise to close the (nonexistent) missle gap.

Since 1946, the promise of more

butter has always been accompanied by the acquisition of

more guns.

In the 1960s protests and riots by welfare

recipients were not disconnected from the similar

activities of the anti-war movement.

Given Kennedy's

commitment to a military build-up,

was not difficult

it

to disarm the arguments of Federal Reserve Board

Chairman Martin that deficits were unacceptable.

Nor

were the arguments of John Kenneth Galbraith, in favor
of public spending for domestic goods and services to
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spur a consumption-based recovery,
convincing to the
President. The Heller CEA after
1961, though, offered a
recovery package that promised more
military

expenditures and provided

a

rationale for

a tax cut

without a cut in government expenditures.
The Heller CEA was able to propose
such "voodoo
economics" because they believed that
a reduction in
taxes during a business upturn would
maintian or

increase the upturn and create the economic
growth

necessary to decrease unemployment and to
increase tax
revenues despite the tax reduct ion. [ 60
Government
]

deficits during the downturns in the economy would
be
acceptable because government spending would shorten
the

downturn and deficits would be recouped during the

prolonged economic booms.

The appeal, then, of the

Heller CEA version of expansion economics is not

difficult to deduce: there was something for almost
everyone in the recovery package.
continue to build-up.
maintained.

The military could

Existing social programs could be

Big business and small business supported

the tax cut and the populace did not object to

reductions in personal income tax rates. [61]

The tax

cut of 1964 was a proposal that generated a vast array
of political support for the President's fiscal

pol icies

The domestic economics of the
Heller CEA weiire
acceptable to Kennedy for many of
the same reason:is
Keyserling's views were acceptable
to Truman.
First,
Kennedy could placate private sector
fears of big

government by stimulating the economy
without large
public expenditures on domestic
programs.
Fiscal policy
would be deployed, but the emphasis
would be
on tax

policy rather than on public spending.

Second, Kennedy

could still make the standard Democratic
claim that
balanced economy was more important than a
balanced
budget.

This, of course,

a

is a claim that pays homage to

the Employment Act's mandate for maximum
employment and

the Democratic party's commitment to decent living

standards for all citizens.

Third, a balanced economy

with due regard for the economic conditions of citizens
was possible if economic growth was rapid and sustained.

Kennedy's conversion to the economics of the Heller CEA
(the first signs of the conversion are usually traced to

Kennedy's speech at Yale on 11 June 1962), [62] was, in
part, based on Kennedy's belief that economic growth

would depoliticize the issues of redistribution.

Class

conflict would be mitigated by overwhelming
abundance. [63]
All this was possible because Kennedy believed that
a

science of public finance was possible.

Kennedy, more
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than any other modern president,
was convinced that
rational and reasonable policy was
the result
of

objective facts, neutral management
techniques and
technological sophistication. Just
as Robert McNamara
was able to become the top adviser
to Kennedy
on Viet

Nam because of McNamara's ability
to overwhelm with
statistics and "objective" accounts, the
Heller CEA was
to gain predominance in domestic
economic policy because
they were able to provide a steady stream
of
quantitative, and therefore "true," mater ial
.[ 64 ]

This

faith in the object if iable was not, as some
commentators

have argued, a sign of Kennedy's pragmatism.

Kennedy combined

a

Rather

fairly conservative view of domestic

politics with

a

formulation.

The business of the United States was

scientific approach to policy

business, and the federal government would act in a

manner calculated to foster economic growth first and
social goods later.
The Revenue Act of 1964 was deemed a success by

almost every observer.

The tax cut was partially

responsible for an increase in revenues and
in unemployment.

a

decrease

The fiscal policies of the Heller CEA

had apparently fueled faster economic growth.

There

were several morals that were drawn from this success
story.

First, the federal government had been too timid
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in the use of fiscal policy
during the 1950s and the

early 1960s. [65]

The federal government's
distance fr om
the private sphere and reluctance
to deploy the fiscal
arsenal had become too great to insure
the goal of
economic growth.
Second, government management of a
growth economy

could be
tools,

(a)

(b)

based on economic tools that were neutral

sustained permanently

if

the political

structure of the United States would provide the

Executive branch with enough flexibility and

(c)

lifted

from the partisan and moral quagmires into the lofty

realm of pure science.

In 1966 Robert Lekachman

concluded that:
The effects of the victory will be
felt for a long time, but the
continued expansion of the economy
during 1964 and 1965, the steady
downward drift of unemployment, and
the gratifying increase of sales and
profits gave immediate support to the
claims of the new public finance and
justified the slash in excise taxes
in June 1965.
It is as certain as
such things can be that never again
will an American government profess
helplessness in the face of
unemployment, recession, and lagging
economic growth. Rational fiscal
policy expressed in the use of taxes
as stabilizing agents and the
acceptance of deficits without guilt
may be a belated achievement but not
the less treasurable because it comes
a generation after the birth of the
doctrine which justifies the public
action. [66]
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Even the usually restrained
prose of James L. Sundquist
flowered before the scientific
achievements made evident
in the 1964 tax cut:
n ° ther terms
the Revenue
I^ PUof^ 1964
?Lj may
Act
have marked the point
at which the discussion of
fiscal
policy in the nation crossed the
threshhold from the realm of morals
to the realm of economics.
Fiscal
policy may have come at last to be
molded primarily by a cool assessment
of its impact upon the various
indices that reflect the economic
well-being of the people
the rate
of national growth, levels of
employment and unemployment, the
stability of prices
rather than by
the force of moral absolutes.
But
assuming that "the Puritan ethic," as
Heller once termed it, has faded, and
assuming further that economic
science has advanced to the point
that the economists, at any moment in
time, can devise the right
antirecession measures, what then?
Will the institutional structure of
the government permit the effective
execution of well-designed
antirecession measures? 67
'

—

—

[

The science of economics had arrived.

The solutions

were at hand; the sole question remaining was whether
the constitutional separation of powers would allow the

hand to played.
The third moral of the tax cut was that government

management of the economy was dependent on government's
long-range planning abilities.

Effective economic

management precluded reliance on only short-term
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reactive planning:
In fact, the jump from relatively
specific, emergency, and short-term
programming to more comprehensive
planning of governmental programs
received perhaps its biggest boost in
the acceptance, during the Kennedy
administration, of the basic policy
objective of accelerated economic
growth.
By Administration
interpretation, growth involved
projections into the future in terms
of potential, the anticipatory nature
of which required forward
planning. [68]

The federal government must return to the location on
the perimeter of the private sphere which was prescribed

by Keyserling in the 1940s.

The "perfection" of macro-

economic tools made possible government planning that

would not have to interfere directly with the price,
wage and profit decisions of the private sector.

This

was not a type of planning that pushed government into
the private sector in the pursuit of specific policy
goals, but rather

it

was plannning at a distance that

permitted the government to anticipate the needs that
could be addressed through macro-economic leverage.
Fourth, social programs would not be the result of

firm ideological commitments; they would be the logical

extension of a neutral fiscal policy.

Education and job

training programs would offer "equality of opportunity"
and still serve the interests of the private sector.
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Increased funding for these programs would
not be so
much a political choice; rather, funding
would be a

scientific response to anticipated needs

in the

private

sector.
The federal government had accepted the role
of

steering mechanism for the private economy and

legitimator of the social order in the 1930s.

in the

1960s the federal government had "perfected" the

techniques which would make

it

possible to fulfill both

roles without substantial penetration of the private
sphere.

Scientific planning by the government would

produce abundance, would still political debate over
economics and would make rational the policies of the
federal government.
made.

At least,

these were the claims

A failure to obtain these results would no longer

generate an attack aimed directly at the private
economy.

The target for discontent,

if

it

emerged, would be the federal government.

crisis would now be understood as

a

somehow
An economic

rationality crisis

-- a crisis in the scientific planning functions of the

federal government.

The distance from which the federal

government was to plan would be inadequate to secure the
results promised, but the distance was not so far as to

blur the target of citizens' disenchantment.
The promise of scientific and rational planning by
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the federal government continued
to precede the

institutionalization of planning processes
and
structures during both the Kennedy and
Johnson
Administrations.

However, rationalization of the

Executive branch did continue during the
1960s.
Centralized coordination of domestic programs
under the
guidance of the Executive branch became a major
concern
of the Johnson Administration in 1966 and
1967.
The

proliferation of domestic programs at the beginning of
the Great Society had created a dispersal of control

over the programs.

In October 1966,

Charles L.

Schultze, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, sent a

memo to Johnson on the dilemma facing Great Society
programs:

Their success or failure hinges upon
establishing new and effective
mechanisms for coordinating planning,
evaluation and execution quite
different from any currently
available. [69]
In response to Schultze' s concerns, Johnson established

the Heineman Task Force on Government Organization.

By

September 1967, the Heineman Task Force had prepared two
major recommendations for enhanced Executive control of

domestic programs.

The first recommendation was for

increased planning staff within the Executive Office and

within domestic agencies:
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a
ia
S
ary
Jw
^force
that fJ
the task

lt can be seen
envisaged a need
tor strengthening presidential
program development and coordination,
to be achieved primarily by
the
expansion of institutionalized staff
aid at the presidential level
reducing somewhat the need for
personal staff aid, but supported by
stronger planning and direction at
the departmental level. There was
no
discussion in the report of whether
Great Society programs could be
successfully administered without
policy change
such as grant
consolidation or transfer of some
programs to financially aided state
governments.
Instead, there was an
assumption that institutionalized
staff aid to the president and the
departments -- aided by field
decentralization
could provide
coordinated program and policy
development. [70]
i

'

—

—

—

This recommendation hardly represented

a

departure from

the established mechanisms for coordinating planning,

evaluation and execution.

The Heineman Task Force was

simply calling for an extension of the Executive

coordinating mechanisms proposed by those two earlier
reports that also based government planning (on the
perimeter) on a belief in Executive Office control and

accountability: the PCAM report and the First Hoover

Commission Report.

The Heineman Task Force accepted the

relationship between the public sphere and the private
sphere which had been articulated during the last years
of the New Deal.

154

The second recommendation of the
Heineman Task

Force was for the consolidation of the
Departments of
Commerce and Labor into a new Department of
the Economy.
The Task Force stated that:
We continue to feel that the major
organizational problem in the area of
economic affairs is the existence of
several special interest executive
departments each holding a stake in
only part of the national economy,
and none now capable of serving as a
neutral, Presidential instrument of
program or policy on broad-gauged
economic issues on problems that
affect "their" interest or clientele.
... As President Johnson has
recognized, the President and the
public interest would be served
better by a Department of the
Economy especially including
activities of the departments of
Commerce and Labor. [71] (original
emphasis)
,

,

This recommendation illuminates the path upon which the

advocates of scientific planning wished to trod.

The

neutrality of economic policy, with its consequent

neutralization of political issues, was being thwarted
by the institutionalization of two clientele departments

which were created to press specific economic interests
The

and which regarded the other as a rival.

consolidation of the Departments of Commerce and Labor
did not occur, but the proposal reveals the degree to

which intelligent citizens subscribed to
neutral economic policy.

a

view of
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Government planning at the periphery
of the privat e
sphere was also further rationalized
in

the introducti on

of a new budgeting approach in
the 1960s.

Performance

budgeting, with its emphasis on management
control, was
replaced with "Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System"
(PPBS).
PPBS was an approach designed to
address the
three basic functions of budgeting: (a)
operational

control

—

the efficient use of money to carry out

assigned tasks,

(b)

management control -- the efficient

and accountable use of resources, and (c) strategic

planning -- the designation of plans and objectives to
be funded. [72]

PPBS would force all departments to

engage in a clearer articulation of program objectives
and to make planning part of the departmental routine.

PPBS's contribution to comprehensive planning in
the federal government was limited by a number of

factors.

First, PPBS assumed a comprehensive review of

funding beyond the capabilities of administrative
agencies.

Lindblom has testified to the incremental

nature of bureaucracies and the incremental nature of
the human mind. [73]

Nevertheless, long-term planning

need not be completely comprehensive to be effective.
The crucial point in Lindblom's defense of

incremental ism against comprehensive planning is that
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comprehensive planning places too great

burden on policy makers.

a

political

Comprehensive planning assumes

decisions are made free from the pressures
of political
groups and free of past political commitments.
It
assumes

a

rationality untainted by political

considerations.

More importantly, PPBS

is

based on the

proposition that goals can be stated with clarity and
specificity, and that indices can be developed that will

provide

a

goals.

In social programs,

sound determination of progress toward stated
the development of

quantifiable goals and indices is notoriously difficult.
In the Department of Health, Education and Welfare

(HEW), analysts, during the 1960s, had an abundance of

statistics but a dearth of useful indices for evaluation
and planning. [ 74

]

Evaluation of agencies engaged in

public activities is intrinsically difficult because
public agencies must not only be efficient

in

delivering

goods and services, they must also be fair, open and
honest.

Planning by such agencies is made more arduous

by their lack of control over their political

environment
When indicators of social progress are developed by
public agencies, the results may be even more
troublesome.

In March 1966, Johnson requested a report

from HEW on the nation's social progress during the last
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decade. [75]

This "social progress report" was to

supplement the economic report prepared by the
CEA for
the President.
The document prepared by the HEW

was a

voluminous indictment of American society which
concluded that little,

if any,

progress had been made in

ensuring the social welfare of large groups of citizens.
The result was an Executive Office condemnation and

suppression of the report.

In response, HEW prepared a

very short paper entitled "Toward

a

Social Report" which

omitted all sections on racial issues and which
suggested how future indices might be developed.

Comprehensive planning could not function without social
indices and, yet,

it

could not prepare indices without

illustrating that many social programs were beyond the

grasp of "comprehensive" planning at the perimeter of
the private sphere.

The scientific approach to government's economic
and social responsibilities reached its culmination in
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

Despite some

successes, this approach to public policy was finally a
failure.

The federal government had assumed

responsibilities that
fulfill.

it

did not have the power to

Keynesian fiscal policy could accelerate

economic growth under certain conditions, but it could
not guarantee that growth because the federal government

did not control the price, wage
and profit decisions
private enterprises.
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CHAPTER

VI

THE PARTICIPATION MOVEMENT:
1963-1969

The Imp ortance of the Participation
Movgmpnf
Even as the scientific planning
approach to public
policy was reaching its culmination in the
Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations, a new approach to
public policy
was being unleashed: the participation approach.
The

participation approach, realized most fully

in the

Community Action Programs (CAPs) administered by the
Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0)

,

is of crucial

importance in the history of public policy in the United

States for three reasons.

First, the participation

movement was established because the scientific planners
realized, as early as 1963, that the rapid and sustained

economic growth promised by scientific planning would
not lift all citizens out of poverty.

Citizens

unfortunate enough to suffer from the consequences of
stuctural unemployment and citizens mired in the cycle
of poverty (the Kennedy Administration's code word for

institutionalized racism) would not be able to partake
of the promised abundance.

[

1

]

The attempt to

depoliticize society by the technical provision of
abundance would have to await specific policies which
165
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weighed political and economic
gains and losses, and
which addressed questions of
equity that were beyond the
domain of science and technique.
Second, the dominant evaluation
of the

participation movement concludes that
the participation
movement was a failure and that the
failure
can be

attributed to an inconsistent conception
of the movement
and to the accidental construction of the
movement. [2]

The dominant evaluation stresses the dangers
of e

participation movement and, therefore, discourages
further exploration of, and experimentation, with

structures for democratic participation in the United
States.

I

will illustrate in this chapter that (a) the

CAPs were not accidental,

(b)

the CAPs were far from an

unmitigated failure, especially given the goals set for
the CAPs, and (c) the CAPs embodied a concept of

participation that was not structured democratic
participation, but instead participation

group politics.

in

interest

The history of CAPs may be an

indictment of interest group politics, but

it

is not an

indictment of structured and responsible democratic
part icipat ion
Third, the participation movement politicized

citizens and, thus, hastened the demise of the
scientific planning approach to public policy. [3]

The
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participation movement gave voice
to the urban poor,
especially the urban black poor,
and also politicized
those citizens who responded to,
and reacted
to,

this

new voice.

The CAPs did more than politicize
the urban
poor; they politicized the bureaucrats
who administered
the programs for the poor and they
politicized the

populace by forcing issues of equity and
ethics into the
public domain. The result was the rejection
not only of

the participation movement, but also of
the scientific

planning approach and the very premises which
had guided
the scientific planning approach.

Indeed, the

estrangement from government declared by both the left
and the right in the late 1960s, and the discord

experienced by all citizens during this time, caused
some commentators to suggest that the United States was

experiencing a legitimation crisis.

[4]

Hostility toward

the government and toward the society for which the

government was responsible did not, though, produce
new government.

a

Rather, the crisis of the 1960s,

precipitated by the CAPs and the polit icizat ion of
scientific planning, brought about

a

search for a policy

approach that would pay lip-service to citizen

participation and that would remove the government from
the perimeter of the private sphere as the government

discarded the social responsibilities

it had

assumed
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during the New Deal.
The history of CAPs, then, is the
history of the
demise of the idea of government planning
at the

periphery of the private sphere and of the
ideals which
motivated this approach. The inability of
scientific

planning (even with the supplement of CAPs) to
attain
the objectives framed in the Employment Act of
1946

engendered

a

crisis in citizenship and a crisis in

scientific rationality.

scholars would be

a

The response by some policy

redefinition of citizenship and a

restructuring of the relationship between the public
sphere and the private sphere that would redefine the
concept of the public good.

To trace the political

reasons for this new public policy model

economics/public choice approach

—

—

a welfare

we must first

examine the history of the participation movement and

dismiss the present myths which surround

it.

The Political Appeal of the Community Action Programs
The war on poverty did not begin with the creation
of the 0E0 and the CAPs in 1964.

By 1963 three distinct

approaches to urban poverty had developed:
One, exemplified by the Ford
Projects, sought to work through
the local
existing institutions
government, the school system, the

—
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—

private social agencies
with the
hope that they would be influenced
by
1
coordinated planning.
Another, of which Mobilization
for Youth was the prototype,
went
behind the "power structure" to
organize the poor themselves to
assert and defend their own interests
• •

•

The third strategy, adopted by
the President's Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime, put its
faith in the application of
knowledge, through comprehensive
planning, with the risk that planning
might never lead to action. [5]

Mobilization for Youth and the President's
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime were
two of the Kennedy Administration's early attempts to

deal with the problems caused by urban poverty.

Both

programs were premised on the recognition that urban

poverty (and the problems associated with

it)

would not

be cured by the economic abundance promised by Kennedy's

Keynesian economists.

The meager results these programs

achieved, combined with data from the Council of

Economic Advisers showing that between 1956 and 1961 the
absolute number of families living in poverty had
increased, convinced Kennedy in the spring of 1963 that
the problem of poverty in the United States must be

addressed in a new and comprehensive fashion. [6]

Kennedy was assassinated before the new design for
this new and comprehensive anti-poverty program was
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completed.

The responsiblity for
supporting and
executing the war on poverty fell
into the hands of
Lyndon Baines Johnson. Johnson's
support for this new
program, which would create the OEO
and establish the
CAPs, was strong because it appealed
to his vision of
the presidency and because it was
politically appealing.
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964
was politically

appealing because it appeared that everyone
was to gain
and that no one was to lose. The Act did
not create a

massive program based on the transfer of income.

An

income transfer program raises equity considerations

which scientific planning was supposed to obviate.

The

OEO anti-poverty program would not be caught in the
political turmoil and ethical quagmire an income
transfer program would produce.
A second virtue of the CAPs was that this anti-

poverty program would not be foisted on local
communities, but would await community demand before the

services were offered.

Furthermore, responsibility for

the success of the community programs would not rest on
the federal government, but on the local communities.

A third benefit of the CAPs was that its design

satisfied the planning agencies within the Executive
Office: the Council of Economic Advisers and the Bureau
of the Budget.

The programs would provide flexibility
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at the local level,

coordination of service delivery
within the communities and a variety
of data bases from
which planners could evaluate the
success of programs.
Social experimentation could now be
practiced
by the

planners within the Kennedy Administrat
ion.

[

7

]

The 0E0

programs could serve as a ready data base
because,
unlike Mobilization for Youth which was
mired in
intricate planning details, the CAPs would

be launched

with minimal centralized planning by allowing
communities to plan as they developed.

This "building

block" conception of planning made possible the
rapid

extension of CAPs to

a

variety of localities in

a

manner

consistent with Johnson's claim that his Administration
was now ready to fight an "unconditional war" on

poverty. [8]
A fourth virtue of the CAPs was that the

legislation creating the 0E0 did not specify the nature
of participation in the CAPs.

Legislators could, and

did, embrace an anti-poverty program which depended on

local initiative, and they did ignore the possibility

that CAPs might provide an organizational structure for

new and powerful minority interest groups.
One can search the hearings and
debates in their entirety and find no
reference to the language
which
became so controversial later
regarding the participation of the

—

—
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poor in community action.
novel concept of community The whole
action -the definition of the
community, the
nature of the community action
n
he c °ntent of its program,
£
K were
all 3'
of which
to have a profound
impact on federal-state-local
relations and on the social and
governmental structures of
participating communities
was left
to the Office of Economic
Opportunity
in an exceptionally broad
grant of
discretion. [ 9]

^

—

That legislators did not understand
the nature of
participation to be employed by CAPs, though,
does not

mean that planners within the Executive
Office deployed
CAPs casually, unref lect ively or accidentally.
Daniel
Patrick Moynihan's claim in Maximum Feasible

Misunderstanding that the CAPs were not designed to
create participation by the poor in organized political

pressure groups simply does not wash.
In Moynihan's retrospective apology for his

involvement in a program which he later considered to

pose dangers to the legitimacy of the welfare state,

Moynihan avers that:
The community action title, which
established the one portion of the
program that would not be directly
monitored from Washington, should
provide for the "maximum feasible
participation of the residents of the
areas and the members of the groups"
involved in the local programs.
Subsequently this phrase was taken to
sanction a specific theory of social
change, and there were those present
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who would

have drafted just such language
with
precisely that object. But the

record, such as can be had, and
recollection indicate that it was
intended to do no more than ensure
that persons excluded from the
political process in the South and
elsewhere would nonetheless
participate in the benefits of the
community action programs of the new
legislation.
it was taken as a
matter beneath notice that such
programs would be dominated by the
local political structure .[ 10
(original emphasis)

There are several problems with this argument.
First, as was noted earlier, the Kennedy

Administration had already created poverty programs
based on the theory that poverty engendered political

powerlessness which, in turn, promoted the continuance
of poverty.

Mobilization for Youth was based on this

explanation of the "cycle of poverty."

Participation

only in the benefits of poverty programs would not solve
the core of the problem: powerlessness.

Maximum

feasible participation by "the residents of the areas
and the members of the groups involved in the local

programs" was absolutely essential in creating community

power structures which could address the problem of

powerlessness.

To assume that participation in the

OEO's anti-poverty programs was to be simply

participation in the benefits of the programs, Moynihan

has to ignore the setting
in which the term
-maximum

feasible participation" came
into use.
Second, even the distribution

of benefits to the

poor depended in many cases on
the creation of local
community organizations which
would not be dominated by
the local political structure.
This point was
recognized by federal planners and is
documented in
Moyni nan's work.
On Febuary 3, 1964, the CAP
advocates
once more put forth their proposal.
Charles Schultze explained that
projects would be initiated at the
local level, with a measure of
federal prodding, and approved at the
federal level. William Capron
touched on the problem of local
leadership in the South, especially,
and noted that CAP's could be used to
bypass the local "power structure"
with the use of Federal funds. [11]

Domination of CAPs by local governments would not only
fail to alleviate the powerlessness of the poor,

domination would perpetuate the problem of local
governments' misdirecting federal funds targeted for the
urban poor.

The CAPs were to provide an alternate route

for federal funds that previously had been waylaid by

existing local racist political structures.

political structures could hardly be bypassed
were to dominate CAPs and

if

These local
if

they

CAPs were to be staffed,

not by the poor, but by members of these local political
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structures.
Third, CAPS were designed to
do more than provide
an alternate route for federal
grants to the poor: CAPs

were to create organizations
capable of forcing local
agencies to provide funds for the
poor which had been

authorized for the poor by the federal
government.
I
am
not suggesting that the federal
planners in the Kennedy
Administration knew that CAPs would create
warfare
between federally sponsored programs and
local
governments.

The confrontational tactics deployed
by

some community action groups

demonstrations and riots[12]

—
—

sit-in protests, mass

surely exceeded the

expectations of the federal planners, including Jack

Conway the Director of the 0E0.[13]

However,

confrontational tactics of a more moderate nature were

certainly expected and even encouraged.
bypass local governments and create

a

The attempt to

competition

between political organizations for federal funds was
sure to create confrontation among these organizations.
The provision of legal talent to the CAPs and to

citizens in poverty with the creation of the Legal
Services Organization was

a clear

indication that the

prevailing power structures would be challenged.

[

14

The refusal of some participants in CAPs to pursue only

legally and socially acceptable tactics

in

confronting
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local governments may have surprised
federal planners,
but confrontational tactics by
community programs

populated by residents of the area was
the not-soaccidental goal of the Kennedy and
Johnson
Administrations.

Community Action Pro grams and the Politicizat
ion of
Ci t lzens

CAPs did develop in ways not always anticipated

precisely by federal planners.

The broad grant of

discretion given to 0E0 officials by the Congress was
followed by broad grants of discretion by 0E0 to federal
field administrators and to local community action

programs.

The variety of program structures and the

differences in program priorities among the CAPs,
though, was a stated goal of the federal planners .[ 15

The "building block" planning approach to the CAPs

proved compelling in two ways.

The variety of designs

and program priorities provided federal planners with
the opportunity to discover the most successful

structures, procedures and agendas for future community

programs.

Social experimentation could be practiced

with a large number of available cases --

a

highly

desirable result for those imbued with, and engaged
scientific planning.

in,
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The "building block" approach also
allowed 0E0 to
institute community action programs
quickly and the
immediate participation of disgruntled
citizens.
This
flexibility made CAPs the perfect instrument
for

anticipatory federal programming.

Potential urban "hot

spots" could be identified and then funding and
federal

officials could be poured in to douse potential
violence.

In their case study of Oakland,

Implementation

,

Jeffrey

L.

Pressman and Aaron B.

Wildavsky castigate federal officials for poor planning
and poor politics. [16]

The latter accusation is made

because federal officials, on their arrival in Oakland,
met first with local black leaders rather than with the

Mayor and his staff.

mention that

it

Pressman and Wildavsky fail to

was not the Mayor and his white

constituents who posed an immediate threat to urban
tranquility.

Federal officials knew whom they could

afford to bypass more conveniently in a no-win
situation.

Members of city government may have felt

slighted, but they could be expected to illustrate their

displeasure through legal and socially acceptable
forums.

The lack of action based on sophisticated

planning was far less important than the lack of (some
kind of) action.
The CAPs did provide action and they did provide
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participation by the poor and by
representatives of the
poor.
By 1965, the poor constituted,
on average,
27

percent of the community action
boards. [17]
By 1966,
participation by the poor on community
action boards had
risen to 30 percent, and the 1966
amendments to the OEO
legislation mandated that a base of 33
percent
be

reached by all community action boards
by 1967.
Congress may not have considered the
nature of

participation in CAPs in 1964, but by 1966
Congress had
endorsed the direction taken by federal
administrators
in the OEO programs.
is evident

That this direction was successful

from two results.

First, CAPs, and the

welfare organizations they helped develop, did increase
the flow of funds to urban poverty areas.

The threat of

litigation and the acts of demonstration by CAPs and by

welfare rights organizations forced local relief
agencies to make available funds to the poor which the
poor were entitled to under federal legislation. 18
[

]

No

longer were local agencies able to hold down allocations
to the poor because the poor were no longer ignorant of

their rights or powerless in the political structures of

urban America.

The increase in welfare benefits to the

poor during the middle and late 1960s was not so much
the result of increased benefit levels, but rather the

result of two other developments:

(a)

an increased
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knowledge by the poor of their
rights and privileges in
the welfare state and (b) the
destigmat
ization of

welfare which encouraged more of
the poor to apply for
funds for which they had always
been qualified. 19]
The success of CAPs in confronting
[

local

governments and in establishing interest
group
representation for the urban poor was also
evident in
the 1967 Green Amendment to the 0E0
legislation.
By

1967, CAPs had placed local governments
under such

pressure that mayors began to lobby for control
of the
programs. The confrontations between CAPs and
local

governments forced mayors to push their claims for
control over community power structures to the federal
level.

Congress responded with the Green Amendment

which, for the first time, placed CAPs under the control
of city governments. [20]

This backlash against the

developing power structures of the urban poor did little
to slow the momentum of welfare rights organizations or
to diminish the growing political astuteness and

awareness of the urban poor, especially the black urban
poor.

It did,

however, signal the decline of CAPs as an

effective agent for social change.

Even Moynihan admits

that prior to 1967 the CAPs which had fallen under the

control of local governments were inef f ect ive

.

[

21

purpose of the Green Amendment was to render all

]

The
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community action programs
ineffective and, thus, to slow
the changes being rendered
in urban areas.
it

curious that Moynihan reveals
that

if

is

CAPs had been

enacted in a manner designed only
to secure benefits,
and not to develop participation
outside the prevailing
power structures, they would not
have been able to
secure those benefits.
A reevaluation of the success of
the CAPs, then,

certainly in order.

is

A fair evaluation has not been, and

cannot be, made as long as the illusion
that the CAPs
were designed accidentally and enacted
arbitrarily is
accepted.

Federal control of the CAPs did, at times,

elude OEO administrators, but the general direction
taken by the CAPs was plotted by the federal government.
If we judge CAPs by the goals established by
OEO

planners, the experiment with CAPs is far from an

unmitigated failure.

CAPs did bypass local governments

and establish direct links between the urban poor and
the federal government.

CAPs did confront local

governments and they did increase the delivery of goods
and services by local governments to the poor.

CAPs did

increase opportunities for blacks to participate in

mainstream local and state politics, and, over time,
CAPs helped legitimate black interest groups in urban
politics.

It can be argued that CAPs did,

by
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politicizing blacks and by encouraging
confrontation
with local governments, increase
urban violence during
the late 1960s.
However, such a view underestimates

the

ability of CAPs to coopt black
leaders who might have
chosen more violent tactics if CAPs
had not been
deployed by the federal government, in

retrospect, the

legitimation of black political structures
and the
integration, albeit limited, of black
political issues
into the political agenda of the United
States were

extremely smooth given the racism and the
inflexibility
of white political structures prior to
the 1960s.

While the successes enumerated above

—

and these

were not unintended consequences -- were largely ignored
by social commentators, both the left and right in the

United States railed against the participation movement
as it was embodied in the CAPs. [22]

The right

criticized the participation movement for placing an

overload on the administrative systems of local, state
and federal government [23]
.

The increased demands of

the poor placed an extra burden on already overextended

and overloaded governments.

The left,

in a

seemingly

contradictory criticism, railed against the

participation movement as
hoax. [24]

a

government perpetrated

The left claimed that citizen participation

never occurred in the formulation, execution or
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evaluation of federal programs.
criticisms correct.

I

deem both of these

Such an interpretation is possible

if one examines the administrative
structure of

governments at the three levels of this nation's
federal
system.
The administrative structure of local,
state

and federal government in the United States is

characterized by centralized control within each level
and by the construction of agencies which formulate and
enact policy within limited and specific avenues for

constituency input.

Interest group participation is

usually limited to formulation and evaluation within
congressional (or council) committees or subcommittees.

Constituency participation in agency decisions and
actions is most pronounced only when the constituents
have a monopoly on the information necessary for the

agency to fulfill its legislative mandate.

Thus,

constituency participation in administrative activities
is a characteristic of regulatory agencies.

While it is

certainly true that welfare policy in the United States
has been designed to regulate the poor, the poor have
not been viewed as legitimate partners in welfare

policy. [25]

The attempt by CAPs to create interest

groups for the urban poor resulted

in an

overload on a

system not designed to engage in intercourse with the
poor.

An overload on the system emerged even at the
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same time as participation by
the poor was rejected by
those in the administrative
systems.
Institutions
designed to mitigate and structure
interest group
representation in welfare policy did not
exist, and the
CAPs were not designed to provide them.
Such

unstructured conflict promoted unfair and
unjust
understandings by participants of their

adversaries.

Poor persons engaged in conflict with local
relief

administrators viewed the administrators as heartless
and mal intent ioned guardians of relief funds.
[26]

Local

administrators viewed their adversaries as persons who,
because of their poverty, were obviously unable to
engage in effective participation and planning .[ 27

]

Not

all local activists or local administrators succumbed to

these misinterpretations, but the very structure (or,

precisely, the lack of

a

structure) of the conflict made

such misinterpretations convenient and compelling.
The CAPs, then, generated an overload on

administrations not designed or accustomed to

participation (even interest group participation), and
also failed to provide participation by the poor in the
planning, execution and evaluation of welfare policy.
One can conclude from the history of CAPs that they did
fail to institute CAPs as a meaningful and permanent

interest group structure for the urban poor. [28]

One
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cannot conclude from their
history, though, that citizen
participation failed, because
responsible democratic
participation by citizens in the
decisions
by

governments that affect their
communities was never
tried.
The CAPs were not an experiment
in democratic
participation, but rather an experiment
in creating
interest groups for the poor and the
black poor which
could engage in the everyday scramble
for goods and
services in an interest group-dominated
political

economy.

Why then, did the CAPs provoke so much

criticism from social commentators, even those
who
usually defended interest group politics?
Almost all criticisms of CAPs center on the failure
of CAPs to subdue the issue of equity.

The CAPs,

through their organizational and informational
functions, "hyper-politicized" the urban poor in the

United States.

The CAPs helped legitimate

a

critique

aimed at the systemic failure of a political economy

dependent upon the scientific planning approach to
public policy.

The claims made in the Employment Act of

1946 were stripped of the scientific facade which had

protected the federal government as
structural bind.

it

struggled in

a

The assault by hyper-politicized

citizens was aimed not at the private economy, but at
the federal government and its scientific planning
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approach.

The failure of the political
economy to
secure equity, or even a decent
standard of living for
all citizens, was a failure
of the federal government.
Compounding this systemic critique,
and this new
political awareness by poor citizens
living

in a land of

economic abundance, was the creation
by CAPs of urban
black interest groups which were gaining
political
clout.
In the past, the urban poor, and
especially the
black urban poor, had been the disorganized
losers in

economic zero-sum transact ions .[ 29 ]

The abundant

society which scientific planners had promised was

supposed to prevent such zero-sum transactions with the

provision of plentitude.

Nevertheless, economic choices

were made which benfited the middle and upper income

groups in the United States at the expense of the
poor. [30]

Once the urban poor had developed their own

interest groups to play interest group politics in the

United States, they could force governments to live up
to the obligations accepted by these governments.

The urban black poor, though, were not the only

citizens politicized by the participation movement.
Once the issue of equity was unleashed in

a

political

economy dominated by interest group politics, the

protection and extension on everyone's fair share was
possible only by the creation and action of

a

multitude
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of citizen interest groups,

a pluralist society which

had served the general interests
of the wealthy and of
large corporations, and had
claimed responsiblity for
the general populace now was faced
with organized
interests representing a large number
of diverse and
conflicting interests. Hispanics, women,

environmentalists, the elderly and a host of
other
interest groups emerged to make claims on
the

administrative state.

Pluralist politics, which was

supposed to defuse class consciousness, was successful
in creating cleavages among groups which had
been

consistent losers in economic transactions, but

pluralist politics could not forestall

a

multi-pronged

attack on the upper class groups which had been the

consistent winners in economic transactions.

The claims

made on the federal government by these previous losers

undermined the possibility of the federal government's,

which was dominated by a scientific planning approach,
remaining on the periphery of the private sphere.
The proliferation of citizen interest groups

threatened scientific planning on the periphery of the

private sphere for two reasons.

First, many of the

claims pressed on federal government could not be

addressed simply by rapid and sustained economic growth.
The claims made by minorities and women extended beyond
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economic fair shares.

Equal treatment in the private

economy and equal access to
government funds required
changes in social patterns and
mores.

Equal treatment

entailed federal laws both to mandate
fair treatment
and, in the name of equity, to
redress past

injustices.

To provide these, the federal
government would have to
penetrate the private sphere and intervene
in the wage
and hiring policies of private sector
actors.
Equity

would not be achieved by economic abundance
alone.

Economic abundance would also fail to satisfy the
claims of interest groups concerned with consumer
safety
and with the environmental degradation perpetrated
by
the private economy.

These concerns could only be

satisfied with the extension of government interference
in the decisions and actions of private sector actors.

The federal government found itself in a situation where
the periphery would not hold.

Second, although the CAPs did not institute

democratic participation, the rhetoric of participation

provided

a focus for

interest groups' pressing claims on

the federal government.

These new interest groups

claimed the right to install representatives within the

decision making structure of government agencies which
affected their interests .[ 31 ]

This, of course, posed

the threat that scientific planning structures would be
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penetrated by "non-expertcitizens who would not be
"objective." This penetration
also threatened the
standard defense of scientific
planning that decisions
were based on scientific neutrality.
"Non-expert
citizens would still have the
acumen to realize that
"scientific decisions" were not

neutral, and that those

who made the decisions were not
objective.

Furthermore,

participation in agency decisions by citizen
advocates
would foul the gears of administrative
machines designed
for efficiency. [32]
The assault on the federal government
by citizen
interest groups and the hyper-politicizat ion
of citizens

was a result that seems inevitable given the

contradictions embodied in the promises made and in the

position held by scientific planning at the periphery of
the private sphere.

The legitimacy of such a

public

policy approach and of the federal government which
embraced that approach were called into question.

The

left, the right and, even, the liberals who had endorsed

the federal government's role in American society,

perceived that the federal government was,
1960s,

in a crisis of legitimacy. [33]

in the late

The left called

for a socialist cure, while the right prescribed its

standard medication of

a

return to orthodox economics

combined with a massive reduction in the federal
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government's size and responsibilities.

The liberals

either endorsed a continuation of
present policies or a
search for a new policy approach
which could end the
crisis and provide permanent stability
by reducing the
responsibilities of the federal government
and yet

appease (and anasthetize) the
"hyper-politicized"
citizenry.

The new public policy approach finally

endorsed by many of the distraught liberals
was

a

welfare economics/public choice approach to
public
policy.

This approach has now become the mainstream

ideology of policy scientists in the United States.
is an

It

approach designed to redefine the role of

government and the role of citizens in the United
States.

It

is a pernicious approach to a "dangerous,"

but soon to be defused, situation.
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CHAPTER VII
THE WHY OF A WELFARE ECONOMICS/PUBLIC
CHOICE APPROACH TO

The Sea rch for Political Stability

The 1970s witnessed the emergence
of a new
"paradigm- in public policy models in
the United
States. [1] The new approach to policy
was a welfare
economics/public choice model. This model was
not born
in the 1970s; in the 1950s welfare
economics had

articulated its presuppositions and the 1960s public
choice theory had been developed in the economic

framework established by, among others, Buchanan and

Tullock.[2]

The quantitative rigor and theoretical

elegance of this approach, though, were not sufficient
to displace the theoretical premises and the

institutionalization of either the regulatory approach
or the scientific planning approach.

Only with the

crisis of legitimacy that occurred during the late 1960s
and the consequent pan- ideolog ical barrage against the

federal government's role in society did the space open
up for the welfare economics/public choice model to be

embraced by a wide variety of influential policy
scholars and policy analysts.
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The reasons for the embrace
of this policy approach
were, and are, primarily
political, a welfare
economics/public choice approach
to public policy can,
its advocates hope, depoliticize
citizens and, thus,
render both citizens and the
crisis of legitimacy
quiescent.
in addition, this approach
may reduce the
fiscal commitments the federal
government assumed during
the scientific planning approach,
especially the Great
Society, and thus may solve the
fiscal crisis of federal
government. The political appeal of
a welfare economics
approach is grounded, then, in the goal
of political and
social stability. Political and social
stability,
though,

is to be purchased at an extremely
high price.

The price includes (a) a rejection of
democratic

politics,
a

(b)

a

redefinition of good citizenship and (c)

denial of the public good as a goal of, and

a

criterion for, good public policy.
In the next chapter we will examine the high

political and social costs of
choice approach.

a

welfare economics/public

First, though we need to lay out

specifically the allure of this new approach and to
reveal its moments of insight in its critique of and

"solutions" to the past policy approaches we have

examined in previous chapters.

A welfare

economics/public choice framework does more than offer
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political stability; it provides
coherent answers to the
deficiencies of all of the public
policy approaches
which characterize the modern
welfare state in the
United States.

Solving the Problems Crea t ed by
the Regulator Approach

Governmental regulation of private
enterprises in
the twentieth century has been
prone to
five basic

faults.

First, regulatory agencies have often
been

co °P ted bv the Private enterprises
which regulatory

agencies were designed to regulate.

Second, the lack of

clear and specific statutory guidelines by
Congress has
allowed excessive discretion to fall into the
hands of

regulatory administrators.

Excessive discretion,

combined with cooptation, provides regulated enterprises
with a regulatory atmosphere in which the public good is
often defined in terms of the private interests of

regulated enterprises.

Third, regulatory agencies must

make decisions which are equitable to each firm in their

domain of authority, and this creates both excessive
information demands for regulatory agencies and creates

ever-increasing regulatory staffs.

Fourth, statutory

and administrative guidelines in regulatory policy are

subject to long delays by challenges from regulated
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enterprises in administrative
hearings and in court
trials.
Fifth, regulated enterprises
are protected from
market-place competition and thus
neither competitive
pricing nor technological
innovation are
promoted.

A welfare economics approach
to the goals of
regulatory policy appears to solve
each of these
problems. To illustrate the solutions
proffered to
regulatory policy, we turn to a
regulatory area where a
welfare economics approach has developed
its most
detailed scenario: water pollution.
[3]
From a welfare
economics perspective, industrial pollution
of water
resources is a case where the economic benefits
to the

polluting enterprise, and the social costs
resulting
from the pollution, escape the pricing
mechanisms of the

market-place.

Each polluting company on

a

lake,

for

example, receives the benefits of disposing of their

wastes with minimal cost (the unpleasantness of polluted
water near their facility), and each user of the lake
bears some of the costs associated with polluted water
even if they do not pollute the water themselves.

As

long as the pollution can be absorbed by the body of

water without damaging the water quality, then the
absence of pricing mechanisms is not important.
However, if water pollution does alter the quality for
users, then we encounter, because of the absence of
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pricing mechanisms, Hardin's
scenario in "The Tragedy of
the Commons. "[4]
The correct governmental
response to water
pollution, according to welfare
economists, is the

creation of effluent fee systems.

Water quality

standards for the water resource would
be established
and then all polluters would have
their discharges of
pollution, their effluents, monitored at
the discharge
point.
Effluent fee scales would be established for
each type of pollutant discharged, and fees
would be

based on the costs required to maintain the desired
water quality.

This procedure would force polluters to

pay the price of their polluting and, thus, to pass on
the costs of pollution in the manufacturing process to

consumers.

Prices would reflect the true costs of

production.

Obviously, some toxic wastes would still be

regulated

—

allowed.

Also, obviously, the effluent fee approach

no discharge of these wastes would be

would still present difficult technical problems for
those administrators in charge of developing effluent
fee scales. [5]

Nevertheless, an effluent fee approach

does appear to avoid the pitfalls of the regulatory
approach.
An effluent fee system would curtail cooptation of

regulators by the enterprises regulated and would limit
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the discretion of regulatory
administrators.

Water
quality standards would be established
by Congress and
administrators would be bound, by
technical expertise,

to arrive at the correct effluent
fee scales.

Administrators, under the regulatory
approach to
pollution control, were open to cooptation

because:

regulation demanded intimate knowledge of
the
manufacturing processes of each regulated firm;
(a)

(b)

intimate knowledge of the manufacturing
processes

depended,

in large part,

on the willingness of the

regulated firms to share openly with administrators
their manufacturing secrets and their profit margins,
and,

thus, depended on goodwill between administrators

and regulated firms; and (c) regulatory agencies were

expected to insure the commercial success of all
regulated firms. [6]

An effluent fee approach reduces

the chances for the cooptation by keeping at a minimum
the interaction between effluent fee experts and

regulated copmpanies.

Administrative discretion at the

federal level would be constrained by the one-right-

effluent-fee-schedule which would produce

Congressionally mandated results.

At the local level,

administrative discretion would be removed entirely.

Administrators would maintain effluent monitors, report
the discharge of new and uncovered discharges,

read the
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effluent meters, and enforce strictly
the payment of
effluent fees by polluting companies.
it,

of course,

would still be possible for local
administrators to
engage in misfeasance or malfeasance,
but these

are also

possible under

a

regulatory approach and should not be

confused with administrative discretion

-

choice within

legal bounds.

An effluent fee system might also reduce
the

excessive information demands encountered under
regulatory approach.

a

A regulatory approach to pollution

control demands that administrators know the production

processes of each company regulated, the profit margins
of each company regulated and the current best pollution

abatement technology compatible with each company's

manufacturing processes.

As new pollution abatement

technology becomes available, administrators must
recalculate regulatory guidelines for each company.

Administrators are thus faced with an incredible
information burden.

Under an effluent fee approach,

administrators will still be faced with vast information
demands in calculating effluent fee schedules,

particularly as new effluents are produced, but
administrators will not have to concern themselves with
either the various manufacturing processes employed by
each company or the latest technological developments in
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pollution abatement equipment .[
7 ]

The reduction in

information demands, combined with
the reduction in
demands placed on state and federal
inspectors, may make
it possible to reduce the size
of state
and federal

agencies involved in pollution control,
and thus reduce
government expenditures on regulatory policy.
An effluent fee system would not
guarantee a

reduction in legal challenges by regulated
companies

dissatisfied with statutory guidelines or administrative
fee schedules.

However, an effluent fee system would

allow charges to be levied during litigation and would
(a)

encourage technical innovation during litigation and

(b)

discourage protracted legal battles in which the

plaintiff saw little chance for victory.

Under the

regulatory approach, regulated firms seek protracted
legal suits in order to postpone the purchase and the

use of new technology.

An effluent fee system would

encourage self-maximizing private firms to seek new

methods for pollution abatement even as the private
firms sought legal redress.

An effluent fee approach would also encourage,

rather than discourage, competitive pricing among

private firms which are now regulated.

The regulatory

approach to pollution control must protect all

established enterprises which adhere to regulatory
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guidelines, and which purchase and
use the suggested
best available pollution abatement
technology.
if

regulated companies fail in the
"market-place," then the
blame must fall on regulatory policy
and on regulatory
agencies.
Rather than pursue new pollution abatement
technologies, private firms now have incentives
to

maintain old standards and old technologies
in the quest
to reduce production costs.
New firms must be able
to

meet,

immediately, pollution guidelines which older

companies have had years in which to adapt, and new
firms must have the capital to purchase,

immediately,

the adopted best available technology used by the

regulated industry.

The results of regulatory policies

are minimal price competition and minimal technological

innovation in pollution abatement by regulated firms.
An effluent fee system mandates neither the success of

each enterprise monitored nor the type of technology

used to reduce pollution. [8]

The onus for success of

regulated enterprises moves from the government

regulatory agencies to the amorphous regime of the

market-place (and to the economic shrewdness of company
managers).

If a private firm decides to forego

pollution abatement technology, then their costs of

production will be much higher than those of firms
devising inexpensive methods to reduce their effluents
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and their effluent charges.

Assuming, of course, that a

market is operating for these goods,
companies able to
reduce their effluent fees/pollution
abatement
technology costs will drive companies
with prolific
pollution production costs out of business.
New
companies entering the industry will be
encouraged to
find innovative new techniques to reduce
polllution
costs and will not be saddled with requirements
to

purchase specific, and usually expensive, pollution
abatement technology.

Competitive pricing and

technological innovation will be the products of an
effluent fee system, because an effluent fee system

reinstitutes market conditions.
The solutions offered to the faults of the

regulatory approach to water pollution are impressive
and can be applied equally as well to air pollution

control and, some even argue, to workplace safety
control. [9]

In the area of car passenger safety,

an

incentive/disincentive approach could be used to prevent
auto makers from further delay of airbag installation.

Each car without an airbag system (or a restraint system

capable of equalling the safety capabilities of an
airbag system) would be taxed at such

a

high level that

comparable cars with airbag systems would be much less
expensive.

Consumers would be given

a

"choice," auto

206

makers would be given a "choice,"
and the technological
development of alternative restraint
systems with safety
capabilities equal to or better than
the airbag systems
would be encouraged. Of course, most
welfare economists
would give short shrift to this example,
because
personal safety is not a collective good.
Rather,

safety information on cars should be
provided by the
federal government, and persons who value
safety highly
would be willing to pay the costs of expensive
and

effective systems.

Persons who did not value safety

systems (trusting in their own driving abilities or in
fate, or having a death wish) would forego safety

systems and the price of such systems.

This would leave

the buyer "free to choose" in an area deemed by welfare

economists not to be

a

"commons" situation.

Solving the Problems Created by Government's Assumption
of Responsibilities During the New Deal
A welfare economics/public choice approach to

regulatory policy provides remedies for the maladies of
the traditional regulatory approach.
not end here.

The treatment does

A welfare economics/public choice

approach also provides cures for the ills caused by two
related policy approaches which emerged after the
formulation of the regulatory approach: the New Deal
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provision of goods and services,
and the scientif 1C
planning approach. The scientific
planning approach was
guided, as we saw in Chapters IV
and
V,

by the

assumption of social and economic
responsibi It ies by the
federal government during the New Deal.
The provision
of goods and services by the government
during and after
the New Deal, though, did not necessitate
the particular

characteristics we have associated with scientific
planning.

sphere

—

Planning at the perimeter of the private
the hallmark of the scientific planning

approach -- was not the only method which might have
been pursued in the provision of goods and services.

A

syndicalist approach, or even, government planning which

penetrated the private sphere and decided and
coordinated the production, the prices and the wages of

private enterprises were possible,

if

unlikely, methods

for delivering on the social and economic promises of

the New Deal.

A welfare economics/public choice

approach to public policy supplies both

(a)

methods for

retaining the ambience of "the responsible New Deal

government" without having to assume the social,
economic and political burdens of that responsibility,
and (b) answers to the social, economic and political

problems encountered by
to New Deal promises.

a

scientific planning approach
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Thus, while it is not always
easy to distinguish

clearly between the problems
associated with the New
Deal assumption of social and
economic responsibilities
and the problems associated with
the scientific planning

approach to those responsibilities, the
best case for
welfare economics/public choice approach
to public
policy in the United States can be made if

a

we do

distinguish between the two sets of problems.
Two major problems, obviously related, of the
New
Deal assumption of social and economic responsibilities
are (a) the increasing demands placed on government
in a

society that fosters constantly rising economic

expectations of what constitutes "minimal decent living
standards" and (b) the fiscal bind created for

government as

it

attempts to meet rising needs.

In

neither case is the scientific planning approach

directly responsible for these problems.

Rising

expectations over what constitutes minimal guarantees of
decent living standards are not simply a case of giving
the poor (and the middle class) an inch and their

subsequent request for

expectations are

a

a mile.

Rather,

realistic response in

rising
a

political

economy which generates ever increasing needs, even, to

maintain one's economic standing.

Michael H. Best and

William E. Connolly have pointed out this predicament
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vividly in an insightful
discussion of the burdens of
inequality in the political
economy of the United
States.
The shift from the icebox to
refrigerator merely symbolizes, of the
course, the changed social and
economic context in which today's
consumers must make choices
If
cheap cuts of meat are no longer
available in the supermarket (perhaps
they are not profitable enough),
I
must buy the more expensive cuts.
If
the "consumer durables" of today,
such as television sets, washing'
machines, hot water heaters,
refrigerators, automobiles, and even
houses, wear out faster than in a
previous period, I must simply
replace them more often at the going
prices.
If public transportation is
unavailable, I must purchase a car to
drive to work and to shop.
If the
risks and costs of automobile
accidents are growing, I must
purchase more expensive automobile
insurance.
If cars are more
complicated than in the past, I must
pay to have them repaired rather than
fixing them myself.
If building
codes, plumbing regulations, and the
electrical specifications required by
law are too complicated for the
handyman of yesterday to understand,
I must hire specialists to install
and repair these household systems.
If the breakdown of extended kinship
ties threatens to leave my offspring
unprotected in the event of death or
injury, I must buy life and
disability insurance to provide for
their security.
If home heating
costs are going up, I must buy home
insulation.
If crime is increasing,
I must buy locks and police dogs and
alarm systems to protect my family.
If my children today must go to
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The ever increasing demands by
citizens on government
for more goods and services are
irrational only in the
sense that they are rational and
reasonable responses to
an irrational political economy.

Escalating demands by citizens do not have
to be
met with escalation in the provision of
goods
and

services by government.

However,

in the

United States,

the representative assemblies have been unable
to avert
a fiscal crisis and to fend off the demands of
business,

citizens or the defense establishment.

At the federal

level, Congresspersons' quests for reelection and for

personal power within the assemblies have created both:
(a)

a decentralization of power which gives each

Congressperson power within one or two issue areas and,
thus, contributes to porkbarrel legislation, and (b) a
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break between appropriation,
authorization and revenue
functions within the House
of Representatives
which
encourages expenditures
to exceed revenues and
which
makes coherent budget
planning in the House of
Representatives impossible. [
11

At all levels of the

]

federal system, representative
assemblies produce social
programs which cater to the
interests of specific
minorities and which, many times,
create services which
are neither cost-effective
nor consistent with the user
preferences of the individuals
within the service
population.

These problems

-

rising expectations by citizens

of government provision of
goods and services, and the

fiscal crisis these expectations
create

—

can be

countered with a welfare economics/public
choice
approach.
Four steps must be followed to arrive
at the
solution.
First, the provision of goods and services
must be decentralized, with local and state
governments
taking more fiscal responsibility for goods and
services.

State and local governments can assume this

burden because the second step is to make the provision
of goods and services dependent upon the market success
of delivery agencies.

Charles

Public Use of Private Interest

L.
,

Schultze,

in his The

describes how these

first two steps can be taken in the area of health care:
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First removing financial
medical care for the poor barriers to
can be
a system of'edLal
insurance, either as a
reform of the
M * dicaid P^gram or as
a part
of a broader national
health
insurance system. Second,
providing the seed money to after
help new
institutions like neighborhood
health
centers get started, the
federal
government could gradually
withdraw
the operating funds and
require the
institutions to charge fees covering
costs.
This would be no hardship for
the poor, since their medical
would be covered by federally bills
supported insurance. But the
neighborhood health centers would
then have to stand the test of
the
marketplace, since potential clients
would have the means to choose
between them and other sources of
medical care. Moreover, it would not
be necessary to limit the centers'
services to the poor, since everyone
would be paying fees coverinq the
costs. [12]

SS ^.S

nVIT

The federal government will still bear some of
the costs
of health care for the poor with the creation of
a

national health insurance, but the federal government
can remove its commitments for operating costs

which are substantial and persistent.

—

costs

The federal

government will simply provide the capital for the poor
to enter the same health care "market" as all other

citizens.

State and local governments need only supply

the services which are cost-effective (i.e., do not take

more from local budgets than they return to local
coffers)
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The third step to be
taken is the privatization
of
many services now being
provided by public agencies.
Local governments would
reduce the number of public
employees (and the number of
pensions to be paid later),
and would serve as contract
agents between the public
and privately owned and
managed businesses. Local
governments would learn which
services to seek by
polling residents individually
on their willingness to
pay for a particular service.
Ideally, each resident
would be asked to state how much
he/she would be willing
to pay for each year of service.
Each resident must be
isolated from other citizens when stating
his/her

personal use value for each service, or else,
the
problem of "free-riding" will occur. [13] All

of the

residents' preferences (willingness to pay $n
for a
service) would be summed.

If this figure

could purchase

the service, then the local government would
contract

with a private business.

The fourth step, then,

is the

provision of a method for aggregating individual

preferences
These four steps could reduce the rising costs of

governments and force citizens to see the direct
connection between the expansion of services and
increased taxation.

If,

for example, residents in a

local community expressed a desire for ambulance
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service, the role of the
local government under
a
welfare economics/public
choice approach would be
to
poll citizens to see if they
were willing to finance
the
service.
If such a willingness
was expressed, then the
local community would take
bids from private businesses
willing to provide ambulance
service.
The local
government could decide whether it
wished to pay a flat
rate to the company and avoid
charging residents for
each trip, to subsidize part of
each trip or to allow
the company to charge individual
users
the full cost of

the ride.

The first two options would, of
course,

redistribute tax money to the sick and the
unlucky and
would force non-users to share the costs

—

scenario in
If no

a

not an ideal

welfare economics/public choice framework.

private firm was willing to provide the service,

then the local government would operate the
ambulance

service as a public enterprise.

If the

enterprise did not break even or make

public

a profit,

and

citizens were no longer willing to provide operating
funds, then the service would be discontinued.

course,

Of

ideally, several ambulance services would have

appeared in the community because of the consumer needs,
and the local government would not have to act at all

—

competition between services would guarantee low prices
and adequate service.

Indeed, the success of a public
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enterprise should encourage
private firms to enter the
ambulance service market and,
thus, allow the local
government to discontinue its
service in favor of

competitive businesses in the private
sector.
The privatization of public

services, the cost-

effectiveness criterion for remaining
public services
and the decentralization of the
provision of goods and
services to local governments constituted
primarily to
serve as contract agents can reduce
federal, state and
local government expenditures.
Rising expectations
about the provision of goods and services
by government
will be thwarted as individuals are forced
to see the

direct link between services and the costs of
services.
Public agencies will be streamlined as they compete
with

private firms for clientele.

Another, less mentioned

but obvious, benefit of this policy approach is that

powerful public unions, which increase the costs of
services, can be busted.

If

public unions demand high

wages and generous benefit packages, then they can be

dropped by a local government which will now purchase
the service from a private company.

If a

powerful

private union then emerges in the new private company

providing the service, the local government can
recontract if the private union's demands cause future

price increases in service delivery.

The appeal of
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public union busting extends,
though, beyond price
advantages; public unions
have always

evoked, at best, a

mixed reaction both by the
public and by Public
Administration scholars. The

idea that unions, as

adversaries of management, should
have
public sphere where the government

a

is the

remains troublesome. [14]

place in the
manager,

The trouble would be settled

if public unions could be
disarmed.

Solving the Problems Cre a ted by the
Scientific Pl anninga
Approach
"

"

The scientific planning approach to
public policy
exacerbated the problems associated with
regulatory

policy and with the New Deal provision of
goods and
services.
In the attempt to meet the
responsibilities
assumed by government, the scientific planning
approach

overextended the reach of government, overburdened
government planners with information and placed the
government

in the

position of being responsible for

almost all social and economic maladies experienced by
citizens.

According to the welfare economics/public

choice paradigm, the problems engendered by the

scientific planning approach revolve centrally around
the failure to grasp the miracle of the market.

First,

government is overextended because scientific planners
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placed too little faith in
the proficiency of
decentralized market structures
and too much faith in
the planning abilities of
both

people and institutions.

The comprehensive planning
required by government during
the 1960s was incompatible
with individual abilities and
with the incremental nature of
bureaucratic decision
structures. [15] As administrative
intervention in the

private sector increased in the attempt
to control more
and more of the consequences of the
planning variables
and to relieve more and more of the
consequences

of past

actions, government took on too many
responsibi 1 ites

which

it

could not handle.

The proliferation of

administrative agencies, at all levels of the federal
system, was the product of a planning mentality guided

by an overemphasis on individual equity and on coercive

control of private sector actors.

Charles

L.

Schultze

has described cogently his view of why the scientific

planning approach failed.
First, a satisfactory method of
sorting out the frivolous from the
important occasions for intervention
has not been developed, and thus much
social effort is spent to achieve
such goals as having all fire
extinguishers in industrial
workplaces painted red. Second, we
have a propensity to intervene in
resource-allocation decisions in
order to achieve equity and incomedistribution goals that might better
be handled by some form of tax or
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Second, the scientific planning
approach placed an
information overload on government
planners. Too much
information is needed to make the
elaborate decisions

necessary within

a

planning framework.

The demand for

decisions based on equity exacerbates
this information
overload because it forces administrators
to decide each
case on its particular merits (e.g.,
is this person
eligible for welfare? Should we fine this
polluting
company?).

Even if administrators could handle the

information burden imposed by scientific planning,

it

is

unlikely that administrators would be able to plan
effectively.

Scientific planning at the perimeter of

the private sphere does not allow access to, or control
of,

important economic variables within the private

economy.

Private firms still control production, price

and wage decisions, and cannot be relied upon for

accurate reporting of their decisions and results. [17]
The informational burden on administrators cannot be

resolved in the framework of
approach.

a

scientific planning
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Third, the scientific
planning approach has made
evident the dangers of
placing responsibility for
economic and social conditions
on the limelighted
shoulders of government.
This is, indeed, the condition
welfare economics/public
choice advocates abhor most
strongly. The crisis in
confidence and the strain on
the political and social
fabric of the United States
caused by the scientific planning
approach is a central
concern of welfare economics/public
choice advocates.

Charles

L.

Schultze, in contrasting a scientific

planning approach (an output or
iented-process

welfare economics approach

(a

)

and a

process-oriented process),

claims
Regardless of the circumstances,
however, social intervention has
almost always been output-oriented,
giving short shrift to the processoriented alternative. And this has
proven a costly bias.
It has, with
no off-setting gain, forfeited the
strategic advantages of market-like
arrangements.
It has led to
ineffective and inefficient solutions
to important social problems.
It has
taxed, well beyond its limit, the
ability of government to make complex
output decisions. And it has
stretched thin the delicate fabric of
political consensus by unnecessarily
widening the scope of activities that
it must cover [ 18
(emphasis added)
.

J

In an even more alarmist fashion, Vincent Ostrom,

opening chapter of The Intellectual Crisis

in

in his

American
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Public Administration,
contrasts the bureaucratic
structure employed by a
scientific planning approach
with the bureaucratic
structure necessitated by a public
choice approach, and avers
that:
As we approach the Bicentenary
of
American nationhood, we are losing
confidence that the twenty-first
century will be an American
century.
Instead, we have been seized
by a
maelstrom of crises. Some have even
begun to wonder whether there
will be
a twenty-first century in
the
Christian era, and whether the United
States of America will survive as a
nation. [19]

Among the crises we face in the United
States, one of
the most serious, according to Ostrom,
is an untenable
reliance on

a

centralized federal administration

—

a

reliance induced by the claims of scientific planning.
If we are concerned about human
poverty, community assistance
programs, rural development, the
public security of the neighborhood
streets, and the quality of the
environment, should we proceed on the
assumption that these are national
problems requiring national solutions
which can only be solved by
Presidential intervention? Or should
we proceed on the assumption that
these problems are but names for a
multitude of difficulties confronting
individual human beings as they
pursue their relative advantage in
dealing with one another?[20]
(original emphasis)

Resolutions to these three problems encountered by

scientific planning

—

an overextended federal
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government;

multitude of overloaded
subnational
governments; and a legitimation
crisis
are offered by
a welfare economics/public
choice approach. The key to
these resolutions is a return
to the harmony of market
forces.
The discord caused by
governmental intervention
into the private sphere can
be alleviated if government
will reduce its responsibilities
and replace coercive
regulations with the skillful use
of market
a

-

incentives.

The privatization of public
services will allow
governments to reduce social commitments
(and social

expenditures) without abandoning completely
the promises
of social welfare which governments
have made.

Centralized scientific planning can be replaced by
the
decentralized management of market forces.
Decentralized management of market forces requires
neither cumbersome bureaucracy nor comprehensive
knowledge. [21]

packages

—

Adjustments in incentive/disincentive

e.g., to control pollution,

to reduce

industrial accidents and to provide health services

—

can be made incrementally and over long periods of time.

Such adjustments do not require, necessarily,

confirmation of agency actions by legislative bodies
inclined to fluctuations in objectives and open to

constant assault by narrow-minded interest groups.
The size of governments can also be reduced,
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according to welfare econo
m ics/ P ublic choice advocates,
by evaluating the
effectiveness of public service
agencies with the same
criteria used for evaluating
private enterprises
puses, upif
a r0
welfare
economics/public choice
advocates give short shrift
to some standards employed
in the evaluation of
public service agencies,
especially
such standards as equity,
openness and the symbolic
effects of public service
agencies.
Such standards are,
of course,

far from being rigorously
quantified and,

indeed, may never be.

The solution is to ignore or

slight these troublesome standards
and evaluate public
agencies with the same "benefit-cost
efficiency modelused in the private sector. This
evaluation approach
cannot always be used completely -- e.g.,
the

Departments of Defense and Justice

—

but efficiency

evaluations should be the goal by which all evaluations
are measured.

This evaluation approach can allow for

the "even-handed" retrenchment of government

departments
The reduction in the size of governments is closely

connected to

a

reduction in the amount of information

which must be mastered by governments.

The scientific

planning approach did increase the size of federal
government as the federal government sought mastery over

more and more information about the private sphere.

As
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we have just seen,

informational requirements
under a
welfare economics/public
choice approach are reduced
because (a) social
responsibilities are reduced, (b)
private actors assume many
new functions, (c)
comprehensive information is
not necessary in
structuring incentive/disincentive
packages and (d)
evaluations of public agencies
can ignore some
troublesome criteria no longer
deemed important.
Furthermore, information burdens
are reduced because, as
Schultze states, a welfare economics
approach takes "...
a devil take the hindmost
approach to questions of

individual equity. "[22]

Administrators need not know

the specific conditions of each
polluting firm or the

specific condition of each consumer of social
services. [23]

What is important is to know how rational

self-maximizers will respond to different incentive
packages. [24]

in addition,

even the breadth of this

knowledge can be limited by returning government
functions to the private sphere

—

to the marketplace

where information is processed mysteriously and

miraculously, and where errors can be blamed on no one
person, agency or institution.
By reducing the responsibl i t ies of governments and
the demands made upon governments, advocates of a

welfare economics/public choice approach intend to
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alleviate the crisis of
confidence in government and
to
reweave a tattered social
fabric.
Governments will
still manage pollution
control, but not in a
coercive
regulatory framework. Rather,
companies will be
controlled through the
structuring of
incentive/disincentive packages which
do not require
government intrusion into the
specific economic choices
of private enterprises.

The privatization of public

services will release governments
from accountability to
the public and return
"accountability" to the amorphous
entity of the market. The
decentralization of remaining
public services will take the
pressure off
the federal

government and allow the federal, state
and local
governments to compete for constituents.
This

competition will offer citizens more choices
while
dilating their narrow focus on the federal
government.

Solving the Pr oblems Created by the Participation
Movement
The defusing of the legitimation crisis in the

United States is possible, though, only

politicized citizens -movement

—

a

if the

product of the participation

of the United States are depolit icized. [25]

Thus, a welfare economics/public choice approach must

also offer solutions to the problems engendered by the
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participation movement.

Four basic problems emerged

during the participation
movement, all
dangers of a "hyper-politicized"

a

society:

administrative advocacy

(b)

sign of the
(a)

the demand by citizens for

participatory structures which would
help shape and
control community and regional
policy (c) the
proliferation of interest groups and

(d)

an acute

awareness by citizens of the zero-sum
nature of many of
the economic and political decisions
of governments.
We
will explore briefly each of these
problems and then
turn to the solutions offered by welfare

economics/public choice advocates.
The participation movement created situations
where

administrative discretion was replaced with
administrative advocacy.

Federal administrators in the

social service programs of the Great Society became

advocates for their clientele. [26]

Administrators were

no longer neutral enactors of policy; they became both

proponents of the poor, especially of the black poor,
and instigators for new economic and social "privileges"
for citizens in poverty.

It

is difficult to fault

federal administrators for advocacy of citizens' rights
and privileges for certain groups when the situation of

these citizens in the 1960s was so obviously dire. [27]

Nevertheless, unrestrained administrative advocacy
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undermines administrators'
accountability to elected
officials and, thus, the integrity
of administrators.
Furthermore, administrative advocacy,
even when limited,
is open to wide-ranging
abuses.
Do we want

administrative advocates for the
middle class, the upper
class, polluters, etc.? Simply,
no one has yet been
able to develop guidelines which
will enable

administrators, elected representatives
and citizens to
determine which groups should be served
by

administrative advocates and when.

Yet, one of the

goals of scientific planning and the participation

movement

—

—

a decent

standard of living for all citizens

forces administrators into social service agencies

where they, to procure individual equity, must become

representatives of their clientele.
The second problem -- the demand by citizens for

participatory structures -- is

a result of

the promises

made by the federal government during the participation
movement.

Although responsible democratic structures

for citizen participation in administrative formulation,

enactment and evaluation of regional and community

policies were not developed during the participation
movement, government assurances of such structures

created

a

continuing demand by citizens for

participation. The problem with these demands is that
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the centralized structure
of administration, at
all
three levels of the federal
system, and the requirements
of the scientific planning
approach used by

administrators is not capable,
at present, of working
with participatory structures.
[28
When participatory
structures are slapped onto the
present administrative
structures, the result is little
effective participation
by citizens and a further
information overload
]

on

administrators.

Both citizens and administrators
feel

betrayed by the attempt at participatory
structures, and
the response by citizens, who are
now more
aware of the

political system and the need to control
policies
affecting their lives, is the creation of
more interest
groups.

The third and fourth problems engendered by the

participation movement -- the proliferation of interest
groups and an enhanced awareness by citizens of the

winners and losers in the political economy of the

United States

—

increase the pressures on the modern

administrative state.

Rational planning is undermined

by the abundance of politicized citizen groups on every

side of every major issue within the political economy.
No longer can economically weak groups be deemed

politically weak.

The federal political structure, with

its large number of access points for interest group
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intervention, makes it possible
for almost any interest
group to exercise veto power
over new policy
initiatives. [29]
Increasing economic demands by
interest groups, combined with
their ability to stave
off assaults on gains already
made, place an increasing
fiscal burden on governments,
especially the federal
government. [30]
(At the federal level, the
fiscal
pressure is especially intense because
of a continued
commitment to vast expenditures on
armaments.) The
result has been a questioning of the
scientific planning
approach to public policy, a ridiculing of
participatory

structures and

a

choosing between two unacceptable

options for federal policy-makers:

muddling through or

(b)

(a)

a

continued

a return to orthodox economics

in which the promises of the New Deal are
ignored,

the

federal government reduces social expenditures and the

economy once more prospers by impoverishing large
numbers of citizens. [31]

Without the depolit icizat ion

of citizens, though, the latter approach may also find

itself in the quagmire of interest group liberalismf 32

and without a coherent policy of social regulation
(e.g., pollution control) the latter approach may find

itself exposing the irrationalities of an orthodox

economics approach which had earlier generated the

demands for coercive regulatory policy. [33]

]
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A welfare economics/public
choice approach can
provide solutions to the problems
we have just examined.
In each case, the solution
centers on the

depoliticization of actors within the
political economy
of the United States.
First, administrative advocacy
can be stilled by
removing administrators, especially
federal

administrators, from the delivery of social
services.
Equity considerations will not be important
because of
national minimal guarantees for income
(national

guaranteed income) or health care (national health
insurance) or education (a national voucher system).
[34]

A majority of social services can be supplied
by private

enterprises contracted by local governments.

In

addition, federal administrators will never again have
to play the role of organizers for the poor in the

United States as they did in the 1960s

—

a role

which

encouraged both identification with clientele and

administrative advocacy.

Administrators will not have

to be organizers of disadvantaged groups, because the

nature of citizen participation will be redefined.
The second problem, the demand for participatory

structures, can be handled by a redefinition of citizen

participation which will eliminate the need, and thus
the demand for, participatory structures which encourage
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responsible democratic
participation.

Participation in

welfare economics/public
choice approach is
participation in the polling
process used to determine
the isolated preferences
of citizens.
A good citizen
need not reflect on issues
in a democratic forum or
participate in interest group
a

liberalism.

Rather, a

good citizen must know how much
he/she is willing to
spend for each particular social
service offered by
local governments.

participate

—

Each citizen is allowed to

provide his/her economic opinion

—

on

each issue, thus alleviating the
demand for

participation and providing

a

structure of participation

that does not threaten the remaining
administrative

structures.

Information about citizens' views can be

reduced to one number (the sum of individual

preferences) and structures of participation do not need
to be slapped onto existing administrative
structures.

Third,

approach,

in a welfare economics/public choice

interest groups will still attempt to

determine policy goals, but the ability of interest
groups to redistribute tax monies to themselves, and to

veto policy changes, will be reduced.

Federal

guarantees of income, health care and education will be
redistr ibut ive, but clients of social services will be
forced to see the direct link between social
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expenditures and taxes.

User fees for social services

will discourage interest
groups from applying political
pressure for social goods and
services, because services
will rest on individual
consumer's willingness to pay
for those services.
Interest groups may still veto
some
national insurance schemes through
the political
process, but they will lose power
over the

administrative formulation and execution
of public
policies. Administrators will develop
programs which
return service delivery to the private
sector, and will
determine needs not by interest group
pressures, but by
the summation of the preferences of
isolated

individuals.

Citizens will gain leverage not by

political pressure, but by the economic choices they

make in the new "market" atmosphere of social service
provision.
The fourth problem, an increased awareness by

citizens of the winners and losers in the political

economy of the United States, can be resolved under

a

welfare economics/public choice approach by transferring
responsibility for winning and losing from governments
to the amorphous "black box" of the private market. [35]

The problem is not that there are winners and losers;
the problem is that governments, especially the federal

government, are now responsible for political and
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economic outcomes.

By defusing the
political in the
modern political economy,
it may be possible
to shift
responsibility for outcomes
to the interplay of market
forces and to retrieve the
notion that losses are the
result of bad choices by
individuals or of the bad luck
of individuals.
indeed, even the failure of
governments
to provide adequate social
services is not the result of

administrative shortcomings, but of
the inability of the
individuals in a community to register
their "true"

economic preferences.

Accountability

is

either shifted

to the market or back to the
individuals who voiced

their preferences.

in neither case can the

government

be held responsible or accountable for
the losses

experienced by citizens.
A welfare economics/public choice approach
to

public policy provides resolutions to the problems

engendered by

a

participation movement which was

designed to shore up the problems encountered with
scientific planning approach.

A welfare

economics/public choice approach can

(a)

administrative advocacy,

a

(b)

a

provide

squelch

certain type of

participation which will alleviate demands for
democratic participation,

(c)

diminish the worst moments

of interest group liberalism and (d) reduce governments'

responsibility for gains and losses in the political

^
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economy.

Thus

,

this approach can

in confidence in the
federal government.
it can solve the
fiscal

^

Furthermore,

crisis facing the federal

government without resorting
to the tactics of orthodox
economics; it can still pay
homage to the social

promises of the New Deal while
reducing social
expenditures and it can still
provide a coherent
regulatory schema without resorting
to the coercive
methods employed by the regulatory
approach.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE DEPOLITICIZATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY

Bad Diseases and Worse Cures

We have seen in the last chapter
the allure of a
welfare economics/public choice
approach to public

policy in the United States.

In this chapter,

I

argue that the cure is worse than the
diseases.

will
A

welfare economics/public choice approach
offers, at
best, superficial cures for the maladies
produced by the

previous public policy approaches we have examined.
Beyond the superficiality of a welfare economics/public
choice approach, though, lingers a philosophy of

public/private relations and a conceptualization of
human thought and action which threaten the very

possibility of good government; for a welfare
economics/public choice approach asserts the most anemic

view possible of the public good and denies the
possibility of good citizenship.

This harsh judgement

of a welfare economics/public choice approach can be

best substantiated by (a) examining the effects of this

approach on the four policy approaches employed in the

United States in this century,
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(b)

revealing the
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theoretical barrenness of
this approach and
(c)
unveiling the anti-political
social conditions which
this approach engenders
and, indeed, in which
it would
operate most efficiently,
we turn fi rst
,

then, to an

examination of the welfare
economics/public choice
solutions to the problems
posed by previous public
policy approaches undermine
the possiblity of good
public policy.

Ess ential Qualities in Regulatory
Pojj cy
A welfare economics approach
to regulatory policy

suffers from three fundamental flaws.

The first flaw is

a result of a failure by welfare
economists to

pursue

fully their own assumptions about the
nature of selfmaximizing private enterprises. Polluting
enterprises

may respond to effluent fees with reductions
in
discharges and with the creation of innovative
pollution
abatement technology.

However, an alternate response by

self-maximizing corporations is the creative
restructuring of chemical pollutants.

Corporations may

alter the chemical composition of their effluents and

create new pollutants that are not covered by existing

governmental effluent fee schedules.

As each new and

innovative discharge is produced, federal government
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experts will be forced to
evaluate and then record
new fee schedules. [
1 ]
Once the new discharge
is
"costed-in" to the production
process by effluent fees,
the response will be
the slight chemical
alteration of
discharges and the creation
of new and uncovered
effluents.
Such behavior may well be
both selfmaximizing and innovative.
it is also guaranteed
to
lead government effluent
experts on a never-ending chase
after new effluents and a
never-ending restructuring
of

effluent fee schedules.

The information burden posed by

this behavior is large, especially
when effluent fee
experts must also adjust effluent
fee schedules to
account for the synergistic effects
of new

pollutants. [2]
It

is,

of course,

true that not all polluting

enterprises will be able to take advantage of
effluent
fees through creative discharges.
In some
industries,

for example the wood milling enterprises,
the costs of

pursuing innovative pollutants may outweigh the costs of
new pollution abatement technology.

However, within

those industries which produce a variety of chemical

discharges, the incentive to decrease costs without
reducing discharges may lead to

a

continuing scramble as

effluent fee experts chase after the elusive new

discharges produced by self-maximizing corporations.
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The chances that such

a

mad scramble will occur are

heightened by an even more
fundamental flaw in the
welfare economics approach
to public policy: the
failure
to grasp the distinction
between the letter
of the law

and the spirit of the law.

Despite the problems with

the traditional statutory
approach to regulation of
private enterprises, the statutory
approach

acknowledged

the importance of the spirit
of the law.

Private

enterprises were expected to comply
with both the
restrictions and the intent of the law.
a welfare
economics approach, there is no spirit

m

of the law.

Reflection on the intent of the law is not
necessary
because the intent of the law is to be realized
through

unreflective profit maximization.

As long as the

private sector actors remain within the letter of
law,
anything goes.
Under the statutory approach, few companies abided
by the spirit of the law.

This, however,

is no reason

to give up on the importance of the spirit of the law in

civilized society.

Corporate irresponsibility was not

the result of the statutory approach, but rather was the

result of a legal fiction which provided the corporation

with the legal status of an individual without the civic
responsiblit ies and the state of accountability demanded
of individual citizens.

Indeed, the legal fiction of
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the corporation as
individual raised the status
of
corporations at the same time
that it demeaned the idea
of citizenship.
The corporation as an
individual set an
example of irresponsibility,
and left a trail of selfmaximizing behavior devoid of
the spirit of the law, for
Veal" individuals to follow, a
good society cannot be
based solely on the letter of
the law conception of
individual thought and action.
All laws, as all rules,
are open to interpretation and
abuse.
Faced with

creative self-maximizers as "citizens,government is
forced to respond continually with
ever more detailed
and rigid laws. Without an acceptance
of the spirit of
the law, government is caught in an
infinite regress of
writing laws to cover all possible
circumstances and
interpretations.

This is not only futile,

it

creates a

situation antithetical to the very foundation of
good
government: the laws should be simple, straightforward
and few so that citizens can know and understand the
law,

and,

thus, act within both the letter and the

spirit of the law.
The proliferation of administrative rules and laws
in such agencies as the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) need not be the result of
bureaucratic intrigue, of bureaucratic idiocy or, even,
of the statutory approach to regulation of the
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workplace. [3]

Rather, the proliferation
of rules may be
the result of self-maximizing
corporations which will
use any possible interpretation
of the letter of law to
reduce production costs at
the expense of worker safety.
Welfare economists confuse
cause and effect: OSHA
nitpicks not because it is a
nitpicker, but because many

corporations creatively construe
general rules on
workplace safety to the detriment
of workplace safety.
The effects of a welfare economics
approach to
government regulation of the private
sphere are to
diminish further the spirit of the
law in the United
States, and to undermine the achievement
of responsible
and reflective citizenship which has
made social
life,

without tyranny, possible.

Rather than attempting to

reconstruct the legal fiction of the corporation
as an
individual, welfare economists wish to reconstruct
the

nature of citizenship in order that "real" individuals
will assume the unreflective and irresponsible character
of private corporations.

Indeed,

incentive/disincentive

packages are not proffered by welfare economists just
for the regulation of corporations, but also for the

control of citizen activity.

Good citizens,

in a

welfare economics approach, do not need to understand
the spirit of the laws, they simply need to (re)act to

the incentive/disincentive systems in society as
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unreflective self-maximizers
The third flaw of

a

welfare economics approach
to

regulatory policy is the result
of the failure of
welfare economists to understand
and appreciate the
character of legitimate public
action during previous
public policy approaches.
Government actions depended
upon providing remedies to
social and economic problems
which (a) were directly linked
with the problems
to be

addressed and

(b)

created both rights and obligations

for citizens and for private
enterprises.

The failure

of public choices was the result
of the application of

inappropriate methods, or of the irresponsibility
of
public or private actors.
If the failure was the result
of irresponsiblity,

then citizens could, and did, hold

reflective actors accountable for their actions.

If

failure was the result of inappropriate methods,
then

either new approaches should be tried or the project

should be scrapped.

In any case,

citizens were able to

determine the connection between means and ends in
public policy and were, thus, able to examine and
critique the use of public authority.

authority did, and must, rest on

a

Government

transparency of means

and ends so that citizens can reflect on, and

distinguish between, legitimate and illegitimate
authority.

in a welfare economics
schema, authority is masked

and citizens are not
expected to distinguish
between
either rights and obligations,
or between legitimate and
illegitimate authority. The
failure of
an

incentive/disincentive approach will
be construed as
either the failure of experts
to build the correct
incentive packages or the
failure of private actors to
act solely as unreflective
profit self-maximizers.

The
correct cure is not to question
to deployment of
incentive systems, but rather to
redesign the incentive
packages. Once one has accepted
the assumptions
of

welfare economics, the only rational
response is to
amend and to extend incentive packages
in an eternal
quest to control the behavior of innovative
profit selfmaximizers, personal and corporate. Because
incentive

packages are not designed to be transparent, their
extension into more and more areas of social life makes
the critique of illegitimate authority difficult,

impossible.

if not

The "nature-like" quality of incentive

systems (by "nature-like" welfare economists mean as

unaccountable as Nature) threatens the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate authority, and,
thus, undermines a foundational element in both

republican and democratic theories of legitimate

government
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E ssential Conuiit^nts

n the New Deal
Provision of
Goods and Serviced
i

A welfare economics/public
choice approach to the
provision of goods and services
will shrink government
expenditures and reduce citizen
demand for more goods
and services by (a) privatizing
many public services and
(b) operating remaining
services on the criterion
of

private enterprises, cost-effectiveness.

Yet, since

before the turn of the century,
government agencies have
developed selection and evaluation
procedures, internal
norms, and structural constraints
which, correctly,
reject the amoral standards and the
amoral aims of

private enterprises.

Merit exams, openness in

procedures and decisions, and tenure in office in
return
for non-partisanship are all methods to
ensure that

public agents in public bureaucracies remain committed
to procedures and goals which have eluded
bureaucracies
in the private sphere. [4]

Public agencies maintain a

commitment to equity, to equal opportunity and to the

public good, as well as a recognition of the symbolic
effects of their activities.

These commitments and this

recognition are not acknowledged by private enterprises
and the result in the United States has been the

development of

a

moral public sphere and an amoral

private economic sphere

.

These commitments and this
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recognition cannot be infused
in private agencies
providing formerly public
goods by creating new
incentive packages.

The concern for equity, the

enactment of equal opportunity,
the pursuit of the
public good and the understanding
of the symbolic power
granted by public authority are
reflective achievements
of human thought and action,
and can never be the result
of simple stimulus-response
behavior induced by
incentive systems.

The public sphere has always

questioned and demoted the criterion of
costeffectiveness because cost-effectiveness
constituent element of effectiveness in

is
a

only one

sphere

maintained by reflection on morality and human values.
In the attempt to alleviate the burden of

responsibilities accepted by governments at all three
levels of the federal system, a welfare economics/public

choice approach is willing to destroy the distinction

between the values of the public sphere and the values
of the private economic sphere.

The result is the

collapse of the public sphere into the private sphere
and a loss of the very values which helped establish

public action and which grounded the distinction between
citizen and consumer.
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Essential Qualities in the Scientific
Plann ing
Approach
"

Although the scientific planning
approach did try
to claim that accountability sometimes
rested on
professional-scientific standards, the scientific
approach did accept the concepts of responsible
action
and accountable public action which had
been nurtured
during the New Deal.
Indeed, as we saw in Chapter VI,
it was the failure of the

scientific planning approach

to address responsibly the concerns of many citizens

(especially the black poor) which finally led scientific

planners to argue that their approach must be

supplemented by a participation movement.

It was this

participation movement which politicized citizens, thus
creating increasing demands for responsibility and for

accountability which engendered a legitimation crisis
which welfare economics/public choice advocates claim
they can solve.

As should be obvious, though, the

privatization of public agencies is not designed for
either greater public responsibility for the quality of
life of citizens or for greater public accountability to

citizens.

It

is also

unlikely that incentive systems

will reduce the size of the federal bureaucracies which

grew during the scientific planning approach.

We will

first examine the ability of a welfare economics/public
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choice approach to reduce
the
tne size
<H
«f
of government and
then examine the issues
issuer: of n„Ki
public responsibility and
public accountability.
•

If we are correct

in the assumptions
that profit

self-maximizers are both innovative
in their behavior
and ignorant of the spirit
of the law, then arguments
that a welfare economics/public
choice approach will
reduce the size of government
are probably
incorrect,

incentive systems will have to
be adapted constantly to
meet the challenges of innovative
behavior which
responds to all statutes and incentives
not with
reflection on the proper action to
take, but with an eye
toward the cheapest and easiest behavior
to pursue.

Administrators responsible for incentive
packages will
be involved in never-ending revisions
of their packages
and the development of new packages to
deal with the

behavior of private individuals and private
enterprises.
As long as cost-effectiveness remains the chief

criterion of private enterprises providing formerly
public goods and services, public administrators will
have to develop incentive packages to ensure that

private enterprises live up to minimal standards of

decency and competence.

It should be obvious that large

administrative organizations are necessary to control
individuals and to regulate some private enterprises,
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but why should it be
necessary to develop
administrative
organizations to create
incentive packages for private
enterprises providing formerly
public goods and
services? The answer is
that without such incentivecontrol administrative
organizations, there will be no
incentives (in the market)
for private enterprises to
supply quality public goods
and services.
An example
can illustrate this problem.

Public fire companies are
expensive enterprises.
However, because public fire
companies are staffed by

persons who are

(a)

guaranteed

a career,

(b)

guaranteed

pension and (c) infused with an
"esprit de corps"
which causes firefighters to place
public safety above
their own private safety, the quality
of service offered
by public fire companies is excellent.
Private
a

companies, because they would be under contract
to local

governments, cannot guarantee

a

stable career or a

reasonable pension to their employees, or even guarantee

moderate heroics by their employees.

Private companies

which did offer generous salaries, tenured positions,
reasonable pensions and quality service would be placed
in jeopardy every time the contract between the company

and the local government ended and new bids for a new

contract were accepted.

effectiveness from

a

We want more than cost-

fire company and, thus, either
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incentive systems would
have to be developed
(e.g.,
bonuses awarded for fewer
deaths per year and/or lower
total fire damage costs
per year) or contracts would
have to be made more
permanent. The first solution
would be difficult and the
second solution would be a
return to fire service as
usual. [5]
it certainly can be
argued that this is an extreme
case, but it applies in
varying degrees to a host of
other services including
ambulance service and public
education.
'

It can be argued,

of course, that other factors

than cost-effectiveness can be
added to the calculation
which will determine which companies
will deliver the
goods or service.
Such attempts, however, demand that
the "willingness-to-pay" criterion
be adjusted in a

political debate which undermines the elegance
of the
welfare economics/public choice approach and
which
reintroduces the very values which welfare

economics/public choice advocates have explicitly
disavowed.

The growth of administrative agencies may be

temporarily slowed by a welfare economics/public choice
approach to the provision of goods and services, but
large bureaucracies filled with scientific planners will

soon be replaced with large bureaucracies filled with

incentive design experts.

Public responsibility for the quality of life is
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weakened by the welfare
economics/public choice approach
to the provision of
goods and services. Responsibility
in republican government
demands more than simply toting
up individual preferences
for goods and services.
Public choice advocates are
not incorrect in accusing
representative assemblies of providing
goods and
services to their constituents
which would not be
provided if provision depended
upon the sum of
individuals' willingness-to-pay for
the goods and
services. However, welfare
economics/public choice
advocates are incorrect in supposing that
representative
assemblies are simply conduits for popular
opinion.

Responsible representatives are expected to
reflect the
majority opinions of their constituents, but
they are

also expected to inform, enhance and shape the
opinions
of their constituents. [6]

The goal in representative

assemblies is not the summation of all constituents'
opinions; representatives are not merely pollsters and

mathematicians.

The goal in representative assemblies

is to transcend the summation of private self-interests

and to posit policies for the public good.

Responsible

representation includes voting against the majority
opinions, on occasion, and voting for community

interests which are not always identical to the
interests of any specific constituency.

Representation
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and government responsibility
are concepts which elude
precise empirical definition
and, thus, elude most
welfare economics/public
choice advocates.

Nevertheless, they remain important
concepts which guide
political life in human communities.

Accountability in republican government
is also a
concept which eludes precise
empirical definition.
Accountability to the public for public
actions is not
simply the accounting of dollar
costs and dollar
benefits. Welfare economics/public
choice advocates
have been correct in arguing that
post-New Deal politics
have generated responsibilities for
governments beyond
the power given to governments to warrant
such

responsibilities.

Their solution, though,

—

the return

of responsibility and accountability to the market
place
-- is not a solution to, but a rejection
of, government

responsibility and accountability.

The nature-like

market cannot be held accountable, because there

is

focus for neither blame nor praise, nor is there finally

any concept of public action within the market place.

This last point is important because the welfare

economics/public choice advocates wish to reduce public
action, but not to eradicate it. [7]

accountability is necessary even in
economics/public choice approach.

Thus, some form of
a

welfare

However, as we shall
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see in the next section,
the remains of accountability
which the welfare
economics/public choice advocates
proffer are neither compelling
to citizens nor
informative for citizens.

The "hyper-politicization"
of citizens caused by
the participation movement
can be alleviated
in a

welfare economics/public choice
approach by a
redefinition of citizen participation.
Citizen
participation will be based not on (a)
participation in
interest group politics or (b)
participation
in

responsible democratic forums, but by
participation in

"willingness-to-pay for services" polls.

Isolated

individuals (without isolation, "free-riding" will
occur
and ruin the poll) will be queried on their willingness
to pay for public goods and services.

Public policy

choices will be made by aggregating individual
preferences.

The definition of good citizenship will be

the ability of isolated self -maximizers to assess their

personal interests and to reveal their preferences in
accurate dollar totals.

The mark of good policy will be

the ability to sum dollar preferences and to provide

goods and services within the constraints of the final
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summations.

^^rs^then^^^.e

^^^
^^^^

economics/puhl ic choice

i?££E2

of

the ability nf

indiv iduals to com e^ether
and to discuss issues
forum that allows them tQ r
ise above thpir OT c , na1
p

in

-

.

interests and decide o n the
public ^ nnH
Accountability for the public interests
(there is
no longer a "public good")
is shifted from public
representatives and public agents to the
market place
and onto the shoulders of individuals
who provided the

preferences which were aggregated.
public goods and services

is

An insufficiency of

necessarily the fault (if

there is fault and not just the whims of
the market
place) of individuals who revealed their
preferences

incorrectly or inaccurately.

Citizens, who are denied

the capacity to determine goals intersubject ively

,

are

the culprits of public policy failures.
In the pursuit of

minimizing the responsibilites of

government and of defusing the "hyper-politicizat ion" of
citizens, a welfare economics/public choice model is

willing to deny the political capacities of citizens and
to deny the possibility of the public good.

Furthermore, by draining the concepts of "politics" and
of "citizen" of their meaning, a welfare
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economics/public choice approach
is willing to blame
citizens for the failure of
public policies created in
political and moral vacuum.

The Tragedy of a Welfar e
Economics/Publ
Approacn to Public Policy

i

c

Choice

"

The dangerous consequences which
we have just
examined of a welfare economics/public
choice approach
the collapse of the public sphere
into the private

—

sphere, the masking of government
responsibility, and
the rejection of the value of intersubj
ect ive

(democratic) communication, and, thus, the rejection
of
the public good

—

are all the result of an attempt to

reconstruct two prime categories of political
understanding.

These categories are humans and goods.

In the history of political thought,

understood as political beings within
group, a class or a species.

humans have been
a

community, a

Goods were understood as

having specific relations to the needs and wants of

political beings within the political economy of the
society.

Public authority rested on the ability of

political beings to determine intersubj ect ively the
needs and wants of political beings within human

associat ions

.

[

8

]

In a

welfare economics/public choice

a
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approach, humans are not
understood as political beings,
but rather as individual
self-maximizers. Goods are not
understood as having specific
relations to political
beings, but as having general
izable relations to each
individual (i.e., more is better).

m

the

reconstruction of these two categories
of political
understanding, a welfare economics/public
choice
approach inverts the relationship
between humans and
goods and, thus, removes the needs
for political thought
and action by citizens and the
need for forums
of

political discourse.
We can now finally see the importance
of Garret

Hardin's fable, "The Tragedy of the Commons,"
for a
welfare economics/public choice approach. Only
by

positing

a

transcendent view of humans as individual

self-maximizers can welfare economics/public choice
advocates hope to overthrow a tradition of political
thought (and an everyday self -understanding by humans)

which is grounded in the moral quality and the political
capacity of citizens.
they are, indeed,

outside of

a

Citizens must be convinced that

incapable of resolving problems

solely self-interested economic framework.

The only political awareness demanded of citizens is
that they realize that political solutions must be

abandoned and that reflection must be replaced by self-
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interested behavior.

Hardin's fable is important in

convincing humans of their
political inabilities because
it posits that humans
never had such abilities in the
first place; crises were
managed by scarcity which was
produced by the whims of nature
or the whims of invading
barbarians. The lesson is that
there is no political
tradition of thought and action
in human affairs;
rather, there is just the
timeless self-interested
individual finally unleashed by the
marvels of the
natural sciences.

Hardin's lesson is compelling for two
reasons.
First, modern corporations live down
to this model of
the self-maximizing individual.
Second, humans are
-

self-interested beings; but, this
constitutive element of

a

is just

one

successful human.

Humans are

also moral, altruistic, reflective and political.

These

latter qualities, though, must be denied or, at least,

must be judged unimportant in the modern world by

welfare economics/public choice advocates.

The denial

or denigration of these constitutive elements is

necessary in order to

appropriateness of
approach and

(b)

a

(a)

convince the doubter of the

welfare economics/public choice

compel the citizen to retard these

qualities and bask in the light of pure self-interest.
Both convincing and compelling the individual are
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necessary, because the
success of a welfare
economics/public choice approach
depends upon
individuals' acting on pure
self-interest.
The failure
of the individual to
pursue his/her pure self-interest
clogs the gears of a welfare
economics/public choice
approach, because altruistic
citizens may not respond to
incentives or reveal their "true"
self-interest when
allowed to "participate" in the
selection of public
goods and services.
indeed, the success of a welfare
economics/public choice approach rests
upon the

realization of an array of social
conditions all
dependent on the depolit icization of
public policy and
on the depoliticization of society.

The ideal conditions for a welfare
economics/public

choice approach depend upon four fundamental
changes in

society in the United States.

Each change undermines

the political achievements upon which previous
public

policy approaches were based.

Given the inadequacies of

previous approaches, this may not seem much of

a

loss.

However, all four previous approaches were built on and

around a concept of the public good, an appreciation of
the legitimate tasks of government and a belief in (and

commitment to) reflective, responsible citizenship.

A

welfare economics/public choice approach disavows these
core concepts of responsible politics.

First, a welfare
economics/public choice approach
demands the extreme depolit
icizat ion of society.

Political truths are no
longer the product of reflective
citizens earnestly pursuing
the public good within
democratic forums. Rather,
politcal "truths" are seen
simply as the aggregation
of individual opinions which
must be voiced in isolation
from other citizens.
Justice and equity become
mathematically determinable
and no longer must rest on
reflection and dialogue and
an understanding of particulars
in the world.
Political
rights are products of economic
opinion and not the

product of reflection on the role of the
individual
within the life of the community. Freedom
becomes
simply the anemic freedom to voice one's
economic
preferences.

The need to ponder, much less engage in

reflective dialogue about, justice, ethics, rights
and

freedom is undermined.
Second, a welfare economics/public choice approach

attempts to mask questions of legitimate authority.
Politics, though, can achieve both great good and great
evil.

Thus, within a liberal state, citizens must be

able to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate

authority.

This involves more than an understanding by

citizens of the ends of political action;

it

involves an

understanding of the means of political action.
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Government has

a

responsibility to lay bare (to
make
transparent) each step in the
means to political

ends.

A welfare economics/public
choice approach obscures
authority and severs questions
of responsibility and
accountability from a political
framework in which
illegitimate authority may be
critiqued.
Third, a welfare economics/public
choice approach
portends the collapse of the public
sphere into the

private economic sphere.

The legitimacy of public

actions has, correctly, within the
United States been
premised on the character and commitment
of public
employees. As we have seen, the ethical
character of

public employees has been formally acknowledged
since
the Pendleton Act of 1883 and the commitment
to the

public good by public employees has been legally

recognized since the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887.
This character and this commitment have produced a

Public administration which holds effectiveness above
efficiency.

Effectiveness includes a dedication to

fairness, a quest for open procedures and an

understanding of the symbolic effects of public action
which transcend the mathematical accountability of
efficiency.

A welfare economics/public choice approach

attempts to replace public sector values with the

criterion of private sector efficiency.
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Fourth, a welfare economics/public
choice approach
demeans the reflective achievements
of political beings
by arguing that politics can
be seen as stimulusresponse behavior to economically
derived incentives.
The vending machine society
becomes the vending machine
"polity." Citizens become consumers
and humans become

Skinnerian pigeons, albeit efficient
pigeons.
is not replaced by action,

behavior.

Thought

but instead is replaced by

This result is not unintended.

The goal of a

welfare economics/public choice approach is
prediction
and control in the name of social stability.

The goal

of the good society is replaced with the goal
of the

predictable, yet unaccountable, society.
These four ideals are necessary to purge society of
those who might be moved by politics to ask the

difficult questions which, necessarily, politicize human
lives.

Just as eighteenth and nineteenth century

political-economists desired to convince individuals
that the decline of the commons was the inevitable

outcome of individual liberation from the moral

constraints on greed, the proponents of

a

welfare

economics/public choice approach desire to create
individuals who will fit their model of

a

placid, yet

"interested," individual.
A welfare economics/public choice model does, then,
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provide strategic answers
to certain policy problems.
However, its method of
answering and the answers
themselves provide no foundation
for a public policy
approach that could responsibly
deal with political
questions and values that must
be reconciled and rereconciled within a political
and democratic setting.
A
welfare economics/public choice
approach to public
policy marks not the beginning
of a new and enlightened
approach to difficult political
issues, but,

instead, a

march into the sea of technique,
efficiency without
responsibility, numbers without values,
policy without
politics.
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